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Displaying: 1-20 of 1823 documents


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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Mark C. Murphy On the Superiority of Divine Legislation Theory to Divine Command Theory
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The view that human law can be analyzed in terms of commands was subjected to devastating criticism by H.L.A. Hart in his 1961 The Concept of Law. Two objections that Hart levels against the command theory of law also make serious trouble for divine command theory. Divine command theorists would do well to jettison command as the central concept of their moral theory, and, following Hart’s lead, instead appeal to the concept of a rule. Such a successor view—divine legislation theory—has the attractions of divine command theory without the unacceptable limitations of command theories that Hart identifies.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Anne Jeffrey A Divine Friendship Theory of Moral Motivation
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One task of moral theory is to answer the question, “Why be moral?” This paper describes a particular theistic theory’s account of moral motivation, which I call the Divine Friendship Theory. I illustrate its plausibility and promise by showing how well the theory does along two dimensions along which an answer to the why-be-moral question can fare better or worse, namely, being psychologically realistic and supporting recognizably moral actions and attitudes. of the answer to the why-be-moral question. Given that the Divine Friendship Theory does well on each dimension, it deserves serious consideration.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Rope Kojonen Why Evolution Does Not Make the Problem of Evil Worse
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Does evolutionary history with all its apparent contingency, wastefulness, animal suffering and innumerable extinctions make the problem of natural evil worse? In this article, I argue that it does not. I respond to two main ways in which the evolutionary problem of evil might make things worse: (1) by increasing the scale of suffering to include billions of additional creatures over hundreds of millions of years, and (2) due to the apparent cruelty of evolution by natural selection as a method of creation. I argue that both problems fail to make a difference when considered in depth. Instead, the problem of natural evil is based mostly on factors that do not depend on evolutionary biology, such as the existence of animal mortality and suffering, as well as chance and contingency in the world.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Timothy Perrine Reasonable Action, Dominance Reasoning, and Skeptical Theism
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This paper regiments and responds to an objection to skeptical theism. The conclusion of the objection is that it is not reasonable for skeptical theists to prevent evil, even when it would be easy for them to do so. I call this objection a “Dominance-Reasoning Objection” because it can be regimented utilizing dominance reasoning familiar from decision theory. Nonetheless, I argue, the objection ultimately fails because it neglects a distinction between justifying goods that are necessary for the existence of a good and those that are necessary for God’s permission of the good.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Justin Morton A Defense of Global Theological Voluntarism
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In this paper, I challenge the recent consensus that global versions of theological voluntarism—on which all moral facts are explained by God’s action— fail, because only local versions—on which only a proper subset of moral facts are so explained—can successfully avoid the objection that theological voluntarism entails that God’s actions are arbitrary. I argue that global theological voluntarism can equally well avoid such arbitrariness. This does not mean that global theological voluntarism should be accepted, but that the primary advantage philosophers have taken local views to have over global views is, in fact, no advantage at all.
symposium: god, suffering, and the value of free will, by laura w. ekstrom
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Simon Kittle Evaluating the Value of Free Will: Some Comments on Ekstrom’s God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will
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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Timothy O’Connor Laura Ekstrom’s God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Thomas D. Senor Ekstrom on Free Will and the Problem of Evil
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Laura W. Ekstrom Replies to Critics: Kittle, O’connor, Senor
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book reviews
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
David Brown David Mcnaughton, Ed.: Joseph Butler: the Analogy of Religion
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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
John A. Keller Jc Beall: The Contradictory Christ
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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Sabrina B. Little Nathan L. King: The Excellent Mind: Intellectual Virtues for Everyday Life
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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
C.A. McIntosh Colin Ruloff and Peter Horban, Eds.: Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology: God and Rational Belief
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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Beth A. Rath Paul K. Moser: The Divine Goodness of Jesus: Impact and Response
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15. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Ignacio Silva Jamie Boulding: The Multiverse and Participatory Metaphysics: a Theologica L Exploration
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articles
16. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Robert J. Hartman Gratitude to God for Our Own Moral Goodness
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Someone owes gratitude to God for something only if God benefits her and God is morally responsible for doing so. These requirements concerning benefit and moral responsibility generate reasons to doubt that human beings owe gratitude to God for their own moral goodness. First, moral character must be generated by its possessor’s own free choices, and so God cannot benefit moral character in human beings. Second, owed gratitude requires being morally responsible for providing a benefit, which rules out owed gratitude to God because God must do what is best. Both reasons are unpersuasive. I argue that God can benefit morally good character in human beings with and without their free choices. Subsequently, I argue against views of moral responsibility that preclude divine moral responsibility and argue that influential accounts of moral responsibility preserve it. Thus, these two requirements generate no problem for owed gratitude to God.
17. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Stuart Jesson Nietzsche and the Problem of Evil: Theodicy, Morality, and Nihilism
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I provide a Nietzschean reading of the way that moral concerns shape and structure discussion of the problem of evil, through consideration of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism and compassion. Although, on this account, all theodicy is nihilistic in one sense, in another sense theodicy actually inhibits the fully-fledged nihilism of despair, which “judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist.” I go on to apply Nietzsche’s account of “devaluation” to moral critique of theodicy. Such critique is rooted in compassion, but in such a way that it is self-undermining: once the “protest” that motivates compassion rules out any appeal to a world that transcends earthly suffering, protest against suffering is revealed as a purely negative posture; this is what one would expect, if compassion were a nihilistic value from the beginning.
18. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Allison Krile Thornton Petitionary Prayer: Wanting to Change the Mind of the Being Who Knows Best
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On the standard understanding of petitionary prayer, the purpose of prayer is to make a difference to what God will do. In this article, I argue that such an activity does not make sense.
19. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Brian Leftow What Is Sin?
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This paper defends a definition of sin. I begin by defending the project of trying to do so. I then suggest that the Bible does not clearly define it. I then consider some candidate definitions, pointing out ways they fall short. I finally introduce my method for coming up with a better definition. I use the method to evaluate a recent proposal. Finally I offer my own. I suggest that the method favors mine over the other proposal I discuss.
20. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Levi Durham The Father of Faith Rationally Reconstructed
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There is a tension for those who want to simultaneously hold that Abraham’s disposition to sacrifice Isaac is epistemically justified and yet hold that a contemporary father would not be justified in believing that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. While some commentators have correctly pointed out that one must take Abraham’s long relationship with God into account when considering Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, they do not entertain the possibility that his hearing this commandment is evidence against the hypothesis that Abraham is speaking to God. I grant this possibility. But I argue that when God commands Abraham to do the unthinkable, Abraham’s previously acquired evidence could still be sufficient to justify his belief that he is speaking with God. And in making this argument, I attempt to show what differentiates Abraham from the contemporary father who thinks that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son.