The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ (kinêsis) and ‘activity’ (energeia) that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics (book 9). Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without being in motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live.

During the 9th century Aristotle’s Metaphysics was translated for the first time from Greek into Arabic by Ustâth, at the request of al-Kindî and, afterwards, the interest of the Arab world in this oeuvre grew with the production of several translations, comments and paraphrases of the work. Among the books which compose the Metaphysics, one of the most studied was book Epsilon. In particular Arab philosophers focused their interest on the passage of Ε1, which contains a classification of the theoretical sciences (1026a13-1026a16), founded on the degree of immateriality and of separation from the matter of their object. Aristotle states: “Natural science deals with things which are inseparable from matter but not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable, but probably not separable, but are embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which are both separable and immovable”. According to the Arab exegetes, Aristotle introduces here the doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction, on the base of which the object of first philosophy is the most abstract among the beings, both from the conceptual point of view and from the real one. This interpretation of the Aristotelian text – already present in Avicenna – had a huge influence on the Latin Middle Ages and on modern philosophy.

In her book, Method and politics in Plato’s Statesman (1998), Melissa Lane discusses the relationship between political authority and time. Namely, she asks what the source of political authority could be when, in the Statesman, the Stranger tells us that law cannot be applicable in all situations, for all people, in all times (294b2-6, 295a1-5). In this paper I agree with Lane that the apparent contradiction in the dialogue between, on the one hand, the temporal laws and, on the other hand, the contingency of everyday situations can be explained only in coming to understand the statesman as a master of kairos, or “right timing”. A mastery of kairos, I suggest, does not mean simply that one is able to recognize when it is the right time to do or say something, but rather it must mean that one is able to create the right time, which involves foreknowledge of universal truth and proficiency in the art of putting things together.

Because virtuous action is the fulfillment of our nature and so is constitutive of good living, Aristotle argues for a conceptual connection be-tween virtuous action and pleasure. Yet courage does not seem to conform to this account of virtuous action. Because courageous action involves confronting the fearful, which is painful, and because courageous action can fail to achieve the desired (and presumably pleasant) goal, it seems contrary to experience to claim that all truly courageous action is pleasant. I offer a defense of Aristotle’s claim that courageous action is necessarily pleasant. To do this, I give a more detailed explanation of the hierarchical, metaphysical relation between process and activity in courageous action. Virtuous activity, as instantiated in courageous actions, is necessarily pleasant because it is an end-in-itself and complete, and so requires pleasure as the full engagement of the agent in the action.

It is well-known that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics V deals with a single virtue, justice. He divides justice into two kinds: the complete justice and the particular justice; and the latter is further divided into several different sub-kinds of justice, among them the distributive and corrective justice are the most prominent. As regard the former, Aristotle defines it as law-abidingness and the complete exercise of all virtues. However, the notion of law-abidingness and the notion of virtue as the state of character seem to be in conflict. In this paper I would like to explore this issue by arguing the fact that Aristotle’s identifying the complete virtue with law-abidingness shows that although for him justice is still a virtue, but it is different in kind. For not only can justice not fit into the scheme of the doctrine of the mean, but also does not have the corresponding emotion. That is, it is not a state of character. A proper interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of the complete justice would be to see it as concerning with rules or principles.

Aristotle often says ‘the prohairesis, the conclusion of deliberation, is a combination between nous (reason) and orexis (desire)’. However, what he actually means by this remark is rather unclear. Is the prohairesis an actual action? Scholars have argued that the prohairesis is an action, claiming that the relationship between reason and desire here is of such a nature that the prohairesis becomes an actual action, at least in the context of ‘the euboulia’ (εὐβουλία). Yet, this view seems inadequate, because although it seem evident that the prohairesis results from the combination of reason and desire, Aristotle never uses the terms ‘prohairesis’ to indicate an actual action or a force needed to initiate an action. Instead, I will claim that Aristotle means no more than that the prohairesis (προαίρεσις) is the conclusion of deliberation, in which reason and desire have already been brought together. Hence, the thesis that the combination of reason and desire means that the prohairesis is an action, cannot be accepted. Rather, I will argue that the prohairesis is a decision, a combination of the best judgment (νοῦς-element) of what to do and the correct intention (orexis-element) that follows it.

In this paper a reinterpretation of Protagoras thesis, ‘homo mensura’ is attempted. Plato’s interpretation of Protagorean statement, ‘homo mensura’ in his Theaetetus, as ‘knowledge is perception’ is not reliable, since he was hostile towards sophists. ‘Homo mensura’ expresses a philosophical relativism, wherein Protagoras maintains that each one of us is determiner of truth. Each one of us is the unique authority on the content of our own perception. As a result, our judgments are incorrigible. However, not all judgments are equally true. Protagoras provided for consensus, wherein changes are caused by wise man and he appeals to reason through common sense ways to grasp truth. It seems that Protagoras goes beyond the meaning of sense; perception in man-measure thesis. In this reinterpretation ‘measure’ stands for an insight in determining the general self-world view and the way of life implicit in such a view. It refers to the deeper valuing, and not to any external standard. It has to fit in the overall reality in which man lives, and as demonstrated by his perception and harmony of action to which it leads. This anti-dogmatic philosophical relativism places man in central position. Protagoras’s engineering approach and inseparability of thought and emotion plays an important role in man’s being ‘measure’ of all things.

In Plato’s early dialogues Socrates seems to make a contradictory statement about politics. In the Apology he denies his commitment to political activity in Athens, whereas in the Gorgias he declares that he is the only politician in his time, using the ‘true political craft’. How can we understand his prima facie contradictory statement? In this paper, I aim to answer this question by showing that Socrates is a ‘radical’ politician in democratic Athens, who keeps prompting each individual to care for the soul and the truth. For this aim, I first clarify usual ‘political’ activities in Athens in terms of the public-private dichotomy. Then, I elucidate the political meaning of Socrates’ philosophy in “the semi-public sphere” that he discovers for his politics between the public sphere (e.g., the Assembly and the courts) and the private sphere (e.g., the oikos). In the semi-public sphere, such as the Agora, Socrates helps his fellow citizens establish their true selves, independently of ‘the politics of reputation’. Finally, I conclude that Socrates’ statement about politics is not self-contradictory, although Plato has Socrates pointing out the important use of ‘the true rhetoric’ in the presence of many people.

This paper deals with Plato’s theology based mainly on Book X of the Laws. According to Plato, there are three false beliefs which are fatal to moral character, namely atheism, denial of the moral government of the world, and the belief that divine judgment can be bought off by prayers and offerings. Furthermore, legislation is an embodiment of the divine laws that govern the universe, and therefore it is the task of the legislator to see that every aspect of the state is directed to the inculcation of virtue. Human beings are seen as small parts of the universe and that the gods’ care for human affairs is seen as part of their care for the whole. Plato reinforces the argument that since the universe is under rational direction, one can be certain that what happens to humans after death will be appropriate to the character they have acquired in this life. The message is thus conveyed that people will in some way be rewarded or punished after death, without relying on the kind of mythical detail which the young atheist would obviously reject.

The concepts of sense, movement and potentiality are closely interwoven and the effort to approach the Aristotelian theory of sense leads to the notions of motion and dynamei (δύναμις). We will attempt to show that physical and mental processes of change have many things in common. Our point will be that the important pair of potentiality and actuality, which is a significant contrariety for Aristotle, is a key notion in both of these changes. The role of contrariety and, more specifically, the transition from potentiality to actuality plays the same role both in physical changes (movements for example), and - in the case of sense - since processes of change that take place in the soul does not differ from those found in physics, despite the fact that are being more subtle and complex. We will try to illustrate that the soul is (ἀρχὴ) the principal (the beginning) of a unique kind of movement, but it is not itself a movement, because it is not a separated substance completely independent and self-existent. Sense is a movement, a process that requires a transition from potentiality to actuality and potentiality can be the key notion for the understanding of the Aristotelian theory of perception.

It is important to re-investigate Aristotle’s concept of nous. This concept basically denotes some telos-related thinking/reasoning activity of the human intellect, which proceeds both upward and downward: upward to grasp a comprehension of the telos one has acquired, and downward to reach some ultimate end. It differs from the theoretical thinking/reasoning of science in its upward-proceeding inquiries in that it constitutes a comprehension of the very first principles; it differs from technique in its downward-proceeding reasoning in that it always proceeds with a certain comprehension of or insight into the telos of human beings. As it aims to attain some ultimate end, in practical affairs it is construed to proceed with downward reasoning. This downward reasoning zigzags around the issues being faced, until reaching some ultimate point, at which we need no more thinking and simply act. To see how this helps us in finding a way to the good life, we must adopt a special perspective on living, i.e., that of the good man, because it contains and is addressed to greater truth.

With the revival of virtue ethics, recently more and more scholars start to realize the important role of Aristotle’s theory of virtue, and present to “going back to Aristotle”. Therefore, it is very significant and meaningful to re-read Aristotle’s concept of virtue. Through the analysis of Aristotle’s “neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us”, this paper attempts to re-estimate the concept of Aristotle’s virtue. My analysis will focus on Aristotle’s virtue from the perspective of nature and practice. Finally, I will attempt to point out that Aristotle’s virtue has its roots in nature, but is cultivated by the practice of human beings. The activity of human beings’ practical life is the fundamental to the existence of human beings.

More than 200 countries are in the world and the number is still growing by the day. For the establishment of social system in any country there is one or other form of government. None of the five forms of government described by Plato is completely flawless or completely false. All the forms have been experienced by different states in the world and are being experienced even today. In every country there are some evils like. Secondly, before the year 347 BCE Plato said an ideal government is must for an ideal society. What does an ideal government mean? Plato answers; the king should be a philosopher, in order to rule as an ideal king applying philosophical thought, courage, wisdom, justice etc. I propose one additional thing here: that this philosopher does not necessary mean an academician of philosophy, but the person who has the sense of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, and the sense of practical utility. I think by this the concept of the ‘philosopher king’ is not a theoretical one but it becomes practical (not a 100% practical, but it will be helpful for maximum goodness). Thirdly, for any king or administrator - even with the above virtues 100% perfectness - or ideal king or ideal society can never exist. Ideal king, ideal government and ideal society of 100% perfection cannot be realized in this world nor can be realized in future. No one is perfect in this world and no one can use perfect king, government and society. Many reasons of that due to research paper restriction I am not able to explain here. But one point is clear here; Plato’s wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, if taken into consideration by any administrator and used with consciousness, then it can help to make better public administration oriented towards an optimum ideal society. From this point of view, Plato’s ethical theory is very important.

In this paper, I wish to take account of the formulation of the PNC in Aristotle (1005b19-20) from a metaphysical point of view. After some comments on the arguments presented in the Aristotelian text, I will briefly discuss: 1) the highly topical principle in metaphysics understood as a ‘four-category ontology’ (Lowe 2005) or newly defined as “the most general attempt to make sense of things” (Moore 2012); 2) the challenge to this principle, coming from the so-called ‘aletheists’ or from ‘Hyper-physics’.

In this paper, I would like to consider Aristotle’s concept of time by examining his use of the word χρόνος in the biological works. I defend the thesis that for Aristotle, χρόνος is first and foremost a local biological and physical reality and not a universal mathematical structure. That is to say that in the biological works χρόνος refers to the time of specific movements and functions or biological activities: for example the time of mating, the period of gestation, generation, the periods of celestial movements etc. I will argue that this becomes clear as we examine the semantics of the word χρόνος in his biological works, and especially in the more descriptive works such as History of animals. The larger aim of my paper is to provide elements that shed a new light on Aristotle’s “theory of time” in his Physics (IV, 10-14). I will argue that for Aristotle time is a relative and that, although he states that we can’t attribute velocity to time, his conception is in this respect much more akin to the theory of Einstein than to the conception of Newton. So, I construct and evaluate arguments to sustain the Aristotelian notion of χρόνος as ‘local time’. This important aspect of his theory of time has until now largely been overlooked.

Matter is accepted as something unknown in itself, but that does not mean you cannot talk about it. Aristotle believed you can give the description of matter by using analogies. We first come up with the term ‘matter’ in Physics I.7. Aristotle uses it in relation with the problems of change and movement; then in metaphysics it is used in connection with form. Matter and form are accepted as the aspects of the one and same being, in a different level of being though. Because matter is usually associated with potentiality and form is with activity. Therefore, our main problem in this paper is how to make a definition of something and regarding what, that is, to matter or form? Aristotle’s answer for that question will be form because he thought that form is always prior to, and a more real being than matter. We have lots of potentialities throughout our lives, but only some of them are actualized. Thus, if someone wants to make a definition of us, he has to make it in virtue of considering our form.

In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a disposition. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a problem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus on the gap between potential knowledge and its activation, whereby I argue that the distinction between potential and actual knowledge is at the center of the problem of akrasia. I suggest that to elaborate on this gap, we must go beyond the limits of Nicomachean Ethics to Metaphysics IX, where we find Aristotle’s discussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. I further analyze the gap between potential and actual knowledge by means of Aristotle’s discussion of practical syllogism, where I argue that akrasia is a result of a conflict in practical reasoning. I conclude my paper by stressing that for the akratic person the action is determined with respect to the conclusion of the practical syllogism, where the conclusion is produced by means of a ‘conflict’ between the universal opinion which is potential and the particular opinion which is appetitive.

In the Phaedo Socrates tells his intellectual biography. He states that in the beginning of his intellectual career he occupied himself with the same causes that the ones of the Pre-Socratics. But this explanation was the root of all sort of philosophical problems so he abandoned it. After this disappointment, Socrates discovered the book of Anaxagoras and he expected there to find that the nous is causa finalis of everything because it is the good. But Anaxagoras never really developed this thought so Socrates pursued a different path: the method of hypothesis and the theory of ideas (the deuteros plous). Is there any trace of the good in the Phaedo? The standard interpretation of the intellectual biography and the deuteros plous passage, where Socrates says he was deprived of it, maintains that there isn’t. Contrary to the standard reading of the text we affirm that the critique that the old Socrates makes against the Pre-Socratics for not taking into consideration the teleological aspect of causality could also be read as an outline of the causal role of the good. This reading allows us to think of a Socrates who is still searching for the good in the deuteros plous account.

The present paper discusses the question of whether the manifoldness of the soul is restricted to its three known parts or whether those three parts can further be divided into individual parts. According to the Republic 580d7-8 the three parts of the soul correspond to the three kinds of pleasure, so each part of the soul corresponds to its proper pleasure. It is not only the pleasure that is nuanced, according to each part of the soul and its particular nature, but also the spirited (ἐπιθυμίαι) and the rational part (ἀρχαὶ) of the soul are nuanced in the same way. Thus, it becomes clear that each of the three main parts of the soul include three powers: the cognitive, the spirited, and the appetitive, so that we can rightly argue that there are nine powers of the soul in total. This happens because, for example, the cognitive power is as a proper kind a single unified power, but it is also divided in three further powers, according to the particular nature of each of the three main parts of the soul. And, of course, same goes for the other two parts of the soul, the spirited and the appetitive part.

In this paper, I try to show how epagōgē is related to the actions of nous, and furthermore to the kind of calculative (λογιστικὴ) or deliberative (βουλευτικὴ) phantasia analysed by Aristotle in De Anima. By examining the role, whichAristotle attaches to the epagōgē, nous and phantasia, I conclude that the Stagerite philosopher didn’t mean to identify epagōgē merely to a process of systematic correlation of the empirical facts. Experience finds its deserved place inAristotle’s epistemological system, but it is the mind’s actions that lead us to discover the new and the novel. Among them phantasia has a distinguished constructive role. Aristotle in his logical treatises describes the classic theory of syllogismōs and the less systematic theory of epagōgē. Transcribing, however, the argument from the field of logic to one of the epistemic process within Aristotle’s philosophy, I argue that in the light of De Anima, and specifically at those points where the philosopher mentions the power of the mind to imagine and infer, Aristotle’s model of knowledge is better explained, and the epistemic character that the philosopher attributed to the meaning of epagōgē, nous and phantasia is demonstrated in a more complete way.