The aim of this paper is to ofter a general view of the development of the issue about judicial reasoning and argumentation in Europe. I start with a mention to the methodological problem in law, and after that I expose the main models about the so called “legal argumentation theories”. Thirdly, I bring out some general thesis about judicial reasoning, and finally I propose some critical reflections about those theories.

Legal discourse is, admittedly, a rational message. As such, it presupposes some kind of logical structure. Nevertheless, legal theorist are not agreement as concerns the adequate logic law requires. A proposal to develop a specific logic, called “idiomatic legal logic”, is discussed as regards its consequences for an understanding of the rationality of law. Further, linguistic models adopted for the explanation of legal concepts are also considered, inasmuch as they imply that law is somehow isomorphic with Iinguistic structures.

This paper is intended to be a homage to the philosopher Ludovieo GEYMONAT, deceased in Milano (ltaly) the 29-XI-1991. It presents his contribution to the introduction of the neopositivism in Italy, in the thirties; the posterior planning of an epistemology strongly influenced by the History of Science; and the continous dialogue with the neopositivism, behind that GEYMONAT has embraced the dialectic materialism, as a philosophic general frame.

Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the predicate “truth” in some of the most relevant contexts of science and daily life.

Four types of truth can be distinguished in scientific knowledge: local truths, truths by definition, mathematical truths and empirical truths. These types are strongly interrelated: empirical theories use the four types; mathematical theories are concerned only with the first three clases, whereas logical theories contain just logical truths and definitions. Those relationships allow to classify the types of truth from two viewpoints concerning, respectively, their degree of abstraction and their relative power. The multiplicity of truth modes means that the idea of truth as unique and complete description of the world can be considered inadequate.