論 著 / articles |
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 28
陳榮 華
Wing-Wah Chan
海德格與高達美的時間概念
The Concept of Time in Heidegger and Gadamer
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本文是要檢討海德格與高達美的時間概念,說明它與他們哲 學的關係。我要指出,無論海德格前期和後期的時間概念,在理 論上無法讓海德格完成他的哲學工作──存有意義的探索,但高 達美的時間概念,卻可以讓他得以詮釋存有的意義。本文首先分析海德格的前期作品《存有與時間》中的時間概 念,繼而說明他的後期作品(時間與存有)的時間概念。我指出,這兩個概念在理論上無法讓人完成存有意義的詮釋過程。然後,我從三個觀點分析高達美的時間概念, 它們分別是 (Gleichzeitigkeit, contemporaneity),節慶(Fest, festival)中的時間和 充實時間(erfuellte Zeit, fulfilled time)。我認為,高達美的時間概 念可以讓人完成詮釋的過程,因此亦可以理解存有的意義。由 此,高達美的時間概念在理論上是可以證成的。
This essay analyzes the concept of time in the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer in order to show its relationship with both philosophers’ discussion on “Being”. I point out that no matter in his early or later writings, Heidegger’s concept of time is in conflict with his concept of understanding. Therefore, Heidegger’s quest for the meaning of Being cannot be accomplished. In contrast the Gadamerian concept of time makes the understanding of the meaning of Being possible.In the first part of this essay Heidegger’s concepts of time are revealed by an analysis on his two major works: Being and Time and On Time and Being. I argue that the concept of time revealed in these two books makes the understanding of Being impossible. In the second part Gadamer’s concept of time is discussed by an investigation on the following terms: contemporaneity, time in festival and fulfilled time. I show that the Gadamerian concept of time is in harmony with the understanding of Being. ThereforeGadamer’s philosophy can accomplish the task of illuminating the meaning of Being. Finally I show that it is justified to accept the Gadamerian concept of time in the interpretation of Being.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2004 >
Issue: 28
黃懿 梅
Yih-Mei Huang
論富蘭克福特式的例子與其他可能性的原則
On Frankfurt-style Examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
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在討論自由意志問題中,我們要問:為什麼我們應該關心自己是否有自由意志以及決定論是否是真的?我們之所以關心自己是否有自由意志是因為我們關心道德責任。一個行為者如果沒 有自由意志,那麼就不能要求他負道德責任。這個原則就是其他 選擇可能性原則”(the principle of alternative possibilities 簡稱 PAP)。PAP 是這樣的:一個人為他所做的行為道德責任,那麼他能做其他不同的 事。Harry G. Frankfurt 在“ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (Journal of Philosophy 66, 1969, pp.829-39) 一文 中,提出反例,證明PAP 是假的。針對Frankfurt 所提出的反例,有不同的回應。最普遍的反應是:認為在反例中確實有其他選擇 的可能性—微弱的自由(flicker of freedom)。有各種不同理由支持 這個觀點。Fischer 反對這微弱的自由可以做為道德的基礎。另外有的哲學家認為反例中預設因果決定論,行動者不要為他的行為 負道德責任。Van Inwagen 認為PAP 不成立,但他提出另外三個 原則來重新建立做其他不同事的能力與責任之間的關聯。本論文討論Frankfurt 的反例是否反駁了PAP。反例是否是真 正的反例?(1) 反例中是否確實有其他選擇的可能性?(2) 反例 中的行動者是否要負責?(3) Van Inwagen 的三原則是否有效地把 做其他不同事的能力與責任關聯在一起?以釐清能有其他選擇 的可能性與道德責任之間的關聯,以便對自由意志問題的能有比 較有效的探討。
There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities” (hereinafter : PAP) which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39)The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 28
蔡耀 明
Yao-Ming Tsai
《佛說不增不減經》「眾生界不增不減」的修學義理:由眾生界、法界、法身到如來藏的理路開展
Buddhist Doctrine of "Neither Increase Nor Decrease in the Realm of Sentient Beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa: A Doctrinal Development from the Realm of Sentient Beings, Dharmadhātu, Dharmakāya, to Tathāgatagarbha
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本文主要探討《佛說不增不減經(Anunatvqpurnatva-nirdewa)》 「眾生界不增不減」的修學義理;至於落實的辦法,則以眾生界、法界、法身、如來藏等關鍵字詞為環節,闡發眾生界之所以不增 不減在理路的根據與開展。如果僅就粗淺的經驗所及,通常大致傾向於認為,在時間之 流的沖刷下,一定範圍內的眾生數目,要不是增多,就是出現減 少的情形,也就是說,幾乎不可能維持在零增加且零減少的水 平。然而,《不增不減經》不僅拒絕接受表面上看似有增有減之 見解,而且擺明了就在經典的標題,高高掛出眾生界「不增不減」 為其主旨。本文扣緊既是《不增不減經》的主旨也是本文主題所 關注的「眾生界不增不減」,沿著關鍵字詞,逐一打開其間之意 涵、根據、和理路。在論述架構上,總共分成五節。第一節,「緒論」,就論文的構成項目,由研究主題到研究目標,逐一交代全 文的構想與梗概。第二節,切入經典主旨——「眾生界不增不 減」——並且就其義理構成,透過系列的提問,展開深度的解析。第三節,切換到「法界」,論陳此一關鍵字詞如何一方面使經典 主旨得到確證,另一方面又使經典在論述的觸角和理路都獲得重 大的拓展。第四節,進一步切換到「法身」,透過此一關鍵字詞,論陳經典主旨如何漸次延伸且一一貫穿眾生、聲聞、緣覺、菩薩、和如來等生命形態和佛法修學專業的身分,不僅出之於一貫的著眼點,統整地述說各式各樣的生命形態和佛法修學專業的身分何 以分別造成,而且面對生命相續形形色色的差異,恰好成全經典 主旨的甚深義。第五節,「結論與展望」,總結全文要點,並且針 對後續相關的研究,預做前瞻。本文採取的研究進路,以佛法的修學為著眼點,爬梳與闡明 經典在修學所展開的理路,由此形成對修學義理的一份理解。至 於預期達成的目標,以如下三點最為首要。第一,對《不增不減 經》,做出相當完整的鑽研。第二,以經典主旨和關鍵字詞打通 《不增不減經》的理路,凸顯整篇經文在義理上的整全性與連貫 性。第三,直接藉由《不增不減經》的鑽研,以接近原汁原味的 內涵,開啟生命哲學的一扇門窗,並且認識法界、法身、如來藏 等概念所可能指向的理趣。
The present study examines Buddhist doctrine of "neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa in terms of a doctrinal development focusing attention on keywords from the realm of sentient beings (sattva-dhātu), dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, to tathā-gatagarbha. The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that there is neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, a doctrine which is often linked to the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or the Mādhyamika school. In this paper, I look into just such a doctrine, as it is found in a Chinese traslation of the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, a Buddhist scripture translated by Bodhiruci in 525. Several passages of this scripture were cited in the Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, a treatise still preserved in Sanskrit, Chineseand Tibetan, and give us textual sources for research into the Chinese translation of this scripture.In the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, the very way in which the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings is defined and verified through the employment of the dharma-dhātu theory, a theory which, in turn, is verified by reference to theories of dharma-kāya and tathā-gatagarbha. So in order to understand this scripture's discursive construction of the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, we must explore its conception of such keywords as dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, and tathā-gatagarbha.It is my hope that an examination of such a scripture with the focus on the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 28
鄧育 仁
Norman Y. Teng
自由意志與事件起因
Free Will and Event Causation
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由恰當描述、說明行動與事件起因之間的關係,可消除自由 意志行使的論述困境。本文檢討三項試圖解決此論述困境的途 徑:其一,循事件起因的節制,詮釋自由;其二,由機率起因說 明選擇自由的可能;其三,由當事人起因說明。此三者,皆有令 人難以接受之處。本文追索出此三者共通之假設,由否定該假 設,在基本觀念上,做一關鍵微調,而循生活行動、處境調節的 歷程,重新瞭解行動選擇和事件起因之間的關連。此微調核心在 於:深層來看,事件起因、行動選擇,本是生活行動、處境調節歷程中,同一事理相循相隨的不同面向。本文由交叉質問辯駁,循序闡明此關鍵微調的哲學立論基礎。
The dilemma we are in when we reflect on the free power of choice in our person and our place in the causal world can be dissolved if the relationship between action and event causation is appropriately described and explained. The present study examines three approaches to the dilemma: The first is based on how to interpret freedom given event causation, the second based on having leeway given probabilistic causation, and the third based on a postulation of agent-causation. None of them is found satisfactory.By finding out and negating their common assumption, the present study proposes a way of fine-tuning our conceptualization of what it is to act, and to choose, in a world enmeshed with causality. The core idea of the proposal is that, at bottom, event causation and the ways we act and choose are inseparable from each other in our embodiedinteractions with the environment. The philosophical basis of the proposal is made explicit and defended.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 27
何建 興
Ho, Chien-hsing
商羯羅論不可說者的言說
Śaṅkara on Saying the Unsayable
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對印度教吠檀多不二論的宗師商羯羅(Wavkara)而言,作為萬 有本體以及吾人真性的大梵或真我(梵我,brahman-ātman),不具 有任何屬性,也超越一切思想與言詮,易言之,梵我是非語言思 議所能臻及的“不可說者”。問題是,以語言指涉終極真實一事 似乎無可避免,此外,商氏推崇的《奧義書》等聖典也於梵我多 所言說。如是,對商羯羅而言,我人應如何理解聖典語言的指涉 作用?我人還能否以任何方式言說那不可說者?在簡略介紹商羯羅的不二論哲學之後,本文探討《奧義書》 與商羯羅本人以梵我不可言詮的理由。其次,我們依序論述商氏 所採取,語言之於不可說者的三種表示法,亦即:(1)訴諸否定語的遮撥法。(2)訴諸間接肯定語辭的指示法。(3)訴諸明言的增益及其否定的隨說隨掃法。其後,本文參就「增益及其否定」一概念,討論這三種表示法的 異同關係。我們認為,商羯羅對於「如何言說不可說者」一課題 所提出的語言哲學進路頗具深意,也有極大的參考價值。
For Śaṅkara, the most renowned teacher of the Advaita Vedānta school of Hinduism, Brahman or Ātman as the sole ultimate reality underlying all beings is attribute-less, indivisible, unconceptualizable and unverbalizable. In other words, Brahman-Ātman is for him ineffable, well beyond the reach of human language. Yet, referring to the reality in words seems on many occasions inevitable, and the scriptures of the school do contain positive statements about the reality. How, then, should we understand the referring function of the scriptural language? How can one speak meaningfully of something that is unspeakable? In this paper I propose to expound Śaṅkara’s views on these issues.Śaṅkara, indeed, sets forth three methods by means of which one can make linguistic references to the unsayable: (1) the method of negation (netivāda), (2) the method of indication (lakṣaṇa-vṛtti), and (3) the method of imposition-cum-negation (adhyāropa-apavāda). The three methods will be closely examined in sequence with their mutual relationships exposed thereafter. The author is of the opinion that Śaṅkara’s linguistic approach toward ‘saying’ the unsayable is rather instructive and really worth our attention.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 27
Hans Lenk
Hans Lenk
Towards a Technologistic Methodology and Philosophy of Science
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學
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For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
過去數十年來,諸如Hacking 和Giere 等哲學家在討論科學 哲學時,已不再專注於科學理論本身,而是從實驗操控和建造模 型等方面來進行論述。就催生實作和技術取向的科學哲學而言,不管是Hacking 的實驗主義或是Giere 的模型論都貢獻良多。本 文要論證的是,科學哲學和工程技術學科的方法論兩者之間其實 可以彼此借鏡而相互受益。此外,不同的方法論進路也有必要整 合成一個更普遍的詮釋架構理論,而實作-理解-認知乃是被詮釋 和觀點所形塑而成的。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen
陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論
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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.
像古典力學一類的科學理論如何被檢驗?這個問題有個長 遠的歷史。在本文中,我將提議一個檢驗理論,建基在吉爾關於 科學理論結構的研究上。但我的模型觀點與吉爾有些微不同。我 將從理論性和歷史性兩個不同角度來展示:科學理論總是可以被 理解為擁有一個分類的模型體系的理論,其中包括高層的模型與 可落實模型;而且科學家總是透過可落實模型來檢驗理論。但 是,透過可落實模型把檢驗的結果傳送到高層的模型或原理,乃 是一件非常複雜的機制。因此,就算有一些可落實模型被印證或 否證,整體理論完全被印證或否證實際上不太可能。最後,我將 以說明牛頓理論的檢驗史為例,來佐證本文提議的檢驗理論。以 拉卡托斯的話來說,這個檢驗理論在本質上也是個針對歷史的 「合理重建」。
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