Il y a non seulement de nombreux systèmes philosophiques, mais aussi remploi du terme „philosophie” prête à croire qu’il y a plusieurs philosophies. Ne dit-on pas „philosophie de l’histoire”, „philosophie des mathématiques”, „philosophie de la logique”, „philosophie de la littérature”, „philosophie de la culture „philosophie de la pédagogie” etc.: Les questions se posent. „Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?” et „La philosophie, est-elle une ou y a -t-il plusieurs philosophies?”.La philosophie est définie comme science de l’être en tant qu’existant, visant la connaissance de ses causes ultimes, causes tant de son essence que de son existence, utilisant à cet effet une méthode adaptée qui recourt aux concepts transcendentalement analogiques, aux jugements premiers, existentiels ou non (entre autres aux premiers principes de la connaissance) et enfin aux règles de raisonnement basées sur les principes premiers de la connaissance comme celui de la raison suffisante et ses dérivés (principe de causalité).Ensuite, l’unité de la philosophie est affirmée à l’encontre des adhérents de la pluralité des philosophies, adhérents qui se recrutent aussi bien d’entre les positivistes que d’entre les thomistes. Les positivistes nient au fond la philosophie au sens traditionnelle du mot et qui soit autre chose que la synthèse des sciences dites particulières — et donnent le nom de philosophie aux sciences qui devraient être appelées proprement, methodologies, méta-sciences ou théories de te!Je et telle science (p. ex. métamathé- matiques, méthodologie de l’histoire etc.). Certains thomistes prenant à tort le sujet de cours pour une science autonome démembrent la philosophie et même la métaphysique en parties érigées injustement en sciences indépendantes. Les extrêmes se touchent: ceux qui abhorrent la philosophie et ceux qui T admirent exagérément l’annihilent les uns comme les autres.En marge de ces remarques une discussion est entamée avec ceux qui comme van Steenberghen invertissent l'ordre des problèmes et des thèses philosophiques et essaient de démontrer et d’analyser p. ex. les thèses sur les transcendentaux avant d’avoir prouver l'existence de Dieu en qui ceux-là se réalisent de la façon la plus éminente.

Analysis of those texts in St Thomas which relate to beauty produces two basic groups:1, statements relating to metaphysical beauty,2. statements relating to aesthetic beauty.The so-called objective definition covers both types of beauty. In the case of metaphysical beauty its elements (perfectio, harmonia, claritas) relate to the consituent factors of being, metaphysically considered (e.g. form, essence, existence). In the case of aesthetic beauty, however, they relate to other factors, among which St Thomas mentions colour, shape, etc. Since these factors may be either material or spiritual, aesthetic beauty is either corporeal or spiritual.Corresponding to the divisions of beauty are the concepts of goodness — transcendental goodness and metaphysical beauty, moral goodness and aesthetic beauty. This correspondence does not, however, imply that the concepts of beauty and goodness are identical with each other.On the question of the so-called subjective definition of beauty (pulchrum est quod visum placet), this is, basically, verified only in the sphere of aesthetic beauty: for only that provides the requisite experience of aesthetic pleasure implied in the word placet. Metaphysical beauty does not exclude this kind of beauty, but nor does it necessarily assume it; in view of the poverty of its constituent elements, we must most often be content with the intellectual recognition of this kind of beauty, without demanding that it provide us with a corresponding experience of a purely emotional kind.

The author sets out the development of Joseph Geyser’s ideas on the principle of causality, distinguishing two periods, that before 1915 when Geyser’s position was rationalist a priori, and the subsequent years, to 1922, during which he oscillated between empirical-reductive and empirical-deductive views. In the third section the author analyses the views of Geyser previously set out, indicating with St Thomas the ancient and ontological bases of" the law of causality.

The article is in three part: outline and setting of the problem; historical review of opinions from Aristotle to the present day; sketch of a suggested solution.1. The very raising of the problem can only have meaning if the philosopher accepts prior and more fundamental theses determining the correct formulation of the*problem of the individuation of material beings. These prior theses are: the theory of act and potency, properly grounded and formulated; the theory of the natural priority of act to potency and the theory of the limitation of act by potency. The rejection or even the distortion of any of the theses enumerated makes a rational presentation of the problem of the individuation of material beings impossible. There are frequent instances of this in history as well as in recent years.2. Basic texts relevant to the problem are quoted and analysed, including passages from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Capreolus, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, Alamanus, John of St Thomas, Roland-Gosselin, Manser and Degl'Innocenti.3. The solution advanced is in the following stages: a) determination of the concept of the Individuum in all the varied manifestations and gradations of being, and of the various component elements of the various hierarchies of individuum; b) demonstration that in the composition of the individual material being, matter enters as a co — constituent element of individual being; c) proposal of the theory of the limitation of act by potency as offering the basis for the. solution of the problem. The opportunity is also taken to correct a number of inaccurate or erroneous ideas concerning the problem of limitation, d) The actual solution of the problem of individuation rests on an analysis of the appearance of material beings. This analysis leads to the conclusion that in so far as matter is quantitate signata potentialiter it is the cause of the formation of the given individual. On the other hand, matter which is quantitate signata actualiter is the cause of the formation of the real individual,and is also joint co-principal of its continued existence.

The purpose of this article is to settle a discussion which has arisen among contemporary Thomists on the use of analogy in arguments for the existence of God. An investigation of the concepts of being implied in the most representative of the opposed points of view is intended to serve as a basis for this solution, For as is known from the general theory of analogy, the way in which being is understood determines the interpretation of the structure of analogy and so also of its cognitive application.1. The traditional attitude towards the question of the relation of analogy to the proofs od God’s existence was set out by M.T.L. Penido in his book Le rôle de Vanalogie en théologie dogmatique (Paris 1931). According to him analogy is of use in discussion cf the nature of God but plays no part in demonstrating the existence'of God.Pemido’s theses have the entire support of E. L. Maiscall and H. Lyttkens, and in part of J. E. Anderson. A different position is adopted by R. Garrigou-Lagrange, G. M. Manser, J. Maritain, E. Gilson and A. Krąpiec, although there are considerable differences in their views also. A. Krąpiec represents ’ the position most opposed to Penido’s formulation of the problem; he shows that the chief use of the so-called transcendental analogy of being is precisely in establishing the existence of God.2. At the root of Penido’s views on the structure and cognitive use of the analogies of proper proportionality and of attribution there is shown to lie a concept of being in which essence is regarded in too great detachment from existence, resulting in an essentialist approach to the subject of metaphysics. This conceptian, and also the interpretation of analogy dependent on it, Peni- do took directly from Cajetan and his modern followers (chiefly from Ramirez).3. In the theory of the transcendental analogy of being worked out by A. Krąpiec (in his Existentialist Bases of the Transcendental Analogy of Being, Krakow 1951), being is likewise understood as composed of essence and existence. But recognition of the real difference between these two co-principles of being is accompanied by reassertion of their actual inseparability, and a simultaneous emphasis on the transcendental value of existence. In metaphysical analogy resting on this concept of being, secondary analogues — beings existing by participation — reveal a necessary relation to the chief analogue, Pure Being.4. The concept of being implicit in the theory of transcendental analogy is argued in the light of the realistic metaphysics of St. Thomas. So too the thesis of the role of the transcendental analogy of being in demonstrating the existence of God is shown to be sound.The article also discusses the relationship of St Thomas’s five ways to the argument resting on the analogical structure of real being. In the last fragment, consideration is given to the question of the role of analogical concepts in arguments for the existence of God and to the question of the type of analogy arising between contingent beings and their First Cause.