A particular kind of communication with God is the linguistic form of prayer. The theoretical analysis of each act of communication calls for a reference to the applied theory of communication. In reference to prayer it is appropriate, inasmuch as we accept the standpoint according to which the relations between God and man should be described in line with the achievements of science (A. Peacocke). Thus Peacocke describes the communication between God and man. His description is based on the assumption about God’s self-limitation to adjust to His recipient. This assumption results from the acceptance of the relay theory of communication. According to this theory, the contents of the recipients’ message (in this case God) must be reproduced by the recipient (in this case man). This theory is inappropriate to describe the acts of communication between God and man. The theory of relevancy is more appropriate for the description of this kind of relation of communication. According to this theory, it is the recipient that decides about the contents of the message. The theory does not require that self-limitation should be assumed when describing prayer as an act of communication with God. According to this theory, God, being the addressee of the acts of prayer fully understands the contents and intentions of the message. Man (the sender) may only hope that he has appropriately performed an act of communication.

In this paper one of the popular conceptions of rigidity of general names is presented and discussed. According to this view general terms’ rigidity consists in the fact that they have the same abstract designatum (namely a kind or a property) in all possible words. It is argued that the view which says that all general names are in fact abstract names is no good, because (i) in postulating the existence of abstract designatum, it ‘multiplies entities beyond necessity’, (ii) it either trivialises the notion of rigidity or else entangles us in an unresolvable discussion as to the nature of universals, (iii) is ad hoc, and (iv) rigidity defined in this conception cannot play any of the roles that Kripke wanted the notion of rigidity for general terms to play.

There are various authors who discussed the nature and manner of the existence of aesthetic values and the characterisation of aesthetic experience, among others, Thomas Acquinas, Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski, and Mieczysław Wallis. Taking into consideration their positions, the author claims that, potentially, each object as a coincidence of respective qualities is suitable for an aesthetic attitude. It may appear aesthetically somewhat, such that it alone may move (with its contents), i.e. it may draw attention, stir, delight, arouse fancy, affect strongly. All this may be done „disinterestedly”, therefore without any reference to the practical sphere (to the sphere of usefulness, profit), nor should this object be a source of pleasure („cause good composition”).

The paper gives an account of the origins of the term „analytic philosophy”. The term appeared in the paper Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe by Ernest Nagel, published in 1936, and was subsequently employed by G. Bergmann, H. H. Price, and especially A. Pap. It has both descriptive and normative uses. In its descriptive use it refers to a certain movement in contemporary philosophy. In its normative use it stands for a proper way of doing philosophy, that is the way which provides us with carefully justified conclusions in clear language. Unfortunately, these two different uses are often conflated.

The paper is an attempt to reflect on the valuing dimension of the category of the rationality of science, ontological and epistemological problems. Such problems should be solved should rationality be deemed a valuing category. Taking into consideration the discussions on the valuing character of the categories in ethics (good, evil) and the significance of moral judgements as the point of departure, I am posing a question about the importance of expressions with regard to the rationality of science, expressions treated as valuing expressions. Since the beginning of the reflections on science until now it has contained valuing and normative elements. This was irrespective of whether it took the form of logic, epistemology, methodology or philosophy of science. Moreover, the above disciplines were treated as, of their nature, formulating the ideal of knowledge and providing rules of a valuing cognition. In the twentieth century the central concept on which the discussions focused was the category of rationality. The question was how to define a valuable scientific knowledge and how to pursue science. We find some problems when we want to interpret the category of rationality as a valuing category. These problems seem to be good examples of questions that should be answered, while interpreting other epistemic categories as valuing. Including the category of the rationality of science in the valuing categories is tantamount to the conferral of a valuing sense on the statements about the rationality of science, the predicator „rational” and its antonyms.The standpoints in question, the interpretations of valuing statements are as follows: antinaturalism, naturalism, cognitivism, and acognitivism. They answer such questions as: 1) what kind of feature is rationality? 2) what are its relationships with other features, in particular with the features examined by the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences? 3) does the feature of being rational or the relationship of being a good reason on behalf of something really exist? 4) what kind of predicator of the predicator „rational” and its antonyms? 5) what are their relations to other predicators, in particular those predicators which the natural, or broadly, empirical sciences make use of? 6) what kind of propositions are the statements about the rationality of science? 7) what do the statements about the rationality of science denote, or do they denote anything really existing? 8) what are the relationships of the statements of the rationality of science to other statements, in particular the statements formulated by natural sciences, e.g. cognitive psychology? The review of various manners by which to use the category of rationality in the philosophy of science speaks on behalf of the rejection of extreme interpretations: both extremely cognitivist and acognitivist. In the statements about rationality there are now two components: descriptive (object-related) and valuing. The valuing component may be understood in at least three inseparable and often coexisting manners: approving/disapproving, perfectionist and normative.

It can be argued that the notion of the axiological polytheism' is a key concept which characterizes liberal society (democracy) in late modernity. We can observe its significant presence in I. Berlin's concept of two liberties, and in J. Rawls's concept of the social contract under the veil of ignorance, to recall some crucial examples where state neutrality is developed and defended. I have earlier proposed that in spite of the acceptance of the value polytheism' premise, it can be still claimed that on the ground of the autopoiesis' mechanism a political community as a body can legitimately prefer a comprehensive model of citizenship in order to keep the system on track. This is supported by the social distribution of knowledge' argument.In my paper I try to develop this argument and to examine some obstacles it can face when possible implementation in the fabric of social and political institutions is concerned. In particular I consider some problems which are posed by the uncontrolled professional activity of some types of experts which in consequence (may) influence decisions of those who are equipped with discretionary power (like civil servants and the state apparatus); and by that token they actually may lead to shift of the whole system with regard to the above mentioned premise which seems to be constitutive of the liberal democracy. In other words, do experts qua experts possess the privileged position among other fellow-citizens as far an access to the government procedures are concerned and do they change the power system by their backstage influence and through turning the democratic system into grotesque show and manipulative facade.

The text analyses various examples of moral arguments for the existence of God. Taking advantage of the ideas from the writings of Kant and his interpreters, we sought to reconstruct them logically, conferring on them a form as reliable as possible. All the arguments have been divided into three groups: practical version, theoretical version, mixed version (thought to be optimal).1) Practical version. It starts from our desires, beliefs, obligations etc. and combines them with desires, beliefs, and obligations with regard to God. There are different varieties of this version. We have discussed in more detail its deontic variety based on the assumption: „we should carry out the ultimate good” (the state of happiness conditioned by virtue). Owing additional assumptions (conceptual and psychological) and corresponding simple logical operations we arrive at the conclusion: „we should believe that God exists.” Reliability, however, of such a week conclusion is undermined by the ambiguous character of the statement „we should carry out the ultimate good.” Rather, we should say that we are obliged to carry out moral law, and thereby expect a just reward. Faith in God is conducive to such efforts, inasmuch as they refer to the morality comprehended in a maximalist manner, justice, and happiness.2) Theoretical version. We have pinpointed its two varieties: „the requirement of the lawgiver” and „the requirement of justice.” In the first variety on the basis of the existence of morality we deduce the existence of God as its „author,” for no other creature has a corresponding power, moral and metaphysical, to establish (execute) universal and unconditional moral obligations. In the second variety God appears to safeguard the carrying out a just reward (punishment, inherent in morality itself) for the satisfaction (violation) of these obligations. The debate about the value of the first argument is reduced to the debate about whether morality is indeed characterised by such features whose existence cannot be explained without reference to God. The main debate connected with the second argument is whether the fact of morality entails the ontic (not only deontic) necessity of a just judgement (and its related reward or punishment) of those who are submitted to morality.3) Mixed version. According to some varieties of the practical version, it takes on a human desire to reach the ultimate good at the point of departure. This desire, natural and right, regards the existence of this good as an indicator. Hence it is possible to transfer from the practical sphere to the theoretical one. If it is well-known that the ultimate good exists, we can ask about its cause. Reasoning – similar to the one given in the previous point – leads to a belief that God is this cause. One may doubt, however, whether our natural and right desires are always reliable indicators that their objects exist.4) The above analyses have unveiled the assumptions and difficulties of all the versions of the family of arguments under consideration. Does this mean that the arguments are not efficient? Not in the least. This means only that they are efficient under certain conditions. These conditions, like anything in philosophy, make up the object of everlasting debates.

This paper examines some problems concerning modalities as operators acting on sentential arguments. At first, formal dependencies between modalities are described. Then, the problem of translations of modalities as operators into modalities as predicates is discussed. The author shows that although some predicates satisfy laws of the logical square for modalities, they cannot be represented by sentences with modal operators in front. The explanation of this fact is proposed by using Czez˙owski’s idea of modi entis and the content of presentations.

Richard Schaeffler schlägt in seiner Theorie der ästhetischen Erfahrung die Synthese von transzendentaler und historischer Reflexion vor. Die ästhetische Erfahrung ist ein apriorisch und geschichtlich bedingter Dialog mit der Wirklichkeit. Die transzendentale Philosophie behauptet, dass die apriorischen Strukturen der Vernunft die Konstitution des Gegenstands von Erfahrung ermöglichen. Die historische Philosophie behauptet dagegen, dass diese Strukturen geschichtlich und kontingent sind. Nach Schaeffler verändern sich diese Strukturen unter den Einfluss der Inhalte von ästhetischen Erfahrungen, u.z. paradoxen Inhalte. Unter Einfluss dieser Paradoxe kommt es zur Modifizierung der Strukturen des ästhetischen Bewusstseins. Die Veränderungen der Strukturen des Bewusstseins bewirken, dass sich die ästhetische Erfahrung (und jede menschliche Erfahrung) asymptotisch der Wirklichkeit nähert.

Religion and technique constitute two components of each culture. They occupy various positions in it and play various roles. The development of particular sciences, especially the natural sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had brought about revolutionary changes in the domain of technique, including techniques of communication and intervention in the human organism. As a result of the strict relationship between science and technique and the achievements of science, the scientific-technical mentality was developed. Some cultural processes related to it (epistemological monism, pragmatism, consumerism) lead to the re-evaluation of the very foundations of culture: in the sphere of knowledge (truth), good (morality), and art (beauty). The narrowing of the concept of science, the domination of technique (technocracy) will contribute to inappropriate relations between religion and culture. Thereby they are threats to the humankind of man and the appropriate function of culture.

The paper sought to point at the epistemological aspect of understanding. It departs from the semiotic analysis of understanding, submitted with regard to words, statements, and texts. Some problems connected with the semiotic analysis are pinpointed here. They cannot be solved on the semiotic level. The considerations are crowned with some remarks on understanding as a property of the cognitive equipment of the knowing system. This property is examined not only in philosophical epistemology but in the epistemology developed in the contemporary context of cognitive sciences.