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American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 91, Issue 4, Fall 2017
Dietrich von Hildebrand

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Displaying: 1-19 of 19 documents


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1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Michał Bardel The Island Community of Spinalonga Seen in the Light of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Phenomenology of Community
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The paper aims at a phenomenological clarification of the “island community” category in the light of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s metaphysics of community. I begin with presenting a brief social history of the Spinalonga leprosarium as a model of an island community; then follows a sketch of some of the main findings made by the German philosopher concerning community per se (as presented in his Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft), and finally an attempt is made to explain the place of island communities in Hildebrand’s hierarchy of communities. I aim to show that an island community should be taken as a special example of what he calls a life circle (Lebenskreis). It is special because it somehow transcends the “primitiveness” imposed by Hildebrand on Lebenskreise in general, as a result of being rooted in a serious realm of value and meaning (Sinn- und Wertbereich).
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Mariano Crespo The Husserlian Sources of Emotive Consciousness in Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Moral Philosophy
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In this paper, I would like to show, in general terms, the Husserlian sources of the way in which von Hildebrand understands emotive consciousness, while still recognizing important differences beween the two authors. To carry out this task I will develop four points of contact between the two thinkers: (1) the idea of the existence of a priori laws in the emotional sphere, (2) the defense of spiritual (geistige) forms of affectivity, (3) the idea that affective responses to value can be correct or incorrect, that is, adequate or not according to the value to which they respond, and (4) the existence of a kind of emotive evidence (Gemütsevidenz) that parallels evidence in the realm of judgment.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
John F. Crosby Developing Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Personalism
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I explore the personalism embedded in von Hildebrand’s moral philosophy, and then I explore the personalism in his later account of love. I claim that his personalism was significantly developed in his later work, and that it can be still further developed by us. I begin by explaining what Hildebrandian value-response is, and then I proceed to show how he subsequently qualified this foundational concept, first in his Ethics but especially in his late work, The Nature of Love, and here especially through the concept of Eigenleben that was introduced in that work. I am particularly interested in showing why the personalism of von Hildebrand’s thought is enriched through this concept.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
M. T. Lu Love, Freedom, and Morality in Kant and Dietrich von Hildebrand
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Modern commentators like Allen Wood have noted that for Kant there “is a basic tension in human nature between loving people and respecting them.” Love is a threat to pure morality insofar as love is an empirical inclination and any will determined by such an inclination is unfree. In this paper, I begin by exploring why Kant thinks that love is a threat to moral freedom. Drawing on the insights of Dietrich von Hildebrand, I propose instead an analysis of love as “value-response.” I argue that a more complete phenomenological analysis of the nature of human affectivity (as fundamentally intentional and responsive) exposes a serious defect in Kant’s moral psychology, particularly his unreasonable denial of the compatibility of higher-order affectivity and human freedom. Drawing on von Hildebrand’s notion of “cooperative freedom,” I argue that not only is a higher-order spiritual affectivity compatible with freedom and morality, but it is essential to it.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Mark K. Spencer The Many Powers of the Human Soul: Von Hildebrand’s Contributions to Scholastic Philosophical Anthropology
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Dietrich von Hildebrand is often seen as being at odds with the scholastics in his anthropology. I argue that he in fact uses scholastic principles when distinguishing the powers of the human soul, but he uses these principles to distinguish many more powers in our souls than the scholastics do. His expansion of the list of human powers both is supported by and safeguards his expanded metaphysics of given reality. I first consider the principles that the scholastics use in reasoning about powers. I then show how von Hildebrand’s account of the human person is hylomorphic. Finally, I present von Hildebrand’s account of human powers, in light of the scholastic principles, considering his accounts first of bodily powers and then of powers in the soul.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Josef Seifert Human Action and the Human Heart: A Critique of an Error in Hildebrand’s Ethics, Philosophical Anthropology, and Philosophy of Love
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Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience.
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Rocco Buttiglione Reflections on Dietrich von Hildebrand’s My Battle Against Hitler
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8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
A Dietrich von Hildebrand Bibliography
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9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 91 > Issue: 4
Contents of Volume 91 (2017)
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