This paper has a very limited scope: it just presents some eIements which may introduce us into a wider investigation on vague predicates. Thus, webegin by pointing out our general conception of Iogic (as a descriptive science of linguistic phenomena). After that, we build up our approach by considering characteristic functions and by trying to make useful the model of logical extension which applies to classical quantifiers.

All the acts of behaviour are judgements of reality (held by subject on the object). The first stage in th:is judgesment is denotative (judgement of facts). The second is connotative (judgement of value). Denotative judgement contains 6 components: diacriticity, organization, identification, naming, specialization, timing. All of them have to be provided with values of truth. Value of truth of denotative judgements derives from their value of truth in context. Context is a consensus space. Thus, subject denotes object starting from theory of context he holds. As far as psycho(patho)logy is corcerned, starting from a theory of perception -instead of a theory of denotation- has been a decisive setback.

Patrick Tort, An lntroduction to Darwininian Anthopology. An lnterview with Georges Guille-Escuret. - Recalling how his book La pensée hiérarchique et l’evolution had, in 1983, reoriented the field of the interpretation of Darwinism, P. Tort contrasts “social Darwinism”- which was wrongly thought to be its consequence -with the very different truth represented by the anthropology of Darwin, which opens new perspectives for reflexion on the nature/culture and nature/society relationships. For over a century, this truth was not perceived, not even by Marx and Engels. The selft-eliminating process of selection which takes place within “civilized” societies, is calles by P. Tort the reversive effect of evolution. The method used in this work -the analysis of discursive complexes- should make is possible, through its later developments, to resolve, notedly in matters of classification, a certain numbers of key problems that have been raised by the traditional or estructuralist approaches to the “history of ideas”.

This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from the Aristotle’s Topics down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain particularly: first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at the end of the nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the leibnitian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why Dedekind, Peano, Schröder, etc. made, between two possible definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later made it necessary to postulate in set theory the axiom of extensionality.

In this paper we discuss the way logical consequence depends on what sets there are. We try to find out what set-theoretical assumptions have to be made to determine a logic, i.e., to give a definite answer to whether any given argument is correct. Consideration of second order logic -which is left highly indetermined by the usual set-theoretical axioms- prompts us to suggest a slightly different but natural nation of logical consequence, which reduces second order logic indeterminacy without interfering with first order logic.

A set of constraints forces trade-offs which prevent us from achieving the best possible definitions of the ‘level’ and ‘unit’ of natural selection. This set consists in decisions concerning conflicting pre-analytic intuitions in problematic cases, the relative roles of various conceptual resources in the definitions, which facts need to be accounted for using the definitions, how the relation between selection and evolution orients the definitions, and the relation between the level and unit concepts. Systematic reconstruction and evaluation of leading analyses along these dimensions favors a new functional analysis over Williams’ consequentialist analysis, Sober’s causal analysis, and Dawkins’ teleological analysis.

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand we want to make a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning an adequate explication of the concept of reduction. On the other hand we deal with the explication of the concept of explication itself. More precisely, first we discuss some current explicata of explication, then we show that they are inadequate for explication of concepts like implication, reduction, etc. Finally we propose a new and more adequate explicatum of explication and apply it to the concept of reduction.

In this paper, a series of observations have been made on the pecularities originated by the Theory of Law as an autonomous subject within the wider framework of the Philosophy of Law. The object of these observations is not, however, the Theory of Law in genere but the Theory of Law as understood and defended by some Italian Philosophers of Law of the so-called ‘Bobbio School’. As a result of this examination, it can be seen how a methodological approach to the legal phenomenon does not prevent the existence of a series of dualistic attitudes at three levels: 1) the conception of philosophical analysis (therapy or construction); 2) the status of metajurisprudence (descriptive or prescriptive); 3) the emphasis on meaning (constancy or variability). Subsequently, with reference to certain manifestations whicharise from the second of these levels, the dual category (descriptive/prescriptive) is revised and submitted to the instrumentality of the Theory of Law both intentionally and effectively.