According to Jeanne Parain-Vial and others, humans are characterized by their need for analogy, together with the need for logic and intelligibility, and this need is expressed by a continuous research of models in the scientific field that can, in some aspects, bring to light some properties of reality, namely be analogous ofthem. The knowability of things is founded on analogy; thus, they are not exhausted by a single model of knowledge but rather through multiple and autonomous forms of comprehension.As also pointed out by Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij, mythical thought was the first to postulate the possibility of establishing a relationship of likenessamong very different realities, as in the archetypical cosmological model of world: a possibility that, as they explain, has survived in post-archaic man, constituting a fundamental component of cognitive activity and scientific modelling. The article is dedicated to the use of analogy in Lotmanian semiotic theorizationand to its heuristic and epistemological value.

This paper seeks to shed light on an unwritten chapter in the history of Tartu semiotics, that is, to draw a parallel between Juri Lotman and Emile Benvenisteon the status of natural language among other systems of signs. The tenet that language works as a ‘primary modelling system’ represents one of the trademarksof the Tartu-Moscow school. For Lotman, the primacy assigned to natural language in respect to other systems of signs lied in the fact that the former functions as a ‘model’ for the latter thus regarded as ‘secondary modelling systems’. Yet how does language carry out its function of being a model for other sign systems? Is language the only primary modelling system? This paper seeks to foster the abovementioned claim of the primacy of natural language and argues that this issue deserves a closer inspection. In order to follow this route, it suggests a parallel between Lotman and Benveniste arguing that there exist several points in common that lead to a convergence of positions between these two remarkable scholars. The paper explores such a possibility, arguing that Lotman’s and Benveniste’s positions open up an interesting debate with specific reference to the relations laid down between language and other system of signs.

For all his profound interest in Secondness and its manifestation in various kinds of indices, including deictics, Peirce rarely addresses the inter-pronominalrelationships. Whilst the American founder of semiotics would designate language as a whole to Thirdness, only within the larger framework of which deictics can work, the German philosopher Cassirer observes that “what characterizes the very first spatial terms that we find in language is their embracing of a defi nite ‘deictic’ function”. For Cassirer the significance of pronominals, especially the I-Thou relationship, lies in its impact on the development of spatial concept that lays the foundation of symbolic forms. It may look strange why the “designatives” of I, Thou, He, in Peirce’s own terms, so obvious in their categorial and empirical differentiation, should fail to be reduceable to the triad of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is interesting, however, that in his 1906 correspondence with Lady Welby, Peirce should refer to the strange “Communicational Interpretant”, or “the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place”. Peirce asserts that this communication of a Form, say, being in love, is made possible by sign. This paper discusses Peirce’s and Cassirer’s references to deictics or indexical sign, in particular, inter-personal relationships, in light of Benveniste’s concept of discourse, and probes into a possible subtext underlying the Peirce-Welby correspondence.

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, imaginative, ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index.

The paper provides an empirical study of semiotic mechanisms of culture. We apply the methodology developed by the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, building also on the criteria of boundary-work dynamics to examine a collected corpus of adverts appearing in Silesian Catholic periodicals (in Germanand in Polish) from the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. We discuss the cultural implications of the differences and similarities in German and Polish ads and propose functional explanations of the results in terms of the notion of boundary configurations in a region as a particular structuring of cultural codes. The two analytical axes are the social boundary implicated in the use of German vs. Polish on the parameter of ‘sacred’ (sacrum) reference, and the symbolic border in the use of Fraktur (German script) versus Antiqua (Latin script) (boundary objects).

Uexkull’s famous umwelt theory, which is simultaneously a theory of meaning, remains almost unknown in American environmental thought. Thepurpose of this article is to create a dialogue between the umwelt theory – a source of inspiration for biosemiotics – and one of the major figures of the environmental thought, namely Aldo Leopold. The interest of this dialogue lies in the fact that the environmental thought has much to gain by relying on Uexkull’s theory of meaning and, conversely, that Leopold’s land ethic is likely to extend Uexkull’s thought in terms of ethics.