Numerous writers on photography and motion pictures have claimed that photographically originated pictures are essentially different from handmade pictures. Arguments made on behalf of the essential difference of photographs from other kinds of pictures generally depend upon one or another of two models of the photographic process: the visual model claims that photographs are closely allied to vision and show what we would have seen from the standpoint of the camera at the time of exposure; the mechanical or automatic model claims that irrespective of what a photograph looks like, it is a reliable index of what was the case at the moment of exposure. Each of these models is examined and shown to be faulty on either or both factual and/or conceptual grounds. Stanley Cavell's assertions about the "automatic" nature of photography are examined in some detail and shown to be either equivocal or false. It is suggested, in closing, that sharp, categorial differences between photographs and handmade pictures do not exist and that questions about the differences between photographs and, say, paintings, can be solved only within the context of viewing particular photographs and particular paintings. In sum, claims about the ontological distinctions between photographs and handmade pictures cannot be warranted.

There is a real distinction between fantasy and imagination, which corresponds in part to Coleridge's distinction between fancy and imagination. Fantasy seeks substitute objects for a real emotion: it therefore involves the 'realization' of its object in a perfect simulacrum. Imagination seeks unreal objects for unreal emotions, and therefore is thwarted by the presentation of a simulacrum. At the same time, the motive of imagination is to understand what is real, and to respond with emotional alertness to it. The cinema awakens and satisfies fantasy. But it has difficulty in giving full elaboration to an imaginative thought. Its principle is not reality but realization.

Philosophers currently speak of the growth of knowledge only in the context of scientific enquiry, and concentrate exclusively on the growth of prepositional knowledge. That this is mistaken can be seen from a consideration of the knowledge acquired from fictional literature. There are many different things that are learned from fiction. Certainly people acquire prepositional beliefs and knowledge about the actual world from fiction, but they also acquire strategic and cognitive skills, emphatic beliefs and knowledge, and values of one sort or another. These are all acquired in interestingly different ways which are detailed in the body of the paper.

Music often pictures emotion through representing its expression and is thereby able to bear insight into significant aspects of emotional life. Scruton's arguments for denying that music is significantly representational is shown to fail, musical pictures having their own sort of determinacy. Musical representation is dramatic. Musical sounds play the role of expression. They themselves are portrayed as expressing the emotions which we thus represented. But musical drama is distinct from literary drama.

Peter Kivy has developed a general philosophical account of musical expressiveness based on baroque writings. But he omitted the association which baroque accounts make between the arts of music and rhetoric. It will be argued that one cannot capture the specifics of baroque musical expressiveness without taking account of baroque rhetorical theory. The detailed analysis of an example will demonstrate how rhetorical analysis of baroque music can fill in the details of Kivy's schematic account of musical expressiveness.

Various criticisms have been brought against a Platonistic construal of the musical work: that is, against the view that the musical work is a universal or kind or type, of which the performances are instances or tokens. Some of these criticisms are: (1) that musical works possess perceptual properties and universals do not; (2) that musical works are created and universals cannot be; (3) that universals cannot be destroyed and musical works can; (4) that parts of tokens of the same type can be interchanged and still yield tokens of that type, whereas we cannot interchange parts of performances of the same work and still get performances of the work. Of these claims, (1) and (2) seem to be true, but are not incompatible with a Platonistic construal of the musical work, whereas (3) and (4) just seem to be false and, therefore, of no concern to the musical Platonist.

The purpose of this paper is first to discuss and criticize some general theses about interpretation. The concept of interpretation is shown to be more complex than these general theses indicate. Distinctions are suggested between different types o f interpretations, and an attempt is made to state criteria of interpretation and arguments which can be used to support or criticize proposed interpretations. The relations between the various types of interpretations and the criteria (arguments) are then explored. Can they be combined? How? Can they comie into conflict with each other? How are such conflicts in that case to be solved? It is argued that at least partly different criteria and arguments are used, and ought to be used, when different types of interpretations are proposed, checked, and criticized. Sometimes a particular criterion is given, and ought to be given, different weight when different types of interpretations are considered.

Talk of fictions is usually problematic. One reason is our habitual difficulty in distinguishing clearly between discourse about fiction and fictional discourse. And part of our problem is understanding more clearly what such various discourse refers to. In this paper I would like to examine critically a recent influential account of "fictional discourse" with a view towards offering several proposals for reconstructing that account.

Problems arising from two issues are examined and resolved: those having to do with reference and denotation involving fictional entities (associated with avoiding truth-value gaps and with adhering to extensional accounts) and those having to do with the realist/idealist controversy - and with confusions due to mingling the two issues. Discussion ranges over the views of Russell, Quine, Strawson, Searle, Beardsley, Ryle, Wolterstorff, van Inwagen, de Man, Bakhtin, Goodman, and others. The solutions offered depend on sorting actual persons, actual stories, and imaginary or fictitious persons; and on treating reference in a purely grammatical way, without ontological import in itself but without precluding ontological interpretation.