We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom's negation itself has dramatic consequences that should be of interest to philosophers of mind. Our proof of the theorem provides a new guiderail for thinking about the nature and origin of thoughts.

This article takes a critical look at four instances of a similar idea: that the normativity of a sentence is a matter of what it rules out semantically. These views aim to give both stand-alone conceptions of normativity and solutions to a dilemma that A. N. Prior raised against Hume's no ought from is doctrine. First, I argue that acknowledged adequacy problems with the approach have not been sufficiently explained away. Second, I raise some new concerns, which create additional barriers to defending Hume using the approach. To conclude, I suggest an alternative way of understanding Hume's doctrine that avoids the need for a sentence-level account, and opens up avenues for preserving the insight behind the ruling-out approach.

According to a simple formulation of doxasticism about propositional faith, necessarily faith that p requires belief that p. Support of doxasticism is long-standing and was rarely a matter of dispute until William Alston (1996) proposed that that the content of propositional faith need not be believed if it is accepted. Subsequently non-doxastic theories that reject the belief requirement have proliferated and have come to dominate literature in the field. This paper aims to redress the balance by identifying a dilemma for non-doxasticism that comes into view when we draw out the implications of non-doxasticism for the interpretation of affirmations of religious propositional faith. One horn of this dilemma commits non-doxasticists to hermeneutic fictionalism: a substantive, contentious and little explored theory about religious discourse. The other appears to render the affirmation of faith prima facie bullshitting, leading to problems about the integrity of religious discourse and its speakers.

Recent debates about mathematical ontology are guided by the view that Platonism's prospects depend on mathematics' explanatory role in science. If mathematics plays an explanatory role, and in the right kind of way, this carries ontological commitment to mathematical objects. Conversely, the assumption goes, if mathematics merely plays a representational role then our world-oriented uses of mathematics fail to commit us to mathematical objects. I argue that it is a mistake to think that mathematical representation is necessarily ontologically innocent and that there is an argument from mathematics' representational capacity to Platonism. Given that it is common ground between the Platonist and nominalist that mathematics plays a representational role in science, this representationalist argument is to be preferred over the explanatory, or enhanced, indispensability argument.

According to Whitehead's rectified principle, two individuals are connected just in case there is something self-connected which overlaps both of them, and every part of which overlaps one of them. Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi have offered a counterexample to the principle, consisting of an individual which has no self-connected parts. But since atoms are self-connected, Casati and Varzi's counterexample presupposes the possibility of gunk or, in other words, things which have no atoms as parts. So one may still wonder whether Whitehead's rectified principle follows from the assumption of atomism. This paper presents an atomic countermodel to show the answer is no.

This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non-starter.

I argue that those who accept modal rationalism, the idea that all of modal space is accessible to a priori reflection, must also accept a seemingly much more ambitious thesis: fundamental scrutability, which says that from a description of the world's fundamental layer, one can reason a priori to all truths.