This paper takes its departure from a cluster of approaches to Intentionality that could be headed under the title “Naturalizing Intentionality.” The author groups them into two different arguments: The defenders of the Original-Derived Intentionality argument hold that while there may be such a thing as originalintentionality understood in Brentano’s sense which applies to the mental, we usually extend this intentionality to processes, machines and all sorts of other things. The defenders of the Basic-Higher Order Intentionality argument on the other hand claim that it is physical objects that display basic intentionality, while the human mind has intentionality of a higher order. For both approaches the aim is to show that intentionality can be understood as something exhibitedby non-mental items and thus it can be claimed that what thoughts or bits of language are about is physical in the last instance. The author argues that both arguments are merely inversions of each other and cannot successfully naturalize the phenomenon of intentionality as about-ness of physical items. Furthermore it is exactly the cooperation between the mental and the physical and no reduction of one to the other that can explain the phenomenon of intentionality. Subsequently the author will discuss John McDowell’s Kantian approach to intentionality, which may at first look like a version of the Basic-Higher Order argument, since McDowell distinguishes first and second nature. However, the author shows that already McDowell’s first nature is imbued with conceptuality in that he starts with receptivity in operation. For McDowell, not intentionality of the mind is naturalized, but nature is always already intellectualized or intentionalized.

This paper is concerned with the issue of how predication is possible, as a significant common concern in the philosophy of language, metaphysics and semantics. A ‘subject-comment’ account is suggested in view of its constructive engagement with two relevant competing approaches, i.e., the traditional ‘subject-categorization’ account and the ‘topic-comment’ account. The suggested account views predication as a unifying two-level predication: the primary level of predication is made through recognizing and commenting on some particular attribute(s) of the subject’s semantic referent as a thick object (resulting in a weaker version of Russellian proposition) and the secondary level of predication through categorizing the subject’s semantic referent into a certain group via the Fregean conceptual content of the predicate.

This paper presents current debates on an anthropological principle in linguistics that Russian scholars are involved in. It presents as important the consideration of traditional issues in linguistics from the position of anthropologism. Also, it is fruitful to understand the lingual personality as an object of study in linguistics, to interpret the meaning of words from an anthropocentric position, and to anthropologically interpret ways of the world conceptualization in semantics of the lingual and textual units. It is especially important to consider an anthropological approach in relation to human creativity.

Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively D1 and D2 differ, then D1-propositions and D2-propositions are true in different ways (if true). The aim of the paper isto present a monist challenge to this principle. The gist of the challenge is this: even if metaphysical pluralism (i.e. the antecedent) is granted, truth can be given a uniform account within a correspondence framework. The basic argument is this: every domain that the alethic pluralist is interested in is truth-apt. But any domain that deals in truth-apt propositions likewise deals in facts – after all, it seems a mere platitude that facts are what makes propositions true (if true). Once facts are admitted, the monist can argue as follows: a proposition is true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Now, a proposition corresponds to reality if, and only if, it represents reality correctly – and a proposition represents reality correctly if, and only if, what is says is a fact, or is the case. However, since the notion of fact is available for any truth-apt domain, a proposition – whatever its (truth-apt) domain – can be taken to be true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Thus, metaphysical pluralism does not imply alethic pluralism.

How does a sign manage to represent an object? This is one of the central questions of philosophy. I want to ask a related question. How is it that several signs can represent the very same object? It is tempting to think there is little to this question beyond what can be said about the first. But things are not so simple. A pair of representations can denote the same object in a special way. For some anaphora-antecedent pairs or for some occurrences of the same word, the signs corefer in a way that makes that very fact evident. In this sense, we may say that sometimes the relation of coreference is “de jure”. I begin the paper by outlining what I think are the three core properties of de jure coreference. This reveals that the phenomenon is genuine, ubiquitous and requires explanation. Next, I argue that the relation is not transitive. What this means is that just about every possible explanation is ruled out. For example, we can’t say that two signs are de jure coreferential because they mean the same thing, they are expressions of the same symbol or they correspond to the same variable, index or discourse referent. I do not pursue a solution here.

Certain anaphoric forms are widely supposed to give rise to ‘de se’ interpretations. Castanteda (1966a/b, 1967) argues that intensive reflexive anaphors such as ‘he himself’ and ‘she herself’ act as devices for the indirect report of essentially ‘first person’ contents when they occur with singular antecedents. In this paper, I argue that first and third person pronouns that occur as anaphors on c-commanding quantified antecedents (so-called ‘bound variable pronouns’) also give rise to de se interpretations. I draw out a problem that this observation raises for a well-accepted account according to which bound pronouns occur as featureless variables. I argue that the best way to account for de se interpretations of bound first and third person pronouns is to abandon the view that pronouns lack features when bound. I offer a new account of bound pronominal anaphora which assigns the features of pronouns a crucial role in deriving bound readings.

The present work attempts to explicate the philosophical method of Wittgenstein, which he formulated in the Tractatus in order to determine the meanings of our linguistic expressions by analyzing the basic structure of the language. Wittgenstein attempts to show that traditional philosophical problems can be avoided entirely by application of an appropriate methodology. The analysis of language is one important tool of solving problems. The role of language as a central concerned of Analytic philosophers is the dimension most involved in disputes about the methodology employed. My understanding about Wittgenstein’sconcept of language in his two philosophies is founded on the methods that he adopts. There are two different methods in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. On these methods, Wittgenstein developed his theories of meaning, i.e., picture and use theories and consequently resulted two philosophies. I intend here to study about the theory of meaning that Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus.

Jürgen Habermas derives his political theory and discourse ethics from a view of language based upon “universal pragmatics.” Universal pragmatics is identified by Habermas to reveal universal conditions of possible understanding with the belief that not only syntactic and semantic characteristics of language, but also pragmatic characteristics of utterances related to speech should be reconstructed to build an undistorted communication. Nevertheless, the communicative competence, which is supposed to be related to pragmatics of language, is derived from the misinterpretation of J. L. Austin’s theory of performative utterances. Linguistic as well as communicative competences have a universal core in universal pragmatics, which paves the way for the essentialist depiction of language having the Chomskyian overtones. Austin’s theory of performative utterances, on the other hand, does not have a universalistic claim. Because Habermas derives universal pragmatics from the misinterpretation of Austin’s theory of performative utterances, it is important to evaluate Austin and Habermas’s views of language by comparing and contrasting them with one another. The first part of the paper consists of the articulation of universal pragmatics. The second part of the paper focuses on Habermas’s unjustified critique of Austin.

The point of view expressed in the present research is directed towards the ideational “torsion” from rationalism to the “language-games” drawing up an analysis according to which one can notice the rationalist and post-rationalist aspects in the philosophy of communication, and the consequences of these perspectives, which could be of great interest as regards the philosophical concepts related to communication, to man or to the human community. As a matter of fact, “the torsion” is only apparent; it cannot hold a dramatic change of the thinking range, from “rationalism” to “neo-positivism”, as regards the comment on Habermas’ theory of communication, as compared to Wittgenstein’s ideas about “the language-games” as central elements of human communication. Jürgen Habermas manifest a specific turn in his way of thinking, aiming at the contemporary modulation of the rationalist approach by means of inter-subjectivism orhumanism, and stressing the modulation of the logical approach, by means of “language-games” and “life-forms.”

D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptualabsolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world.

If the notion of speech acts is to be taken seriously, it must be possible to treat speech acts as acts. The development of systems of DEL (dynamic epistemic logic) in the last two decades suggests an interesting possibility. These systems are developed on the basis of static epistemic logics by introducing model updating operations to interpret various kinds of speech acts including public announcements as well as private information transmissions as what update epistemic states of agents involved. The methods used in developing DEL can be used to develop logics that deal with a much wider variety of speech acts. For example, in ECL (Eliminative Command Logic) of Yamada (2007a) and ECL II of Yamada (2007b), similar model updating operations are introduced tointerpret acts of commanding as what update deontic aspects of the situations in which agents are involved. In Yamada (2008a), ECL II is further extended so as to model acts of promising along with acts of commanding. Moreover, in Yamada (2008b), ECL II is combined with a modified version of DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) introduced in van Benthem & Liu (2007). In the resulting logic DDPL (dynamic deontic preference logic), illocutionary acts of commanding are differentiated from preference upgrading perlocutionary acts. The development of these logics suggests a recipe for developing logics that deal with various specific speech acts: first, carefully identify the aspects affected by the speech acts you want to study; second, find the modal logic that characterizes the aspects in question; and finally, add dynamic modalities that stand for the types of the speech acts being studied and define model updating operation that interprets these speech acts as what update the very aspects.

In this paper, I revisit W. V. Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation. I think Quine’s arguments for the thesis are marred by his controversial assumptions about language that amount to a kind of linguistic behaviorism. I hope to cast a new light on the thesis by presenting a strong argument for the thesis that does not rest on those assumptions. The argument that I present in the paper results from adapting Benson Mates’s objection to Rudolph Carnap’s analysis ofsynonymy as intensional isomorphism.

Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect questions, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘s knows how to F’ as ascribing to s knowledge of a certain way w of Fing that she can F in w. In order to preserve knowledgehow’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they add that this knowledge must be had under a “practical” mode of presentation of w. I argue that (i) there can be non-knowledgeable true beliefs under a practical mode of presentation and that (ii) some such beliefs would nevertheless be sufficient to establish knowledge-how’s characteristic connection to action, and thus count as knowledge-how. If so, Stanley & Williamson’s account is faced with a serious undergeneration problem. Moreover, the structural features on which the argument relies make it likely to present a quite general challenge for intellectualist strategies.

During last century in philosophy of language and epistemology two basic directions in research of sense were generated: first of them is based on understanding of language as sign system and uses semiotics methods of the analysis of language and the knowledge, the second addresses to studying the speech activity included in wide social context, and uses as initial concept of the communications. In the paper we’ll be proposed the uniform methodology of the analysis of sense as the conceptual structure, being base for the given directions is offered. In this case the certain paradigms of sense as models from which there are concrete traditions of scientific research are allocated. The understanding of sense as paradigms proves that depending on its treatment, from theaccepted concept of sense the theory of reference is under construction (as the system of a priority choice of designating expressions), is formed concept of concreteness, the concept of true, criteria of differentiation of the intelligent and senseless expressions, methods of the analysis of language contexts. The specified dependences assume also use of methods of semiotics, phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics when we turn our attention to the analysis of concrete theories and concepts of sense.

In the report are considered initial theses – philosophical ideas and paradigmatic representations, - for formation of a new scientific direction – virtual linguistics: virtual philosophy of linguistics. Focus of interests of virtual linguistics lays in studying attitudes of the internal (virtual) human and language as virtual object of the internal (virtual) human. For ordinary consciousness virtual - concerning computers. It only is partly true. The virtualistic as the paradigmatic direction is developed in Russia since 80th years of the last century. The virtualistic not scientific discipline, and the paradigmatic approach which can be applied in any sphere of human activity. Virtual psychology - one of its most developed directions. The virtual psychology considers mentality of the person (its internal space) as a virtual reality. The main message, the thesis: want a hypothesis, want the statement: the human should cease to be in linguistics a figure of default. The maxim is well-known: language - the house of life. It is less obvious, that the human - the house of language. But, certainly, simultaneously the human is the son of language. In particular, it is possible to ask a question - what ontological structure outside of language space of mental sphere? In this connection some perspective directions of works at philosophical, theoretical, methodological and empirical levels have been considered. The invitation to cooperation of colleagues of linguists - one of the central purposes present article.

This article focuses on several important but obscure concepts in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In order to clarify the concept of “object”, I compare it with “atom”. The analysis of the two concepts explains two important questions which have confused Wittgenstein’s reviewers for long: why is the world not the totality of things? Is object substance? “Logical space” is an important concept in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, although it only appears several times. If a proposition serves as the coordinates in the logical space, what are the coordinate axes? Is a possible world a point in the logical space, or a set of points in it? Based on symbolic transformations, I suggest that possible worlds serve as coordinate axes in the logical space. The concept of “possible worlds” contradicts with “necessity”. In Wittgenstein’s theory, all possible worlds are “accessible” to one another. This is why Wittgenstein fails to cope with the conflict between “possibility” and “necessity”.

The aim of this paper is to introduce Robert Brandom’s Inferentialism (Inferential theory of meaning) and Fodor and Lepore’ compositionality objection, and to protect Inferentialism from the objection based on compositionality. According to Inferentialism, To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences in which it is involved. However, Fodor and Lepore oppose Inferentialism by offering the compositionality objection. They argue that compositionality is needed to explain productivity, systematicity and learnability of language, meaning is compositional. Since inferential role is not compositional, however, meaning is not an inferential role. Against Fodor and Lepore’s objection, I present Brandom’s responses and develop my own views.