Most contemporary proponents of scientific realism advocate some form of selective realism. One of the most prominent variants is the working posits view, which claims that the essential propositions of a successful theory are those that are involved in the actual derivations of predictions. In this paper, I offer a systematic examination of this view, surveying no fewer than six competing interpretations of it. I argue, however, that none is satisfactory. A general reason to reject the working posits view is that it focuses on individual successful derivations, as opposed to the empirical success of a theory as a whole. In response to this, I suggest an alternative positive view, which regards as essential those theoretical posits which “unify” a diverse or large collection of other posits.

Nelson Goodman (1976) argued convincingly that in order to understand the representation relation one should dissociate it from the relation of resemblance because of the logical differences between the two concepts. Resemblance is reflexive and symmetric whereas representation is not. Furthermore, Goodman suggested that what lies at the core of representation is denotation. According to Goodman, if X represents Y then X must denote Y, but he recognized that by opting for an analysis of representation only based on this idea of denotation we run into problems. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that X could be considered to be a representation of Y by mere stipulation. The second reason is that in many cases X represents Y but Y does not exist and thus there is nothing that X denotes. Both of these problems are important when addressing questions about scientific representation. First, we do not think that we do justice to scientific practices by thinking that scientific models represent by mere stipulation. Second, some of our scientific models represent what we often label ideal systems or ideal states of affairs, and if such systems do not exist in the actual world then it would also not make much sense to claim that our models denote such systems. I argue in this paper that there is a way to overcome these two problems and explicate “representation” by means of “denotation”.

Can science interpret morality? Ethics is pertinent to science. To explain morality scientifically is to understand moral concept and behaviour better. In view of Darwinism, the origin of morality is closely related to human hereditary evolution and biology can interpret morality. As it develops, science can interpret morality alone. Science can provide the only correct answer to the moral problems confronting us. But we should keep in mind that the interpretation has limitations and cannot decide or replace morality.

Davidson’s critique of conceptual relativism depends on the application of the principle of charity. I suggest that his argument is insufficient to reject a type of partial relativism. First, I propose a thought experiment, in order to show the shortcomings of the application of the principle of charity. Then, I examine the holism, as a possible answer to the experiment. Finally, I argue that Davidson either must leave the holism, or must accept a partial relativism.

Recently, David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation has been attacked by context-relativists, who point to a number of intuitively absurd consequences of Lewis’ view – e.g. that my birth is a cause of my death – in order to argue that whether or not an event c is a cause of some distinct event e varies relative to certain contextual factors. Not all (e.g. Menzies (2004); Schaffer (2005); Maslen (2004); Northcott (2007)) agree on how contexts should be fixed; but all argue that context-relative analyses better account for our intuitions about causes. In defense of his invariantist account, Lewis argues that the intuitions by which the relativist-accounts purport to be informed are, in fact, intuitions about contrastive explanation rather than causes. That is to say, Lewis accepts that my birth is a cause of my death, and argues that it is odd to say so precisely because the pragmatics of explanation deem saying so inappropriate in most cases. I will examine a definitive objection from Peter Menzies (2004) to Lewis’ proposed defence and argue that the former reveals that the true locus of the relativist-invariantist debate lies in the question of how we ought to order possible worlds.

There are two main sources of risk in contemporary society, one is uncertainty, the other is modern fracture arising from the rapid development of science and technology. From the perspective of risk research, current thinking is focused on the ethical dimension, neglecting culture fracture in specific countries and regions caused by the development of modern science and technology. This article attempts to discuss Chinese cultural fracture by analyzing the Chinese traditional culture and the characteristics of modern western science.

W. V. Quine (1908-2000) and P. Feyerabend (1924-1994) shared many essential ideas in both historical as well as methodological contexts. Both claimed to be descended from the Vienna Circle. Both inherited the result of the protocol statements debates taking place in the Circle and considered it a crucial part of their philosophies. Both resorted to something like conceptual schemes by which they interpreted all experiences, even the most commonplace ones (the idea of “ontology” for Quine and the idea of “theory” for Feyerabend). These similarities enlisted here do not intend to be exhaustive, yet they offer a picture that Quine and Feyerabend are analogous in their ideas. This helps us to see the significance of comparing them, especially the part that while Quine’s philosophy of science is not entirely exempted from the tag of relativism, nor should Feyerabend be considered a prominent member of “epistemological nihilism”. The outcome of this comparison shows that while Quine offered in fact a ‘tolerant’ philosophy of science, Feyerabend instead demonstrated his constructive view of science by proposing a pluralistic methodology.

Time, as we know, belongs to the subjects not only of science but also of metaphysics and it certainly is an entity of a special kind; one needs adequate methodological tools to research it. Currently, one of such widespread tools is interdisciplinary approach. However, it appears that its use runs into a difficulty associated with the fact that reality of a scientific theory is set by its ontology. This means that the ontology of time in various scientific theories, strictly speaking, should be different. The ontology of scientific and metaphysical theories of time will differ even more. Consequently, the study of time as an interdisciplinary subject from a methodological point of view requires the introduction of such epistemological presupposition to understand the reality, to which the constructions of time both in the natural sciences and metaphysics could be considered ontologically coherent. It appears that the role of such one can play the premise associated with the belief in the existence of an external world independent from the perceiving subject (so-called the ultimate reality). Coherent interdisciplinary ontology of time is, in this case, a part of the study of ontology of the ultimate reality which is the subject both of science and metaphysics.

Se propone que gracias a sus profundas raíces filosóficas, la semiótica estructural podría ser empleada como herramienta de trabajo de naturaleza heurística en filosofía de la ciencia. Sin embargo, se anota que esta posibilidad ha sido poco explorada en ambientes académicos naturalmente llamados a tomarla en cuenta, al menos partiendo desde una perspectiva intelectual explícita y plenamente consciente. Esto es una lástima, puesto que estudios con claro y explícito fundamento semiótico en temáticas propias de la filosofía de la ciencia escasean, mientras que estudios con claro trasfondo semiótico, si bien inexplícito y muy seguramente inconsciente para sus autores, permean la discusión de principio en epistemología científica hasta el punto que resulta posible afirmar que algunos de ellos forman parte de las referencias clásicas para los estudiosos en la materia sin ser reconocidos como tales. Ejemplos de ambos tipos de trabajos son referenciados y brevemente discutidos.

Karl Popper believed that his critical rationalism was both a theory of knowledge and an attitude about human life, morality and democracy. Some doubt exists whether Popper managed profoundly to affect the disintegration in Modernity between the physical sciences and the science of reason, and therefore whether he was able to successfully and harmoniously integrate ethics with science. In order to see if Popper considers the intrinsic ethical value of science, or if his moral agnosticism prevents him from doing so, it is necessary to analyze first the fundamental moral creed of Karl Popper, summed up in the following way: “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth;” the role given to Ethics in the search for the truth, and that is expressed in the fundamental principles of fallibility, intellectual integrity and approximation to the truth; and finally the Popperian proposal of a new professional ethics for intellectuals, conceived of in a non-authoritative manner the ideas of truth, rationality, intellectual honesty and responsibility, based on twelve epistemological-ethical principles. Popper maintained throughout his life the conviction that scientific knowledge is one of the greatest achievements of human rationality, which allows one to understand something about the world and improve it.

En este trabajo se describe la categoría de “metáfora epistémica”, que supone atribuir un rol cognoscitivo a las metáforas utilizadas en las ciencias y se la propone como módulo de análisis para la filosofía y la historia de las ciencias. Mientras tradicionalmente se adjudicaba a las metáforas funciones estéticas o retóricas y su propia índole representaría un obstáculo para cualquier comprensión racional de la realidad, el conocimiento científico se presentaba asociado a una racionalidad rigurosa, a la descripción y explicación de lo real. En la divulgación científica o en la enseñanza se toleran las metáforas en tanto mero recurso didáctico-pedagógico y la filosofía estándar de la ciencia, en el siglo XX, ha reconocido en las metáforas, a lo sumo, un papel heurístico sin valor cognoscitivo. De modo tal que una metáfora epistémica parece ser una contradicción en los términos. Sin embargo, la enorme cantidad de metáforas de la historia de las ciencias y de la actualidad permite sospechar que su presencia es más la regla que la excepción y que algo debe ser revisado.

El esencialismo científico surge en la década del 70 a partir de algunos escritos de Saúl Kripke y Hilary Putnam, aunque en la actualidad ha tomado renovados bríos bajo el nombre de “nuevo esencialismo”. Esta corriente fue propuesta originalmente para las ciencias naturales pero desde hace un tiempo ha habido intentos de extender esta posición a las ciencias sociales. Si bien el esencialismo clásico ha recibido desde sus comienzos numerosas críticas, al trasladarse a las ciencias sociales reaparecen fuertes y renovadas objeciones. En primer lugar, caracterizaremos brevemente el esencialismo científico y algunas de las objeciones planteadas desde las ciencias sociales y, en segundo lugar, analizaremos tres propuestas diferentes para examinar cómo aplican el esencialismo a las ciencias sociales y cómo afrontan las objeciones. Se analizarán las propuestas de Brian Ellis, que rechaza tal posibilidad, de Paul Griffiths, que debilita la noción de clase natural y de esencia para poder sostener dicha posición, y de Crawford Elder, quien insiste con el esencialismo original a pesar de las objeciones de las ciencias sociales.

Представление об алгоритмах нового направления в философии – «философии масштабов», позволяющих усилить фундаментальные физико-математические модели реальности, включающие теорию струн, голографическую теорию, теорию суперполя, теорию слабого взаимодействия, гипотезу Пуанкаре-Перельмана.

Having accepted the heritage of the Greek “phisikoi”, science is increasing knowledge faster than the consequences of its application are recognized. This gives the demand of the full conditions unit, when the theoretical knowledge can receive the interpretation and can be realized in artifacts. The problem of blind-spots search in methodology became the task of the second part of XX century. As a result appeared the deepened classical principles of cognition and the new ones were designed. Uniting of all the basis in joint epistemological corpus is the most important task of the modern philosophy of science. In the paper the fundamental principles, which constitute the basis of epistemological corpus, are observed: 1.The abstraction principle in depth understanding of the theory as a structure of abstractions. 2. Leibniz-Heidegger principle of sufficient reason in terms of its connection to the systems paradigm. 3. The systems principle in the meaning of the system as a universal link form of the things being reasoned and the reasons, as a universal form of object representation. 4. The intervality principle, which determines the theory limits through the interval characteristics based on the concept of “abstraction interval”. The logical connection of the above mentioned principles, which form the type of productive thinking both on the way to knowledge and on the life way, is established.

Problem of scientific proof is very important philosophical problem of science. This problem studied great ancient Greek philosophers Pythagoras, Thales, Anaximander, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Anaxagoras, Pyrronas, Agrippas and others. Science has not the truth without the proof and the proof without the truth. Common feature of all scientific method is the proof of its results. Methodology of science is developing and looking for reliable model of a proof. Any expedient of scientific proof has the single beginning, final number of middle parts and the single ending. Strictness of the proof depends on correcting the distribution of the functions between parts of the proof. Functions for beginning stage: purposeful, meaning, analytic, regulative, controllable, organized, selective, stimulant, valued, directive, determining, base, explanatory, prognostic. Main functions for middle parts: the join of the beginning and ending stage in the completeness, the exception of contradictions and chances, the explications of necessary arguments and the strict algorithm. A number of middle parts are logical optimum. Functions for ending stage: crowned, resulting, productive, pragmatic, conventional, synthesis, modal, interpretative. A development of methodology has not finish. Methodological ideals improve continually.

В вопросах истинности математики и других наук нет консенсуса. А проблема давно имеет однозначное решение. Платон предложил «поход за Истиной» – диалектику с чётким алгоритмом: обобщить реалии идеей, и не одной; обобщить идеи одним идеалом (войти в идеальный мир); связать идеи закономерностями идеала в математическую модель; сравнить результаты моделирования с реалиями (вернуться в реальный мир). Главное в диалектике Платона – её обязательная «закольцованность», «сплетение» начала (в реальном мире) и конца (в идеальном мире) любого размышления для доказательства его истинности. Аристотель упростил алгоритм диалектики до двух шагов: задать заранее «истинные» аксиомы; выстроить формальной логикой «идеализированные» объекты. Так пришли к проблеме истинности. Предложенная авторами Идеальная математика Платона строится без аксиом многоступенным сложением единиц вплоть до достижения на её 20й ступени Мирового Разума. От первозданной единицы прямыми операциями до прямых идеалов, а от них обратными операциями вновь к первозданной единице – вот «кольцо» диалектики, гарант истинности. Выполнение обратных операций над первозданной единицей и за ней формирует обратные идеалы с их особыми свойствами. И без каких-либо аксиом и волюнтаризма их создателей! Теперь любой, даже не математик, выстроив математическую модель по закономерностям нужного идеала, может сверить результаты моделирования с реалиями для установления Истины. Пользуйтесь реальными идеалами, и Ваше Познание станет истинным! Платон гарантирует!

A rather negative role is usually ascribed to criticism during the phase of formation of a scientific theory, i.e. criticism is viewed as contributing to the elimination of mistakes and illusions in the proposed knowledge. Historical analysis of scientific theories shows that any theory arises as a result of destructive and constructive transformations of the preceding knowledge. Criticism is a necessary component of this process which has positive impact, alongside with eventual negative ones. It challenges the existing knowledge and contributes to the statement and justification of new ideas, and affirms the estimation of resolution of a problem situation.

Στην ανακοίνωση1 εξετάζονται ορισμένες τάσεις που εκδηλώνονται στην επιστημονική δραστηριότητα, ως αποτέλεσμα των οποίων η πληροφορία αποσπάται από τη γνωστική διαδικασία και λειτουργεί ως αυταξία, σε αντιδιαστολή με την πραγματική σημασία της και την αυθεντική γνώση. Έτσι, η προσοχή επικεντρώνεται στην τεχνολογία κωδικοποίησης-αποκωδικοποίησης της πληροφορίας. Αυτή η τάση συνδέεται με την θριαμβευτική επιβολή ποικίλων επιστημομετρικών, βιβλιομετρικών κ.ο.κ. δεικτών, και τη συνακόλουθη εκθετική αύξηση της παραγωγής-προαγωγής επιστημονικών δημοσιεύσεων. Δεδομένου ότι η ταχύτητα πρόσληψης και αντίδρασης στην πληροφορία είναι αντιστρόφως ανάλογη του βάθους και της κριτικής επεξεργασίας της, εξυπακούεται ότι και οι δυνατότητες αποκωδικοποίησης, γενίκευσης και διακρίβωσης της πραγματικής συμβολής μιας εκάστης των δημοσιεύσεων στην προαγωγή της πραγματικής έρευνας, είναι νομοτελώς αντιστρόφως ανάλογες του όγκου και των ρυθμών αύξησής τους. Η ίδια η αλήθεια μετατοπίζεται από την αναφορά στο μέρος του επιστητού που συνιστά το γνωστικό αντικείμενο, στο καθ’ ύλην αρμόδιο θεσμικό συλλογικό υποκείμενο, τα κριτήρια του οποίου ανάγονται πρακτικά στο δίκτυο καταχώρησης και αναγνώρισης της σχετικής πληροφορίας, ενώ ο επιστήμονας υποβαθμίζεται σε τεχνολόγο, εξειδικευμένο στη χρήση τεχνικών προσπορισμού νέων επιστημονικών γεγονότων και δεδομένων, ή στην επιτήδειο επιλεκτική εμπλοκή σε συγκυριακά δημοφιλείς θεματικές, που του διασφαλίζουν ευάριθμες δημοσιεύσεις, αναφορές, αναγνώριση, κ.ο.κ. Η “έρευνα” ανάγεται συχνά σε επιστημονικοφανείς λεκτικοποιήσεις παραστάσεων, σε διαχείριση του λόγου (του κειμένου), σε συνειρμικές (ή και ασυνάρτητες) αναφορές και “θεματοποιήσεις”, σε “πλαισιώσεις” και ”αναπλαισιώσεις” κατά το δοκούν, κ.ο.κ. εντός ενός τελετουργικά προσδιορισμένου πλαισίου βερμπαλισμών και λεξιλαγνείας. Η υπέρβασή αυτού του καταστροφικού αδιεξόδου είναι εφικτή μόνο στην κατεύθυνση του αγώνα για αυθεντικά επιστημονική θεωρία, μεθοδολογία και στάση ζωής, βάσει της λογικής του γνωστικού αντικειμένου και των πραγματικών αναγκών της ανθρωπότητας.