The most controversial aspect of generative grammar of Chomsky was a hypothesis that humans have a specific cognitive innate structure in language acquisition, called afterwards the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis. That approach was consequently sustained by him in Syntactic Structures, Aspects of The Theory of Syntax, and The Minimalist Program. In fact, Chomsky’s analytic attention was mostly focused on the structure of the syntax of language, that in turn is to generate different phonological structures as well as semantic ‘interpretation’ respectively. Identifying of UG with a deep-structure level of a language did not influenced in solving a problem of innate cognitive structure of humans. Ray Jackendoff, grown up among the generativists, does not share the ‘syntactocentric’ approach of Chomsky proposing the ‘parallel architecture’ in which phonological, syntactic and semantic levels are reciprocally interfaced in the program of ‘biolinguistics’ that is to encourage the necessary culture of inter-scientific collaboration. By means of his theory of conceptual semantics Jackendoff tries to show that a system of concepts expressed in human language is an autonomous generative component of human brain/mind that processed out of evolution.

There are two basic notions of truth (objectivism and subjectivism) connected with two understandings of the world (respectively, realism and idealism). Author claims, against deflationists, that the concept of truth is not metaphysically neutral. Tarski’s T-schema requires some metaphysical reading. Reading the schema from the left to the right, leads to realism. Reading the schema from the right to the left, leads to anti-realism. The concept of truth is the part of some ontological package deal or alethic network. There are two basic packages, competing since centuries, that focus on two poles in human cognition: subject and object.

The subject of this article is the symbol mechanism proposed by J.F. Drewnowski as a tool for the accurate formulation of sentences in science, including theology. The tool consists of three elements: classical propositional calculus, classical predicate calculus without variable functors and constant functor of the elementary proposition f (x,y,z). This sentence contains three arguments of three different types that correspond to the frame of reference, things and qualities of things. The purpose of this article is to show the language apparatus in the context of author’s other works as well as explain the terms characteristic for the author in order to enable the assessment of the value and timeliness of this idea.

In this paper the Author presents some remarks and hypotheses concerning the logic of revealed theology according to approach of Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas Aquinas. First of all he shows that in their opinion revealed theology uses logic (as a science of correct reasonings). He also discusses the problem of scientific status of revealed theology on the grounds of the most important methodological fragments from their summas of theology; in this light he analyses if the revealed theology in their view may be interpreted as a kind of axiomatic deductive system. The Author inclines to give a positive answer on this question and presents a couple of arguments for such a hypothesis, however he is aware that the point is not totally clear and—hence—open for discussion. The next topic is a question if we can admit that Thomas adopts one of non-monotonic logic (understood here as relation of inference or relation of consequence) in some reasonings which we find in his Summa Theologiae. The Author gives a positive answer and confronts his opinion with an opinion of his opponent. In the third set of remarks he wonders if we may adopt that Aquinas accepts some local modifications in logic (this time understood as a some general rules of thinking), such as “the logic of Trinity” or “the Christologic”. Finally the Author invokes a case of the logic of negative theology and a nature of negation adopted according to this approach. However these remarks presented in this article concern the works of Albert and Thomas, the Author tends to affirm that their approach to the Catholic revealed theology is a proper one and—in this light—these conclusions may be valid for contemporary theology.

What did Søren Kierkegaard think on Martin Luther? In some cases he treated to the German reformer positively, but simultaneously very often severily criticized him. Generally speaking, relationship of Journals author to Martin Luther was complicated and ambiguous. Kierkegaard strived to the amendment of contemporary Danish Lutheranism, which was burdened by Luther’s doctrinal errors, and also deteriorated by later generations of Lutherans. Danish thinker accused Luther of considerable reducing of ethical Christian demands by means of moral act values depreciation, abolition of clergyman celibacy and dissolution of monastery life, rejection of ascetic practices like voluntary poverty, fastings, renunces and intensive contemplative life, connection of religious doctrine and cult with real politics. It was main reason for secularization of contemporary to Kierkegaard Danish Christianity.Over the course of time with Kierkegaard the immanent criticism of Lutheranism turned into some kind of external one. Luther’s doctrine was not sufficient for him. He disclosed essential lacks. Hence in spite of clear declarations of remaining at the national faith, he leaned more and more towards Catholicism. Kierkegaard discovered, Protestantism was only “corrective remedy” to Catholicism, but from the beginning the its existence was dependent on the Catholic Church. Hence, Danish thinker was rather protagonist to shape contemporary Protestantism according to catholic patterns than to reform Catholicism according to protestant rules.The main aim of his article is to indicate the whole estimation range of the Luther and Lutheranism, we find in Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals. Furthermore, we do not decide anything about theological rightness or unjustness of Danish thinker criticism directed to German reformer Martin Luther.

The article discusses the Fregean way of producing multiple quantifications and distinction between complex and simple predicates. In the proper sense only the complex predicates are a kind of the incomplete expression (unselbsständig). Many contemporary authors of general logic textbooks do not pay due attention to that determinants.

From the logical point of view, the most interesting among the pronouns are demonstrative pronouns (especially: this/that), indefinite pronouns (a/an), definite pronoun (the) and quantifying pronouns (every, all, some). Unlike personal pronouns (e.g. I/you/he) they are in fact functors (of the n/n category).The differentiation between personal pronouns (n) and functor pronouns (n/n) is vital here. This differentiation does not exist in traditional grammar.The study is limited to determining functor pronouns with the use of logical properties of quantifying expressions, which are functor pronouns themselves – all (π) and some (σ) – formally expressed in the quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN). The calculus is properly enriched with demonstrative pronouns (demonstrativa), in connection to certain studies by Toshiharu Waragai (LID). An attempt to employ this system (BRND) in the analysis of some fragments of Ockham’s Summa Logicae is shown here. The work is concluded with the analysis of a functor pronoun the only (ι), being a special case of a definite pronoun, which is characterised here by means of rules. The work reveals the connection between this pronoun and the operator of definite descriptions (marked in the same way) in relation to a certain Ludwik Borkowski’s conception.

The article deals with the problem of truth by Aristotle. The study begins a presentation of the main cognitive dispositions, mentioned in Book VI of Nicomachean Ethics, by which man achieve the truth. A next object of analysis is the truth in logical understanding. Its “place” is the intellect performing acts of judgment, standing at the basis of discursive knowledge. Having in mind that the determinants of so understood truth are things, further investigations are focused on except logical aspects of truth. Aristotle defines them, as in the case of logical truth, on the base of human cognitive dispositions, which–apart from discursive knowledge (epistēmē)—include theoretical wisdom (sophia), practical wisdom (phronēsis), desire (orexis), and art (technē). The actions emerging from these dispositions are also a form of cognitive agreement with reality, and consequently can be considered as a kind of truth. Despite that here as well, the truth is connected with the cognitive functions, its determinants are also real things. This leads to a crucial question of the presented article which concerns the truth of things themselves. According to Author, Aristotle does not give a directly answer, although his certain remarks touch this problem. Their examination allows better to understand the later conceptions of truth.

The notion of relation is one of the most important concepts present in our language.This study propose some extension of elementary ontology (OE) for relational variables and defining in his framework the concepts of the classical calculus of relations. Such enriched elementary ontology (OER) is a better tool for the analysis of natural language.It is shown that syllogistic with the negative terms enriched by so called oblique syllogisms (SNU with the axioms C1–C5) is a fragment of OER system (Theorem 1).The OER system is enriched next with individual variables (a,b,c) and by assuming the individual term referentiality (axiom A2) we obtain OER* system. The Proof that the classical calculus of relations (KRR) is a part of the system OER* (Theorem 2) is given.

C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics.The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics.The paper—apart from presenting LP—also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.

This paper presents a reconstruction of the argument for the logical possibility of zombies, proposed by David Chalmers, which has been debated in analytical philosophy for at least fifteen years now. Beside discussing it, I’m trying to analyze every of its premises. My aim is, especially, to present how the reasoning can show that: (a) zombies/zombie worlds are genuinely conceivable; (b) conceivability is a good guide to possibility; (c) the possibility of zombies is philosophicallysignificant. I’m particularly putting emphasis on some issues concerning two-dimensional semantics and distinctions of conceivability. The conclusion of this paper is that the argument is still not refuted, so a discussion over it should be conducted, instead of a priori refutation. The debate over zombies may have a positive influence on many fields of philosophical investigation.

The paper presents a little-known episode in the reception of Plato’s dialogues in Polish culture in the interwar period, namely the radio adaptation of the dialogues. The adaptation was based on four dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, all of them translated by Władysław Witwicki. This radio drama was very popular and was broadcasted several times. Its popularity followed the fact that the forefront of the Polish actors interpreted the outstanding Polish texts delivered by Witwicki. The paper presents the reception of the four mentioned above dialogues by the professional readers, philologists and the classic languages’ teachers. The radio drama constitutes entirely separate field of the influence of Plato’s works. Radio made Plato’s Socrates accessible to the unprofessional wide audience. There was, however, a peculiar case of reception of the radio drama among the listeners. It was applied for the didactic purposes by Henryk Jakubanis at his philosophical seminar which was carried in the interwar period in the Catholic University of Lublin.