This paper presents the author’s vision of a computer game, called “The Game of Life,” which would function as a classroom exercise to assist in the teaching of philosophical concepts such as principles of individuation, supervenience, the phenomena/noumena distinction, the physical stance, design stance, and intentional stance (as described by Dennet), the argument from design, and even monads. Originally invented by the British mathematician John Conway, the author describes a computer game version which would aid in philosophical pedagogy by allowing students the ability to experiment interactively with concrete instantiations of the highly idealized concepts that philosophy works with. The author addresses the pedagogical value of such interactive experimentation and argues that all philosophy laboratories should be stocked with such a computational workbench.

This paper presents the idea, structure, history, goals, and accomplishments of mathematics and science laboratories as they have been organized and taught at Trinity College. The laboratories are designed to develop specific science and mathematics problem-solving skills, presenting them within the context of humanities-related inquiry (e.g. neural network theory within the context of philosophy of mind). These laboratories are especially valuable in providing humanities students with literacy in advanced science and mathematics materials that, since they are not requisite for humanities majors, humanities students would not be exposed to otherwise. Especially in the case of philosophy, laboratories bear the additional benefit of dissolving insularity, opening up study onto directly relevant fields and enriching and informing philosophical inquiry. The author concludes by considering philosophy’s relationship to science and mathematics, what these relationships imply for how a philosophy education should be structured, and the important role that science and mathematics laboratories play in that education.

While there are many significant ethical questions which can deliver the lessons of an introductory ethics course (e.g. global warming, world hunger, genetic engineering), students do not face these moral difficulties directly in their lives. The author argues that commonly-faced ethical questions are more effective for rendering the content of introductory ethics immediately relevant to students. This paper presents a general outline of an introductory ethics course structured around the theme of drunk driving. Not only is drunk driving something that college students are confronted with consistently, but the topic lends itself to discussions of moral subjectivism and moral skepticism, various moral theories’ framings of the problem, the assignment of culpability and conditions which mitigate it, secondary responsibility, intoxication and agency, punishment, deterrents, contrition, and forgiveness. The author details each of these discussions and concludes by considering further benefits of teaching a course built around this theme.

While the subject matter and conclusions of scholarly meta-ethical debate are of great import, it is quite difficult to convey this material to students in applied ethics courses where the principal teaching goals are an introduction to pressing moral dilemmas and to the critical thinking skills needed to approach them. After a brief discussion of common obstacles to teaching applied ethics, this paper presents two strategies for teaching applied ethics which remain faithful to the complexities of meta-ethical theory. Under the “advocate approach,” the instructor argues for one particular moral theory and teaches rival theories and moral issues with reference to the preferred theory. This allows for specific moral responses to moral questions studied and satisfies student desire for concreteness of answers in a philosophy course. Under the “outfitter approach,” the instructor refrains from committing to one ethical theory and spends more time addressing advantages and drawbacks of each position, thereby showing the limited scope of many moral theories and communicating to students the risk of taking up a moral position too hastily. The author relates both approaches to meta-ethical concerns such as the possibility of moral truths and moral certainty, the relationship between competing moral systems, and the status of a moral theory.

This paper presents and discusses the results of an email survey which asked participants to share their views on the efficacy of multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, or matching questions as evaluation methods in philosophy courses. First, the structure of the survey and its contents are explained. Next, responses are broken down along the lines of student responses and teacher responses. In both cases, there was significant disagreement among respondents, though there were notable patterns emerged. Student arguments in favor of non-essay assessment emphasized the expedience; arguments against emphasized the inadequacy of such evaluation methods to the nuances of philosophical material. Teacher responses echoed student responses but included considerations of fairness, ambiguity in student answers, student motivation, and justifications for non-essay assessment in specific contexts. Finally, the author discusses respondents’ opinions on whether philosophy departments should ban non-essay questions. The author concludes by suggesting that the results of this survey merit attention as an indication of how widespread the difficulties of non-essay assessment are and as an indication of the diversity of views on the subject.

The author recounts and reflects on the experience of building and teaching a course designed to show students the relevance of philosophy to their daily lives. For a course consisting mostly of students who were women, many of whom were non-traditional students, the author attempted to avoid an excessively arid or abstract presentation of philosophical material. To this end, the selected course themes were friendship, romantic love, and obligations of grown children to their parents. The author discusses, defends, and critiques several trade-offs that resulted from this course’s unique structure: an explicitly non-adversarial approach to pedagogy was helpful and perhaps necessary, but also very demanding of both students and teacher; students selected and developed their own important philosophical questions to research and write a term paper on, but the course did not cover as much material as was desired; students reflected a deep personal attachment to the material and the experience of studying it, but this made evaluation of their work difficult. The author urges professional philosophers to think seriously on the role of philosophy in an undergraduate education and ends this paper with a pedagogical dilemma that philosophers face arising from their position on the emotion/intellect dichotomy. Included is a course outline.

This paper presents three lessons designed to alert students to the setting in which they are learning (the classroom) and the ways in which this setting provides the context for a discourse which is different than everyday discourse. In the first lesson, students examine empirical studies that illustrate how being in a classroom significantly changes how one reasons about even the most basic logical relationships. In the second lesson, Levi critiques an imaginative way of teaching logic that, while appearing to call on students to use critical reasoning skills they already possess, still fails to take into account its setting. In the final lesson, students translate an editorial into the form of declarative sentences, ordered as premises and a conclusion. Students are prompted to consider what is lost in this rendering and how it distorts the original argument, after which a more successful strategy for paraphrasing and evaluating arguments is attempted. These lessons aim to teach students to think for themselves by encouraging them not to learn logic by wrote, but to see its lessons as tools whose very applicability to real life is something they must critically evaluate.

There are at least two notable and distinct literatures on the subject of questions: the educational literature, analyzing questions with a pedagogical upshot in mind, and the philosophical literature, analyzing questions with the concerns of philosophy of language and logic. This paper goes some way towards bridging these literatures by taking a philosophical stance on questions and by examining how a basic treatment of questions as a philosophical theme can greatly aid the introduction of students to the study of philosophy. The foreignness of philosophy to many students means that they enter philosophy courses with many assumptions about it. Discussing their assumptions about questions (e.g. “There are certain questions that should not be asked;” “There are certain questions that cannot be answered”) is a useful way to ease students into philosophical inquiry. This approach also allows for the enrichment of students’ taxonomies of questions. Unlike many other answer-oriented disciplines, philosophy places a high value on the role of questions in inquiry and pays close attention to how different types of questions call for different types of answers. The author defines a number of types of questions (normatively answerable, unanswerable, and defective) and addresses both their philosophical import as well as their value for students.