recenzje |
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Andrzej Makaro
Andrzej Makaro
Modne bzdury. O nadużywaniu pojęć z zakresu nauk ścisłych przez postmodernistycznych intelektualistów
Modne bzdury. O nadużywaniu pojęć z zakresu nauk ścisłych przez postmodernistycznych intelektualistów
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22.
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Józef Turek
Józef Turek
Filozofia przyrody. Filozofia przyrodoznawstwa. Metakosmologia
Filozofia przyrody. Filozofia przyrodoznawstwa. Metakosmologia
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dyskusje i sprawozdania |
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Piotr Kaszkowiak
Piotr Kaszkowiak
Co Hiob mógłby powiedzieć o imionach Bożych, czyli o trudnościach teodycei
Co Hiob mógłby powiedzieć o imionach Bożych, czyli o trudnościach teodycei
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Jacek Wojtysiak
Jacek Wojtysiak
„Wszechmocny odpowie” (Hi 31, 35). W obronie teodycei przed zarzutami Piotra Kaszkowiaka
„Wszechmocny odpowie” (Hi 31, 35). W obronie teodycei przed zarzutami Piotra Kaszkowiaka
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25.
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Józef Zon
Józef Zon
Wprowadzenie
Wprowadzenie
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Michał Heller
Michał Heller
Filozofia Pryzyrody w Działaniu
Filozofia Pryzyrody w Działaniu
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Issue: 2
Józef Życiński
Józef Życiński
Komu i Po Co Jest Dziś Potrzebna Filozofia Przyrody?
Komu i Po co Jest Dziś Potrzebna Filozofia Przyrody?
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
Komu i Po Co Potrzebna Jest Dziś Filozofia Przyrody?
Komu i Po Co Potrzebna Jest Dziś Filozofia Przyrody?
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29.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Mieczysław Lubański
Mieczysław Lubański
Filozofia Przyrody u Podstaw Myśli Filozoficznej
Filozofia Przyrody u Podstaw Myśli Filozoficznej
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Władysław Krajewski
Władysław Krajewski
Filozofia Przyrody Jako Pomost Między Naukami Przyrodniczymi a Filozofią
Filozofia Przyrody Jako Pomost Między Naukami Przyrodniczymi a Filozofią
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31.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Issue: 2
Jan Such
Jan Such
Filozofia Nauk Przyrodnichzych w Dobie Wykładniczego Tempa Rozwoju Nauki
Filozofia Nauk Przyrodnichzych w Dobie Wykładniczego Tempa Rozwoju Nauki
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32.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Kazimierz Jodkowski
Kazimierz Jodkowski
Filozofia Przyrody Jako Warunek Sine Qua Non Powstania i Rozwoju Nauki
Filozofia Przyrody Jako Warunek Sine Qua Non Powstania i Rozwoju Nauki
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33.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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Mirosław Zabierowski
Mirosław Zabierowski
Kosmologia Jako Filozofia Przyrody Nieożywionej
Kosmologia Jako Filozofia Przyrody Nieożywionej
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Zdzisława Piątek
Zdzisława Piątek
Komu i Po Co Potrzebna Jest Dziś Filozofia Przyrody?
Komu i Po Co Potrzebna Jest Dziś Filozofia Przyrody?
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35.
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5th International Whitehead Conference (V Międzynarodowa Konferencja Whiteheadowska). Korea, Seul, 24-28 maja 2004 roku
5th International Whitehead Conference (V Międzynarodowa Konferencja Whiteheadowska). Korea, Seul, 24-28 maja 2004 roku
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artykuły |
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Issue: 1
Michał Bardel
Michał Bardel
Od Platona do Rosenzweiga:
O zapoznanej roli dialogu w strukturze filozofii
From Plato to Rosenzweig
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The Main purpose of the article is to compare the originally Greek, Plato’s concept of dialogue and its function in the procedure of philosophying to the one developed by the 20-century “philosophy of dialogue” (F. Rosenzweig, M. Buber, F. Ebner, E. Levinas). It seems quite astounding that philosophy of dialogue, a trend which consistently and persistently defends the privileged position of dialogue in the structure of reality and uses it as an essential factor in the understanding of the relation between God and Man, has not developed any solid methodological perspective. What is even worse, it failed to observe its presence in the very core of philosophical thinking, i.e. in Plato’s thought. We are capable of reconstructing Plato’s modus philosophandi with its essential conditions: the philosopher must not only ‘see’ the truth (the noetical function), but must also tell it to the others, choose the partners of the dialogue and defend his logos if necessary (the apophantical function).The article consists of two complementary analyses: the first one is devoted to the presentation of the dialogical factor in Plato's noetics and apophantics, and the second one focuses on Rosenzweig's criticism of the whole European philosophy. The author tries to indicate its doubtful moments by putting forward the question whether Plato's philosophy may be justly ascribed to the tradition under Rosenzweig's criticism, and if so, to what extent.
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Gabriela Besler
Gabriela Besler
Strawsonowskie koncepcje analizy filozoficznej
Strawson’s Conceptions of Philosophical Analysis
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In his philosophy P. F. Strawson employs the method of analysis, which he describes as “[...] resolution of something complex into elements and the exhibition of the ways in which the elements are related in the complex.”During fifty years of his philosophical activity Strawson has worked out two conceptions of analysis: the analysis of ordinary language and the connective analysis. In general Strawson’s contribution to philosophy may be viewed as an elaboration of his conception of analysis and its deployment for particular cases.In the article the Author presents Strawson’s criticism of the following conceptions of analysis: reductive analysis, therapeutic analysis and analysis as construction of a conceptual map. Then she gives an account of Strawson’s analysis of ordinary language and his connective analysis. In conclusion she tries to point out difficulties connected with this method of analysis.
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Jerzy Breś
Jerzy Breś
Język jako rezultat procesu fulguracji w ujęciu Konrada Lorenza
Language as Result of the Fulguration Process in Konrad Lorenz’s Approach
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The article presents the conception of biological conditionings of language in Konrad Z. Lorenz’s approach. In Lorenz’s works the category of fulguration is the main philosophical category. It means the creation of ‘something new’ as result of the process of a sequence of phenomena that are causally related. Viewing the human race from the historical perspective Lorenz differentiates two important fulgurations, called superfulgurations. One of them is the transition from the “experiencing I” to the “conscious I”. Development of man’s mental sphere made it possible to form “verbal speech”. More broadly, in Lorenz’s approach, also culture has its subjectivization in nature. Cognition is an element of an organism’s behavior, and what is more, every mechanism of learning evolved phylogenetically. However, this does not result in strict determinism – various cultures are developed independently of one another. In the process of development of culture a special role is played by symbolization. Lorenze differentiates two development of culture a special role is played by symbolization. Lorenz differentiates two types of symbols: symbols of a group (e.g. emblem) and language symbols. Language symbols were created in the regularity formed in the process of phylogeny, that is in conceptual thinking. In his philosophical explanation of the language structure Lorenz uses the data supplied by particular sciences. Moreover, language behaviors of particular people are conditioned by their personal experiences, and by the definite social and cultural milieu they live in.
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Anna Głąb
Anna Głąb
Zagadnienia filozoficzne w pracach Lewisa Carrolla
Philosophical Questions in Lewis Carroll’s Works
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The article tries to answer the following questions: Why did Lewis Carroll’s ideas, expressed in the form of fairy tales, fascinate numerous analytical philosophers? What does Carroll’s contribution to the contemporary logic and philosophy consist in?The basic thesis of the article is that Lewis Carroll – remaining in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of David Hume’s and George Berkeley’s philosophy – supplied material illustrating the problems connected with the use of language. He showed how improper use of language leads to formation of philosophical problems.The article presents Carroll’s output. He was one of the pioneers of symbolic logic that he developed in Boole’s and De Morgan’s tradition – in the field of the so-called recreation mathematics that he popularized in the form of riddles, puzzles, doublets and puns, compared by some logicians to a formal system.The article presents the essence of the theory of language developed by Carroll, in which language may be something hermetic with only one person having access to it (the case of Humpty Dumpty), but also something common, something social (Alice’s conversation with the White King). Attention is paid to the fact that Carroll differentiated between what is nonsensical and what is absurd (the criterion being its relation to logic). It is pointed that Carroll’s aim was first of all discovering the nonsense that is hidden behind the formulation of a metaphysical problem.In the article also the connections are studied between Carroll and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the relation between them being seen in the view that absurd introduced by means of humor is a kind of vaccine that is supposed to protect us from forming absurdity in philosophy.In conclusion it is stated that Carroll’s ideas that are the most significant for analytic philosophers are concerned with the nature of language that is not a transparent medium for him, but something that offers resistance when we communicate with others, as well as something that may be flexible and adjusted to our will. By manipulating language Carroll shows in what way philosophy balances between sense and nonsense and how often philosophical questions arise from erroneous use of language and erroneous posing of problems.
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Jerzy Kaczmarek
Jerzy Kaczmarek
Podmiotowe struktury poznawcze w epistemologii gonsethowskiej
Les structures cognitives du sujet dans l’épistémologie gonséthienne
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L’article se compose de trois parties: 1) L’explication des notions fondamentaux, 2) Les inaliénables du sujet épistémique, 3) L’ouverture des structures cognitives.Cet article présente la conception du sujet épistémique chez F. Gonseth. Je considère les déterminants subjectifs de la connaissance: les essences, les intuitions et les inaliénables. Pour Gonseth les essences sont des éléments de la conscience. La conscience est équipée d’un registre d’essences de divers types: essences sensorielles, rationnelles, émotionnelles, etc. Essences sont pour lui des donnés innés de notre équipement mental. On peut dire des essences gonséthiennes que ce sont des inaliénables. L’esprit humain est capable de les dépasser, d’acquérir des intuitions étrangères à notre état naturel primitif.Gonseth oppose sa phénoménologie ouverte à la phénoménologie husserlienne. (La phénoménologie d’après Gonseth, c’est l’étude de ce qu’il a appelé les « essences ».)
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