There is some limited contemporary scholarship on the theory of metaphor Kant appears to provide in his Critique of Judgment. The dominant interpretations that have emerged of Kant’s somewhat nascent account of metaphors are what I refer to as the symbolist view, which states that Kantian symbols should be viewed as Kantian metaphors, and the aesthetic idea view, which holds that Kant defi ned metaphors as aesthetic ideas (which is a technical notion in his aesthetic theory). In this essay, I claim that the symbolist view of Kantian metaphors is not plausible and that we should accept the aesthetic idea view in its stead. The jumping off points for my discussion are two fairly recent essays on the subject: A. T. Nuyen’s (1989) “The Kantian Theory of Metaphor” and Kirk Pillow’s(2001) “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant.” Nuyen defends the symbolist view of Kantian metaphor and Pillow defends a split view, i.e., Pillow thinks Kant has a dual-aspect view of metaphor that can bear both the symbolist and the aesthetic idea interpretations. Although I make use of some of Pillow’s objections against the symbolist view, I conclude that both he and Nuyen are wrong in thinking that Kantian symbols have any relationship to Kantian metaphors at all. Lastly, I will provide my own positive account of Kant’s theory of metaphors as well as show how this debate affects Kant’s overallaesthetic theory.

I argue that understanding the mechanics of humour, belief, and cultural stereotypes is a necessary precursor to a proper understanding of the ethics of humour. Traditional approaches suppose that laughing at a racist or sexist joke can be explained away by suggesting that the laugher is hypothetically entertaining the beliefs of the joke, or imagining believing that way for the purpose of the joke, or something of this nature. But as we find out, humour functions on our beliefs, beliefs have certain characteristics, and our stereotypes are a kind of belief. It is simply not possible, when this is all put together, to have hypothetical or imagined beliefs leading to laughter. Laughter then must be a reflection of a belief that is held in some more concrete fashion. Our ethical focus should not be on the existence of the bad belief but on the content and extent of said belief.

I make a case for a non-Aristotelian reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two activities called “self-legislation”: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is the activity of determining the organizing principle of our own practical life. Every action of ours takes part in this project, which is thus part of the principle of every action. In contrast, not all actions are acts of Kantian self-legislation. To legislate for ourselves in this sense is to be involved in an internal legal drama in which we demand of ourselves, by an internal force, to respect moral duties. Moral normativity, I argue, is thus separatedfrom practical normativity in general. Kant’s notion of self-legislation is part of an attempt to substantiate an absolute conception of morality: to substantiate the idea that our value is higher than that of other things, and yet incomparable. I argue that the notion of self-legislation cannot be part of such an account if understood the Aristotelian way.

In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument (RA), and argue that it fails. I argue in particular that RA (or RA-style arguments) are either self-defeating or confl ict with reasonably established accounts of early perceptual processing. Third, I tackle a residual phenomenological puzzle and offer a solution to it. Fourth, I argue that the existence of NCC enjoys empirical support. I argue in particular that states associated with early stages of visual perceptual processing have NCC.

David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e. a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an alternative story that a HOT theorist can invoke to account for cases of conscious misrepresentation. Such a story will require denying the existence of hallucinatory conscious states while still accounting for conscious misrepresentation. This is a cost I believe the HOT theorist should be willing to pay.