rozprawy |
1.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
Transcendentalia i uniwersalia:
Próba ustalenia ich znaczeń
Transcendental and Universal Concepts
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The determination of the meaning of transcendental and universal concepts was brought about owing to the analysis of the structure of their content and of the extension of predication.Essential element and basis of the definition of the subject is the analysis of the problem of their structure. Problem of the content and extension of predication is only a necessary consequence of their particular structure (construction).The determining of the structure of the concepts was brought about by the analysis of the „place“ where they are formed. This „place“ is intellect i.e. the acts of theoretical intellectual cognition, not sensual nor pragmatic (sensual and intellectual) cognition. Determining the place where they are formed prepared the definition of the way in which they are constructed. It has been shown that universal concepts are formed in a different way from transcendental ohes. Universal concepts are formed as result of spontaneous abstraction (called also total) if they are prescien- tific concepts or, if they are universal scientific concepts (where we work up the content as result of methodical abstraction called induction according to peripatetic tradition. This induction is also reduced to spontaneous abstraction but in its further acts is directed to determined aims. Transcendental notions, however, are not formed by means of abstraction but by means of a more complicated „separation“ which is conditioned by existential judgements whose content is obtained by means of predicative judgements which express both the content of a thing and its existence. Abstract functions always omit actual existence o£ a thing if any real element of being is omitted.Constructions subordinated to the cognition formed in result of separate cognitive processes (concepts make cognition possible) appear to be different in their structure. For universal concepts are a group of characteristics (attributes) or transcendental relations with identical „angles“ of relation in the content of the thing. Transcendental notions, on the other hand, are main primary judgements in which intellect „sees“ being and exchangeable values in it. Obviously main primary intellectual judgements contain in a material sense (from the point of view of the matter and not only of the afirmation called judgement sensu stricto both the existential judgements and series of negative judgements. The judgement of identity which is the main transcendental „concept“ of being contains in its subject existentially being expressed and in predicate essentially expressed being or vice versa.That is why the elements functioning as subject and predicate from the point of view of their material content are a group of existential judgements. Everything that actually exists is determined in itself and identical with itself. Only such primary judgement can be called „transcendental concept of being“ because its structure expresses the structure of being composed of essence and existence. Such „transcendental concept“ is an intuition of reality which Thomas Aquinas in qu. 6, 1 in De Trinitate called intellectus.From different constructions of universal and transcendental concepts conceived in this way results determination of their different contents. Universal concepts express only content and essential aspect of things in a particular scheme i.e. in an abstract and univocaJ way. At the same time content of concepts and content of things are identical from the point of view of the concepts as there is no reason to deny this identity of content if existence and essence in being are really non-identical. With identical content in a concept and in a thing there is only a question of a different existence of the content in intellect and in the thing itself. Transcendental notions, on the other hand, include all the reality with its all, even smallest symptoms without excluding any element of being. They are therefore analogous concepts, equivocal and concrete including i nd expressing everything actu confuse.As to the extension of the predication of these concepts, universal concepts predicate only about certain groups of beings arranged mto certain classes and species. These classes are narrower or wider. They are not formed arbitrarily but as the result of different structures of being. ]n any case what we call species exists as universale metaphysicum identified with particular concretes in which relations constituting the content of these beings are very similar to relations in other beings included m the predication of the same universal concept. On the other hand transcendental notions predicate about all the reality and all its symptoms both substantial and accidental. They form internal content of every being but at the same time are not exhausted in any concrete as had been proved by the process of forming them by means of separation. The extension of predication is the most noticeable quality differentiating universal and transcendental concepts, it is not an essential quality, however, but to a great extent derivative. Essential differences between these concepts lie in their different structures.
|
|
|
2.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Stanisław Kaminski
Stanisław Kaminski
O ostatecznych przesłankach w filozofii bytu
Ultimate premises of the philosophy of being
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
After the introductory remarks on the conditions of the proper research on the methodology of the philosophy of being or metaphysics, ultimate premises in various types of special (positive) sciences were briefly charakterized. Thus: in formal (deductive) sciences analytical propositions are the ultimate specific premises; in natural sciences — propositions purely observational; in arts — propositions based directly on observation and at the same time on the understanding of something which is on expression. Metaphysics of Aristotle and his continuators cannot be treated as one of the above mentioned types of science. It has its own character and its theses are general and necessary factual (not verbal) statements. As the result of this, ultimate premises of metaphysics must have the same character. Before showing which propositions are the ultimate premises of the philosophy of being an attempt had been made to solve the problem if general and necessary factual statements are at all possible. The affirmative answer was being proved.The ultimate premises of metaphysics should be these theses of metaphysics which are not deduced themselves but from which all others are deduced. It seems that strictly speaking there are no such propositions in the philosophy of being. The whole group of the essential theses of general metaphysics forms a system of something like axioms. All the theses though partly based on each other are also proved directly. They are therefore the work of intellectus principiorum and at the same time supported by other theses. At the end of the article the explanation of the basis of metaphysical theses has been considered with a special attention paid to the problem how to reach metaphysical principia which are: the general and necessary factual statements.
|
|
|
3.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Witold Marciszewski
Witold Marciszewski
W sprawie konieczności logicznej twierdzeń metafizyki
On the logical necessity of metaphysical propositions
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The paper begins with the presentation of the views of Hume and logical positivism, that statements about facts (the so called real statements) cannot be necessary (if „necessary' is understood as „the one which is known true independently of experience“).This point of view ought to be carefully analysed by the adherents of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas who to the statements of their philosophy attributed two simultaneous properties of logical necessity and i eality.The method here applied is a sort of conceptual analysis. This method consists in defining concepts in terms of relevant metalinguistic predicates (such as „true“, „atomic“ and similar other ones) and of logical constans. Owing to this method the application becomes possible of logical calculus to the comparison of the extensions of the predicates (we confirm, for instance, the equivalence or lack of equivalence between analysed definitions). In this way we can formulate the following definition of necessary statement:(N) The statement p is necessary in language L if and only if no true atomic sentence implies here the negation of p.The definition (N) allows also to establish the relation of inclusion between the class of analytic and the class of necessary sentences, where the former are meant as statements reducible to logical truths by means of mere definitions.Next a satisfactory condition is formulated, which, when fulfilled by a sentence, makes this sentence real:(R) If from a sentence p and some true atomic sentence q follows an other true atomic (sentence, then p is real.It is not difficult to realize that (N) and (R) do not bring forward sufficient grounds to establish an exclusion between the classes of necessary and real sentences. Morever, one may easily show the instances satisfying simultaneously (N) and (R), what is a quite satisfactory argument, for the thesis that necessity does not exclude reality.In the last part of the article two statements of thomistic mataphysics ere discussed. These statements enjoy logical necessity as being a substitution of logical truths; on the other hand the same propositions satisfy the condition of reality (R). One may object to a thus formulated condition on the ground that it is too weak and, therefore, it cannot secure the knowledge against the metaphysics. But one can point that there are many theorems of science acknowledged as real by virtue of the proposed test of reality, i. e. the same test, which is satisfied by discussed metaphysical statements.
|
|
|
4.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Antoni Stępień
Antoni Stępień
W sprawie stosunku między teorią poznania a metafizyką
On the relation between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The author distinguishes at least four relations between the theory of knowledge (considered as science whose subject is knowledge as true and whose final aim is an evaluation of human knowledge) and metaphysics (considered as a science dealing with being as being whose ultimate aim is to give the most basic rationale of what exists), i.e. 1. genetic or psychological relation, 2. historical relation, 3. methodological relation, 4. epistemological relation. In the first two relations, in which time is concerned, mataphysics come before the theory of knowledge as we first study the being, and only afterwards reflect upon the truth of our knowledge. As to the third relation (as regards proofs or justification) both sciences are independent: metaphysics is not based on the premises taken from the theory of knowledge, and the theory of knowledge is not based on the premises taken from metaphysics. In its epistemological aspect, however, theory of knowledge is primary to metaphysics: it evaluates both itself and metaphysics while metaphysics does not evaluate either itself or the theory of knowledge. Here, however, we are not considered with an ontological relation as the relations between the subjects of both sciences do not give us any conclusions as to the relations between these sciences.The article analyses and refutes the argument for the methodological and epistemological priority of metaphysics among philosophical sciences which may be suggested by contemporary Thomists. It is stated in the conclusion of tire article that to achieve its main aim the theory of knowledge cannot and need not be based upon an objective theory of the structure of knowledge (as metaphysics or psycho!ophysiology of knowledge). It should be not so much a system as a systematized reflection using in its research phenomenological description (without Husserl's btoyy] and contemporary means of methodological analysis worked out by semantics and formal logic.
|
|
|
5.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Stanisław Adamczyk
Stanisław Adamczyk
Różnica między istotą a istnieniem substancjalnym w nauce Arystotelesa
Różnica między istotą a istnieniem substancjalnym w nauce Arystotelesa
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Dans cet article je m’efforce de démontrer, contre l’opinion aujourd’hui généralement admise, qu’Aristote non seulement dans ses Analytiques Secondaries, dans le classique chapitre 7, mais aussi dans quatre autres textes qui jusqu’ici n’ont pas encore été pris en considération sous ce rapport, à savoir dans le livre II, chap. 1 et 4 Peri Psyches, et dans le livre VII, chap. 3 et le livre IX, chap. 3, des Métaphysiques pensait à la différence réelle (métaphysique) entre l’essence et l’existence dans tous les êtres soumis au mouvement, et même dans toutes les substances. Ainsi sera int éliminées à la fois la conception de Gilson que Aristote aurait seulement présenté la structure essentiele de l’être et robjection faite par Rougier que la différence mentionnée entre l’essence et l’existence qu’on rencontre dans toutes les oeuvres du Docteur Angélique serait d’origime platonicienne et ferait de sa doctrine un conglomérat qui bouleverse l'économie du système péripatétique.
|
|
|
recenzje |
6.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
H. Bortnowska
H. Bortnowska
The Structure of Metaphysics
The Structure of Metaphysics
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
7.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. Majdański
St. Majdański
Problemy konstruktiwnogo naprawieni ja w matematike
Problemy konstruktiwnogo naprawieni ja w matematike
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
8.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
W. Marciszewski
W. Marciszewski
The uses of argument
The uses of argument
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
9.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Tadeusz Kwiatkowski
Tadeusz Kwiatkowski
La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation
La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
10.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
A. Stępień
A. Stępień
Teoria poznania w Odczytach filozoficznych Tadeusza Czezowskiego
Teoria poznania w Odczytach filozoficznych Tadeusza Czezowskiego
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
11.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
Si. K.
Wandlungen des mathematischen Denken. Eine Einführung in die Grundlagenprobleme der Mathematik
Wandlungen des mathematischen Denken. Eine Einführung in die Grundlagenprobleme der Mathematik
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
12.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
St.K.
Methods and cryteria of reasoning. An inquiry into the structure of controversy
Methods and cryteria of reasoning. An inquiry into the structure of controversy
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
13.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
St, K.
Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik
Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
14.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
St. K.
Truth and Denotation. A Study in Semantical Theory
Truth and Denotation. A Study in Semantical Theory
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
15.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
St K.
Einführung in die formale Logik
Einführung in die formale Logik
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
16.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
St. K.
St. K.
Formale Logik
Formale Logik
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
materiały |
17.
|
Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 1
Bibliografia pozycji z teorii i metodologii metafizyki
Bibliografia pozycji z teorii i metodologii metafizyki
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|