The 2008 and 2012 presidential elections in the United States of America showed that democracy and demographics are correlated in a microcosmic nation, where the concept of majority ethnic group is becoming an endangered species. President Obama’s reelection victory can be attributed, among other factors, to the Obama Code, or Obama’s “effective way to bring the country together around fundamental American values” (Lakoff). The victory was also due to his domestic ‘Diplobamacy’, i.e., Obama’s cultural understanding of, effective dialogue and communication on domestic issues and policies relative to gender, class, race, immigration, and age, also referred to as ‘Gender Diplobamacy’, ‘Class Diplobamacy’, ‘Race Diplobamacy’, ‘Immigration Diplobamacy’, and ‘Millennial Diplobamacy’. Throughout President Obama’s first term and during both presidential campaigns, he showed that not only did his biracial identity allow him to better understand the complex demographic and cultural realities of today’s USA, but it also allowed him to see our common humanity and interests in a networked global village. The Obama Code and Diplobamacy allowed Obama to forge a new majority through “the coalition of the ascendant” (Stengel). In the 21st-century’s multipolar world, “the Obama Doctrine” prefigures a new era of multilateralism, renewed internationalism, global democracy, and cosmocitizenship.

Of the many ideological blind spots that have afflicted political perceptions and analysis, none has been more debilitating than the equation of democracy with liberalism. Thus those who attempt to derive propaganda value from such an equation are vulnerable, as the US government has found, to the rhetorical counter attack that in opposing democratically elected governments, such as that of Hamas or Hugo Chavez, they are not merely being anti-democratic, but are in illiberal opposition to human rights and civil liberties also; an argument quite independent of the same charges emanating from their support of, for example, the governments of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore The Council of Europe has drawn attention to the US government’s inhumane, humiliating, degrading and cruel treatment, including torture, of prisoners, at Guantanamo, and the torture of prisoners in the supposedly secret or “black” prisons operated both by the CIA, and other countries, where the torture of prisoners, often illegally or extra judicially rendered to them, has been outsourced. In light of this the paper takes up a discussion of the nature of the relationship between Liberalism, Democracy and Torture as it is germane to the current legitimation crisis facing supposedly liberal democracies.

In this paper I argue that the attempt to develop practice dependence as a middle path between cosmopolitanism and social liberalism ultimately fails. In particular, I contend that the only type of practice dependence that can coherently be defended collapses into cosmopolitanism. I trace the origin of practice dependence theory from Cohen and Sabel’s work (Cohen and Sabel 2006) through Sangiovanni (Sangiovanni 2008) and Valentini (2010). After discussing the various different types of practice dependence, I argue that the only type of practice dependence that stands up to scrutiny is functionalism, but that if functionalism is true, it commits us to cosmopolitanism.

Religious dialogue is a trend and characteristics of the contemporary religious development, it has a historic significance. Religious dialogue is based on the existence of religion in a diversified society. This is not a problem of which theoretical possibility needed to be discussed and studied, but a historical fact which can be derived by the religious history of the development of China. Diversification is not only the basis of religious dialogue, but also the logical premise of democracy: without the existence of diversification, equality and freedom, as the essence of democracy, there will be no basis for discussion. Such understanding of the nature of democracy has a positive and practical significance.

Experience itself, Gadamer argues, can never be science. It is a non-scientific deliberation. This paper aims to critically analyze the recovery of the concept of “hermeneutical experience” (Erfahrung) in Gadamer’s philosophical investigations. Focusing mainly on Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and Method and his later writings on ethics and politics, this examination will allow us to discuss a) the imaginative development of Gadamer’s interpretations on Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis as practical judgment and its political repercussions for modernity, b) a construction of a possible dialogue between Aristotle’s proto-hermeneutical inquiry on praxis and Hegel’s phenomenological account of the experience of conversation, c) a critical engagement with both Habermas’ procedural conception of political philosophy, through which the role of philosophy is largely restricted to the problem of designing procedures for determining the validity of generalizable, collectively binding norms and Derrida’s unconditional and anti-foundational idea of ethics where the call of the other; the arrival of the other, of a singular event, is a burden, an infinite political responsibility; and finally d) a more aesthetic and non-cognitivist idea of experience where there is an openness to the tragic nature of human action.

The issue of ideology is a very important proposition in Marxist theory. In the course of their scientific exploration to establish historical materialism and in their critique of the whole of capitalist society and culture, as represented by Germany, Marx and Engels always treated materialist inquiries into ideological issues as the focus of their struggle with idealism. By adhering to the fundamental intellectual principle that man’s social being determines his social consciousness, they defined ideology’s reactive mechanism and social function in terms of the interrelationship of economic, political and mental life; defined its subjective mechanism and class attributes in terms of the mutually generative and prescriptive relations between social consciousness and social entities; and defined its cognitive features and its character of practicality in terms of the forms of existence of social consciousness and the relationship of knowing and doing. From this they constructed three dimensions and nine perspectives for interpreting ideological phenomena and clarified intellectual tenets and a scientific methodology for understanding ideology.

The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate Chantal Mouffe’s adaptation of the concept of the political proposed by Carl Schmitt. It is my claim that her adaptation is contradictory to Schmitt’s assertions on the political. The rigidity of the concept of the political cannot lend to promising adaptations for democratic theory. The primary interest lies not, therefore, in possibility or cogency of her adaptation, but rather with the consistency of basing this view on Schmitt’s concept of the political. In this aim, I argue, Mouffe fails to find the correct theoretical background. I thus offer three reasons for misappropriation of the concept of the political: misconstruction of the friend-enemy distinction along the adversary-enemy lines; Mouffe’s claim that consensus is unreachable; and different views of ontology in Mouffe and Schmitt.

Nietzsche’s connection with the Anarchists sounds rather peculiar since he is known for his hostility towards anything socialistic. However, this paper makes use of “elective affinity” – a term deriving mainly from Johann Goethe and Max Weber, which I intend to adopt in the way Michael Lowy did in his essay on Jewish libertarian thought – in order to present various hints of this connection. For Lowy, elective affinity is a kind of dialectical relationship that develops between two social or cultural configurations and cannot be reduced to direct causality or to ‘influences’ in the traditional sense. It is a mutual and active attraction that can end up even at a fusion. Hence, hints of this affinity will be presented, firstly, by locating the “presence” of Nietzsche in the thought and politics of anarchist thinkers – and especially in Gustav Landauer – and, secondly, by recognizing fragments of the anarchist worldview in certain aspects of the Nietzschean philosophy and life.

In this work, I explore the question of whether Karl Marx did characterise capitalism as unjust and condemn it as such. I argue that he did not. Proponents of the view that Marx condemned capitalism as unjust contend that his use of terms such as ‘robbery’, ‘theft’, and ‘embezzlement’ against capitalist exploitation necessarily commit him to moral condemnation of capitalism. In addition, his vision of a communist state where the principle, ‘from each according to his ability to each according to his needs’ will apply, proves that some principles are essentially more just than others on a tran-historical standard of justice. I argue that Marx’s texts vindicate him of moral indictment. Exploitation of workers under capitalism as espoused by Marx, conforms to the capitalist mode of production, hence, the transaction through which the workers are exploited by the capitalist and the distribution relations ensuing from this relation are just. Marx’s use of ‘robbery’ and cognate terms, I argue, is metaphorical, hence, not a proof of his condemnation of capitalism. I further argue that the need principle is not a principle of justice, for Marx had firmly stated that communists do not preach morality.

This paper tries to discuss the concept of inclusive toleration, conceived as that toleration which is not based on empirical considerations –more kantiano- nor it needs political justifications, but it is rooted on individuals’ dignity conceived as a metaphysical preconception and not as the result of public recognition. To see the scope of the concept we analyze John Locke’s views in his Letter concerning Toleration, and John Rawls’ ideas on the cooperation of free individuals who voluntarily and rationally interact to arrive to political agreements. It will be argued that Rawls’ position is more inclusive than Locke’s, though it still has obvious shortcomings.

The public sphere plays a crucial role in the functioning of liberal democracy. As a sphere conceived ideally independent of state control and economic influence, it serves as the sounding board of social and political concerns, where communications take place, ideas are exchanged, and arguments are put forward. The liberal notion of the public sphere relies on values such as inclusivity, transparency, equality, and rationality. This paper explores the limits of the liberal notion of the public sphere by looking into the recent media transformation, which blurry the boundary between public and private, change the form and content of the circulation of information, and are decoupling the communicative from the political realm. Taken together these media transformation ask for a reconsideration of the dominant model of the public sphere.

This paper examines Aristotle’s conception of responsibility through three different interpretations present in contemporary ethics and political philosophy. The topics of moral and political responsibility are discussed within Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, which contain an emphasis on human character and its components, the virtues. Discussion on responsibility has been present in one form or another within the history of western philosophy since its very beginning. As there has not been any universally recognized, continuous process of definition, the writings on responsibility by Aristotle are still as valid source as any other of the more recent theories on the subject. Aristotle doesn’t have a directly translatable word for “responsibility”. Therefore some interpretation has to be used. If ethics and political philosophy of the last decades are looked at, it seems that there have been several different approaches to Aristotle’s conception of responsibility. In this presentation three of these approaches are examined: (a)responsibility for action, (b) responsibility for character and (c) political responsibility. Through these three interpretations of Aristotle’s responsibilityit is reflected upon, what of his ideas could be utilised in contemporary discussion on responsibility.

This article examines the contemporary political-social crisis of Europe, tracing causes of such crisis in the project of the EU or, more precisely, in fundamental contradictions and intrinsic difficulties of EU theories and practices in relation towards the concept of the political and concept of democracy. Investigating various, principal as well as particular examples of the gap between EU forms and European realities, with special reference to processes of depolitization, the author, in dialogue with both philosophical conceptions of radical left and right, lines out new shapes of discursive movements and social impulses for action. In final part of the article, coming from the thought on true democracy as an alternative to the current EU project, the choice between politics and anti-politics is presented. In such light, rethinking of both the contemporary situation and the future of Europe, doubtlessly refers to the event of the political based on freedom, equality and justice.

The paper attempts to briefly examine some basic issues of Aristotle’s political philosophy. The first part presents some perspectives based on the interaction between the concepts of justice and equality. It also presents an example taken from Plato’s Politeia for the importance of justice as a value which can educate good citizens. The second part refers to citizenship and the need for a community to have a prevailing middle class, characterized by the value that Aristotle defines as “civic virtue” [πολιτική αρετή]. The last part of the paper explains the concept of “civic virtue”, which has to be connected with abilities, middle solutions and distance from extremes. It also deals with advantages concerning democratic and lawful systems of government, which should be supported by educated individuals, according to what was previously referred.

The paper presents a discussion of the theory and practice of direct democracy and its relation to a stable legal system and legalism. In contemporary theories of democracy, the most important factor in determining the proper functioning of this system is elections. The referendum is regarded as most popular institution of direct democracy. According many constitutionalists and theorists of democracy, the referendum is not an improvement to democratic rule because it is inherently simplistic and rejects compromise. It represents a danger to the state of law because it weakens constitutional controls, which can be shocking and frustrating to the people. In many cases, it can be used as a populist instrument to impose limitations on freedom. Also, groundbreaking applications of the referendum in the early 21st century pose serious problems for political and social life, so the political elites seek to avoid this procedure. Generally, they use arguments about the specialization of law, and arbitrarily decide about the use of the referendum. The main role of the referendum in contemporary democratic countries is no longer to allow for the expression of a dialogue between rulers and the governed in the law-making process. The contemporary situation can be described as a crisis of democracy, but we can also find symptoms of a new post-democratic era.

My paper will be an inquiry on the meaning and the role of political philosophy. Political philosophy has a different ambition than other fields of academic philosophical doctrines: it should create ideas and theories that go twofold ways; they have to be consistent enough to be considered as a sufficient moral theory of good society, but they also had to be in some ways politically relevant for actual societies. In my paper I claim that if one of these aspects is overemphasized then political philosophy will lose it credibility, either on political feasibility or as a philosophical academic doctrine. Therefore it seems that political philosophy is in the middle of Rawlsian conceptions of ideal and non-ideal theory. I claim that political philosophy should consist on at least these three elements; regulativity, reforming and reflectivity. These elements give political philosophy it contents as a eutopia model, in other words, model for a realistic good society.

The article deals with the politics of secularism as an essential component of modern democracy, confronting the contributions of three major contemporary political philosophers about religion and public life. I present, first, Charles Taylor’s characterization of secularist regimes as attempts to secure the basic principles of the modern moral order. Next, I argue that John Rawls’s growing interest in the relation between religion and democracy led him to an even more inclusive view of public reason. Thirdly, I show that Jürgen Habermas preserves a distinction between faith and knowledge that proves essential to grasping the debate over the place of religion in the public sphere. All three thinkers are concerned with the appropriate forum for the basic political language of the secular state. In a nutshell, my interpretation highlights a much greater proximity between Habermas and Rawls regarding political justification, on the one hand, and between the former and Taylor concerning the normative basis for the secular state, on the other hand, than their various interventions seem to indicate.

The concept of radical democracy is a concept that is often used in an ambiguous way. There are a lot of theorists that are theorizing radical democracy, either outspokenly or labeled radical democrats by their peers. Regardless, there doesn’t seem to any consensus on what the concept of radical democracy entails and how it differs from any other conception of democracy. This lack of conceptional clarity leads to a situation where the radical in democracy is used only to add rhetorical strength to the concept as a whole. In this paper I will first present a couple of already existing different conceptions of radical democracy, they are not seen as definitions but are descriptive of similarities in the usage of the concept within different contextual frameworks. After this I will present what I find the most plausible usage of the concept which is radical democracy as difference. In this view radical democracy is viewed as a concept where difference is seen as the main constitutive feature of democracy, a view that ties this question to the agonism/deliberative democracy debate.

Rawlsian framework is based on a cooperation model, which takes a democratic society as a cooperation system. Such a conception of democracy not only obscures the distinction between democracy and despotism; it also makes it hard to argue for the superiority of democracy over despotism. This article develops a different model, the competition model, to explain the historical development towards democracy and to justify democracy as a social order superior to despotism. I argue that once we adopt the competition model to understand democracy, its distinctive characters as well as its merits will fully bear out.

A central concern for non-ideal theory is how to reconcile what political morality demands with what political reality permits. My view is that a liberal conception of religious freedom should be guided by this concern. In this paper I offer a brief defense of an egalitarian conception of religious freedom that takes non-ideal theory seriously. Many liberal accounts of religious freedom are framed in terms of American or European legal and political traditions and in this way are liable to suffer from a kind of parochialism. A non-ideal theory of religious freedom should have something useful to offer to transitional societies, including emerging democracies with Muslim majority populations and I try to show that an egalitarian conception of religious freedom is promising in this way.