This paper argues that applying the mental files framework for singular thought to thoughts about specific times could produce an account of tensed thought with significant advantages over competing theories. After describing the framework (1) and motivating the paper (2), I discuss the possible make-up and function of a NOW indexical mental file (3-4). The last section argues that, if all ‘now’ thoughts can be coherently analyzed as thinking of a time under the NOW file, one would have a plausible explanation of the following issues: how the thought can refer to extended temporal intervals of various length; why reference to times is not destroyed by thought delays; and how a ‘now’ thought results in timely actions and relief.

The age-old problem of mind and body is highly discussed problem that has occupied psychologists, thinkers, philosophers and intellectuals. Many philosophers starting from Plato in ancient Greece to Donald Davidson in contemporary times have been occupied by the issue of mind and body. So also, the issue occupied philosophers in Eastern philosophy of India. There is striking similarity between the Bhagavad Gita (the core of the epic Mahabharata) and Donald Davidson’s theory (Anomalous Monism) as a solution to the problem of mind and body. The whole argument of mind and body culminates to the conception of ‘personhood’ – and its limits. The comparison comes to the point that though there are similarities in the Gita concept of personhood and Davidson’s Anomalous monism, the differences bring to the light where the limit is set to personhood and where the personhood goes infinite – both through mind and body. The paper tries to prove that the Gita philosophy has an edge over Anomalous monism of Davidson, as Davidson is unable to solve the dualism of mind and body; while Gita does it successfully by initially introducing kshara purusha (mortal being) and akshara purusha (psychic soul), directly relating it to the Purushottam (the Absolute).

There are very few analyses of the structure of points of view. However, we can identify two general approaches. One of them assumes as a paradigm the structure of propositional attitudes. Here, points of view are understood as having an internal structure similar to the one we can find in propositional attitudes. The other approach is based on the notions of location and access. Here, the internal structure of points of view is not directly addressed. The features that are emphasised are related with the role that points of view are intended to have. Points of view would be ways of having access to the world, and to ourselves, from certain emplacements. The paper has three parts. In the first one, we present these two approaches and some interesting developments inside each one of them. In the second one, we examine more closely the relationships between the two approaches. In the third part of the paper, we defend the non-reducible relational nature and modal character of points of view obtaining some conclusions.

Call the view that perceptual states can have propositional contents the ‘propositional view’ - or PV for short. Proponents of PV include John McDowell and Susanna Siegel; Anil Gupta and Charles Travis are prominent opponents. In this paper, I wish to address an argument against PV put forward by Anil Gupta. Gupta argues that the conjunction of PV with two further claims, which he calls the ‘Equivalence constraint’ (EC) and the ‘reliability constraint’ (RC), leads to skepticism. I shall argue that even if we grant EC, Gupta has not given us a compelling reason for rejecting PV and that if we are faced with a choice between rejecting PV and RC, we should reject RC ahead of PV. I shall also suggest that Gupta’s account begs the question against one prominent version of PV.

Selon certains philosophes contemporains, toute analyse de la nature de la signification implique la clarification des liens entre l’esprit, le langage et le monde. Notamment, dans le courant philosophique du langage naturel et de la philosophie de l’esprit, la détermination du rôle de l’intentionnalité dans la signification sert à expliquer pourquoi les mots peuvent à la fois exprimer nos idées et représenter les choses, et comment l’esprit peut établir la correspondance entre nos pensées et le monde. Pour Grice, Austin, Searle et Vanderveken, les deux caractères représentationnel du langage et directionnel de l’esprit sont logiquement liés à l’intentionnalité. Grâce à elle, les agents peuvent lier leurs idées aux mots, aux choses et aux faits du monde. Dans cette tradition, la signification est une propriété intentionnelle: elle résulte des intentions du locuteur. Nous partageons l’idée que la signification est un phénomène intentionnel cependant nous pensons que signifier c’est accomplir une action plutôt que seulement posséder des états mentaux. Le but de ce travail sera de clarifier la nature ontologique de la signification. Est-elle une action intentionnelle? Si oui, quels sont ses traits essentiels? Comment est-elle liée aux attitudes propositionnelles?

In this paper the modern scientific cognitive programs are analyzed. The article discusses the possibility of building an information and synergetic model of mind. The author introduces a principle of ontological reality of information – primary information in relation to material and energetic (or physical) reality and reality of meanings (or ideal reality). The author suggests a new approach to understanding an anthropic principle and interpretation of a philosophical category “mind-consciousness” as a concept of information reality theory. The consciousness is a fractal of an objective information reality with the certain relationships of cause and effect (so-called information, or mental causality). Physics and metaphysics synthesis is possible at the approach to mind as to certain level of the information reality including a phenomenon of a life. The principle of an ontological reality of the information – primacy of the information in relation to a reality substance-power (physical) and realities semantic (ideal) is essential. On the basis of this principle construction of new model of consciousness, using a mathematical apparatus of theoretical physics (G. Everett, R. Penrouz, V. L. Ginzburg, M. B. Mensky) looks very possible.