Both contextualist and relativist solutions to the faultless disagreement problem clash with our intuitions: contextualism, with the intuition that two people arguing about a matter oftaste are in fact disagreeing; and relativism, with the intuition that the truth of a proposition is independent of who is evaluating it. In this paper, I will outline a solution that explains our intuition of disagreement without clashing with our intuitions about truth. I will do this by proposing a definition of propositions as ideally clarified assertoric content, having one absolute truth-value that does not vary across any contexts. I will argue that this definition is plausible, that it best serves the purposes of philosophy, and that it best solves the problem of faultless disagreement.

David Lewis' thesis of Humean Supervenience combines the claims 1) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences and 2) that truth supervenes on being. Contra Lewis, we should adopt a dispositional rather than a categorical theory of property individuation. Moreover, contra the conventional wisdom, such a theory is consistent with claim 1). However, it cannot be made consistent with claim 2) without abandoning the standard semantics for counterfactuals.

ln the Phaedrus, Socrates cnt1c1zes wntmg as non-living and deceptive. He later also claims that a good writer will write only for the sake of self-amusement. These apparent indictments of the written word seem to be at odds with the fact that the Phaedrus is itself a written text, to which Plato has presumably devoted some care and effort. I will show, however, that Plato uses these claims ultimately to suggest that the reader is responsible for transforming a written text into a dialogue with the text's author. I argue that Plato gets this message across via deliberate but not unsubtle flaws in Socrates' arguments and by highlighting the frivolity of written words, thereby directing the careful reader to recognize the significance of what Socrates leaves unsaid. For Plato, what is left unsaid is a more rel iable vehicle for conveying some understanding of reality and truth than mere written words.

Over the last half-century, Plato's Third Man Argument [TMA] has received a surge of attention. The challenge which numerous critics have undertaken is to provide a viable interpretation of Plato's puzzling passage at Parm. 132a1-b2. The exegetical part of this paper attempts to bring together some of the most plausible interpretations offered to date, distilling the good moves from the bad. The not-so-exegetical part of this paper draws out the consequences of these most plausible interpretations. In pa1ticular, it considers the possibility, inspired in the first instance by a stage-functional interpretation of Plato's one-over-many principle, that Plato held a recursive theory of knowledge. In Part I, I give a textual and logical analysis of the TMA I try to formulate the TMA such that it validly generates a regress from consistent premises, while remaining faithful to the text. In Part 11, I ask whether Plato is vulnerable to the TMA so conceived. I argue that some textual evidence suggests that he is not. In Part III, I assume for the sake of argument that Plato is vulnerable, and ask: (1) ls the conclusion of the TMA vicious - does it pose a problem for Plato? And (2), what are the consequences of the IMA (if it goes through) for Plato's claim that knowledge is possible?

Daniel Dennett is the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and Codirector of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. His research has centered on philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, with particular interests in cognitive science and evolutionary biology. He is a steadfast and vocal atheist and secularist. His many books have been read widely both in and out of the academy. They include Consciousness Explained (1992), Darwin 's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life ( l 996), and Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006). We spoke with Professor Dennett in June 2010.