commentaries |
41.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Issue: 2
Klaus Ladstaetter
Response to “Hope and Knowledge” by Trevor Adams
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42.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Scott Aikin
Pragmatic Infallibilism, Skeptical Perseverance, and Bar Room Knowledge:
Comments on Brian Kim
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43.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Stefan Sencerz
On Self-Effacement and “Schizophrenia” of Virtue Ethics:
Comments On Timothy Bloser, “Self-Effacement and Virtue Ethics”
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44.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Tailer Ransom
From Rhetorical to Dialectical:
Commentary on Duindam’s “On the Singularity of the Categorical Imperative”
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45.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Justin Simpson
The Potential and Limitations of Aristotelian Final Causes in the Life Sciences
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46.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Alastair Norcross
Comments on “The Impossibility of Hypocritical Advice”
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47.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Robyn Gaier
Commentary on “Moral Guilt without Blameworthiness” by Jaeha Woo
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48.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Justin Bell
Alain Locke, Imaginative Reconstruction, and the Condemnation of Stereotypes:
A Commentary on Joshua Anderson’s “Collective Identity and Cultural Pluralism: Alain Locke on Stereotypes in Literature”
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49.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Rachael Yonek
Commentary: Michael Jostedt’s “Finding a Place in Space”
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50.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Cheryl Abbate
Comments on “Epistemic Involuntarism and Undesirable Beliefs” by Deborah Heikes
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51.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Songyao Ren
Commentary on Green’s “Recalcitrant Beliefs and Epistemic Akrasia”
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52.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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John R. Harris
Utilitarianism, Derivative Obligations, and the Problem of Political Obligation
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53.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Sarah Woolwine
Comments on Josué Piñeiro “Rilkean Memory and Testimonial Injustice”
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open submission articles |
54.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Miles Hentrup
Skepticism and Negativity in Hegel’s Philosophy
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55.
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Tori Helen Cotton
The Problem With Who I Know:
What Contextualism Can Tell Us About Interpersonal Knowledge Claims
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56.
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Domenica Romagni
Descartes On Referring the Passions
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As suggested by the title, Descartes’ Passions of the Soul deals primarily with states of the soul that he calls ‘passions.’ This designation includes all mental states that are actively caused by the body and passively received by the soul. However, as Descartes points out to the reader, there is a more specialized or proper usage of ‘passion’ that picks out a subclass of these and which aligns more-or-less with what we might now call ‘emotions.’ In this paper, I will address how Descartes classifies these ‘proper passions,’ paying special attention to how he distinguishes them from the other species of the passions in general. One of my primary aims will be to highlight an under-appreciated feature of the proper passions; namely, that they are distinct from other perceptions in their systematic divergence in terms of their distal or ‘first’ cause, their intentional object, and how they are ‘referred.’ After arguing for this distinctive feature of the proper passions, I show how it enables Descartes to provide a nuanced and multi-faceted account of our emotional experiences that incorporates external sensory perceptions, internal or bodily perceptions, and various cognitive assessments.
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57.
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Josef Novák
Review of The Selected Writings of Jan Patočka: Care for the Soul
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58.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Ken Rogerson
Memorial Notice:
Past President Don Marquis, 1935-2022
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articles |
59.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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Paul Carron
The Moral Threat of Profound Loneliness (Presidential Address)
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60.
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Southwest Philosophy Review:
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David Skowronski
Cryptobiosis and Composition (Presidential Prize Award Winner)
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