The paper investigates the concepts of law and violence in Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin, especially in their works On violence and Critique of violence. The main objective of the research is to find similarities and differences between the definitions of these concepts in the thought of these philosophers. The main thesis of the research is the understanding that concepts of law and violence for Hannah Arendt are very different and the other hand, concepts of law and violence for Walter Benjamin apparently are the same.

The purpose of this paper, delivered at the Twenty Third World Congress in Philosophy, held in August 2013, hosted by National & Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece), is to propose a new eco-centric legal paradigm. This paradigm would constitute the fundamental base for the creation of an effective, global, legal mechanism based on a new legal system. The normative framework of this legal system will be consistent with convergence, unification and dissemination of principles of international law and worldwide national legal systems. Over the last seven thousand years, the law has undergone the two legal revolutions: socio- centric and person-centric which served the purposes of particular historical periods, such as, for the regulation of slavery and feudal state systems and the era of Modernistic societies. A third legal revolution has been necessitated by the globalisation following post-modernism. Such change would establish a new legal framework. This would regenerate modern processes of our civilization and serve to prevent a global financial crisis in the future. The proposed new eco-centric legal paradigm should become a dominant base for the third legal revolution. This legal paradigm would promote an imperative of Nature in the law and balance the hierarchy of power and wealth.

It is stated in The Swedish Environmental Code that (1) Nature is worthy of protection, and (2) Humans have the right to modify and exploit nature. (1) can be interpreted as that nature has both extrinsic value (for the sake of humans) and intrinsic value (for the sake of itself). This may imply that damaging nature is morally wrong, as long as it isn’t necessary for humans’ survival. (2) can be interpreted to imply that it is allowed to damage nature even if it isn’t necessary for humans’ survival. The interpretation is based on the fact that the purpose of the Code is to promote sustainable development, which is often regarded not involve only ecological, but also social and economic dimensions. Given that these interpretations of (1) and (2) are correct, the Code recognizes humans a right that, when exercised, violates the attributed intrinsic value of nature, which is problematic. If the interpretations (or the ideas of what they imply) are incorrect, there is still something to learn. There are often signs of environmental law, both in Sweden and internationally, attributing nature intrinsic value. This apparently has consequences, and requires great carefulness.

In institutional settings affecting the formulation and implementation of international foreign and security policy, nation-states are influenced by Western standards of jurisprudence without explicit concern for religiously grounded legal frameworks (e.g., canon law in Roman Catholicism; halacha in rabbinic Judaism; shari’ah in Islam). The question at issue here is whether there is a role for Islamic law in the formulation of international law, given recent literature examining this conjunction. For some, cultural symmetry requires attention to Islamic law, e.g., the Islamic law of nations (siyar), in the same way Western modernity evolved contemporary international law out of a concept of a “law of nations” (jus gentium). In a historical period of asserted fundamentalist Islamic ideology as well as post-9/11 neo-conservative political ideology, there is ample need for negotiation of culture, including philosophical foundations of law, in which case attention to Islamic jurisprudence may well be a positive development to advance the cause of an evolving international legal order.

This recreates the current debate facing the legal positivism, which argues for judicial discretion in Dworkin’s thesis on the possibility of a single correct answer in the court decision. Our purpose is to identify the most significant topics and the way the debate has been going on now in the national and international level. This should be considered, as well as a preview of the research on theoretical models of interpretation and interpretative practice of law in Colombia, we are starting with the inter-group theory and philosophy of law.

The notion that the application of basic rights requires “balancing” is widely and increasingly accepted. Balancing judgments are ever more frequently used in judicial decisions, particularly in constitutional courts and especially in contemporary supra-national human-rights courts. Many jurists deem that balancing is the only possible method to arrive to a rational decision in cases of conflict between basic rights. I assert that this kind of conflict between principles has the same structure of moral conflicts. And, as is the case with moral conflicts, the way conflicts are solved will depend on the underlying concept of practical reasoning. I describe the two basic patterns that practical reasoning may follow in situations of conflict between moral principles in general and argue against the idea that balancing is the most appropriate procedure to cope with the conflict, either in general terms or in juridical argumentation in particular.

Instead of developing its own theoretical framework, international criminal law has adopted the central doctrines and concepts of traditional penology that was initially developed to address the national criminal law. Even though norms and institutions relating to international criminal law have been widely debated, justification of the actual punishment practices has not received similar attention. This is an implication of the narrow perception of justifying punishments – regarding legitimate norms and institutions as a sufficient reason for punishment. This paper argues that the traditional penology, especially in form of theories of punishment, is both inapplicable to the circumstances of international criminal law and it has been misused in the sphere of international criminal law by postulating the theories as justified by definition and utilizing deterrence and retribution as intrinsic values of punishment. An adequate penology for international criminal law should be built on other premises such as emphasizing the political transition and the victims of atrocities.

Law is in nature an evaluation of conflicting interests; the application of legal rules is paraphrasing inherent value-judgment of law, and value-balancing is indispensable in order to make up for the incapability of formal reasoning. Therefore, law not only reflects value-preferences on the ontology level of what it is, but also embeds value-calculation on the methodological level of how it is applied. Evidence rules, as an important part of legal system, certainly have their own value foundation. Fact-finding is an epistemic activity in court, and fact-finder determines facts through the “mirror of evidence”. Therefore, evidence rules which regulate the process of fact-finding can be seen as ‘court epistemology’. The pursuit of truth and pursuit of value together constitute the justifications for establishing certain evidence rules, and these are reflected in evidence rules’ value basis. Evidence rules shall represent the values shared by the great majority of people. Among these fundamental values, the four most universal ones are accuracy, justice, harmony and efficiency, which constitute the value-backbones of evidence law. The Four Value-Backbones serve as guiding standards for evidentiary legislation. They are also the criteria for applying evidence rules, and may effectively control judges’ judicial discretion in evidentiary adjudication.

Longtemps après leur accession à l’Indépendance, nombre de pays africains ne vivent guère de leur propre droit. Au-devant d’un droit d’emprunt, ainsi que d’une tendance lourde à maintenir les peuples dans la sujétion juridique tout en clamant l’impératif catégorique des Droits de l’homme, on ne saurait caresser ni le rêve idéologique d’une éviction pure et simple, ni celui, irréaliste, d’une adoption en l’état. Les présentes réflexions tentent d’articuler le sens d’une troisième démarche, au reste déjà en cours: celle de l’appropriation du droit. Comment l’envisager? Et d’abord pour qui?

Die hier behandelte Problematik betrifft die Rechtsprechung des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts, das neulich zur Moralskepsis gelangen zu sein scheint. Diese Skepsis besteht in dem Tenor des Urteils, das Art. 14III des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes für nichtig erklärte, so dass z.B. ein von Terroristen gekapertes Passagierflugzeug unter keinen Umständen abgeschossen werden darf – selbst wenn es gegen ein Atomkraftwerk fliegt. Die Menschenwürdegarantie erhebe dem Bundesverfassungsgericht nach einen Absolutheitsanspruch: Sie sei folgenindifferent. Dies führt dazu, dass der Staat, der den Schutz der Menschenwürde gewährleistet, passiv zuschauen soll, wie er im Namen der Menschenwürde vernichtet wird. Im Anschluss an Michael Williams wird eine theoretische Diagnose der Menschenwürdeparadoxie geliefert, indem die theoretischen Vorannahmen, worauf dieser Absolutheitsanspruch beruht, aufgedeckt werden und sich als unhaltbar erweisen.

Este trabajo toma como punto de partida la concepción del derecho como concepto analógico y a las normas jurídicas como focal meaning del derecho. Asimismo, las normas jurídicas generales constituyen textos cuyo sentido debe ser desentrañado en circunstancias específicas y diferentes a las de emisión. Ello conduce a que las normas jurídicas individuales resultantes de la aplicación normativa produzcan nuevos sentidos atribuidos a las normas generales. Si se considera a la seguridad jurídica como la garantía que proporciona a los sujetos normativos la posibilidad de conocer previamente las consecuencias jurídicas de su actuar y de limitar el exorbitante poder estatal, cabe pensar en que los sentidos novedosos podrían atentar contra la ella. Ahora bien, la necesidad de generar nuevos sentidos resulta de la necesidad que encuentran los jueces de decidir conforme a algún criterio de justicia o de una pretensión de corrección a los efectos de evitar la tergiversación de los fines buscados con la creación del derecho. Así, la dimensión ideal del derecho se presenta en el momento de la génesis normativa general y en el de su aplicación. La pregunta central en este paper es ¿la pretensión de corrección en la interpretación normativa menoscaba la seguridad jurídica?

Con el fin de establecer criterios desde los que articular propuestas no reñidas ni con las pretensiones de una heurística crítica no exenta de autorreflexividad, ni con modelos sociopolíticos emancipatorios, en la presente comunicación se pretende la clarificación del sustrato onto-político de las disputas iusfilosóficas, con el que abordar los debates que se producen en el marco jurídico-educativo. Atendiendo a este esquema se proyectan sus implicaciones en el sistema educativo español, el cual bajo el aspecto formal de aconfesionalidad, anda a vueltas con la libertad religiosa, afianzando de ese modo las formas del dualismo y neutralizando el monismo laicista que permite aplicar la regla fundamental del Estado social y democrático de Derecho: la protección del pluralismo de convicciones en pie de igualdad por medio de la libertad de conciencia.

En el marco de la creciente ola de reclamos de diversas identidades minoritarias que defienden su diferencia específica en un mundo globalizado con pretensiones homogeneizantes, se plantea con urgencia la necesidad de repensar los diseños jurídicos en pos de una defensa efectiva de aquellos grupos que sufren el asedio de las mayorías a través de diversos tipos de mecanismos. En este sentido, una referencia obligada es la propuesta del canadiense Will Kymlicka de quien se tomará principalmente su distinción entre derechos colectivos que puedan servir a las comunidades para salvaguardar su integridad ante el avance de una cultura mayoritaria (derechos como protecciones externas) y derechos colectivos utilizables como medio de coacción para la libertad de los miembros del grupo en cuestión (derechos como restricciones internas). Pero a partir de estas categorías se erigirá la principal hipótesis de este trabajo, a saber: la distinción realizada por Kymlicka deja de soslayo la problemática de la titularidad del derecho. En otras palabras, para determinar si un derecho funciona como protección externa o restricción interna resulta necesario reconocer si el sujeto de derecho es un individuo o un colectivo.

This paper is an attempt to identify the foundations and sources of risk environment, describe the ontological, anthropological sources of risk in the sphere of Law. Definitions of forms of risk that occur in sphere of Law are introduced. On the basis of the conflict between order and self-organization (the ontological conflict) an attempt is made to suggest a brief philosophical definition of risk environment. The anthropological source of risk is described, the incompleteness of human nature, and the desire for recognition. The ontological system echoes the axiological characterization of Erich Fromm’s and V. B. Ustyantsev’s mode of existence.

Η δικαιοσύνη στο μυθολογικό στοχασμό, εμφανίζεται με την μορφή των θεοτήτων της Θέμιδος και της Δίκης. Στην ιστορική αρχαιότητα, από τον Πλάτωνα και τον Αριστοτέλη και μετά, η δικαιοσύνη ως «υψίστη αρετή», είναι κεντρικό θέμα της ελληνικής αρετολογικής παράδοσης, που μέσω των ελληνιστικών και ρωμαϊκών χρόνων διατρέχει την βυζαντινή, μεταβυζαντινή και την νεότερη εποχή. Στη σύγχρονη εποχή η δικαιοσύνη έχει κεντρική θέση στον χώρο των αξιών. Προϋποθέτει την αρετή, γιατί γεννιέται στην συνείδηση του ενάρετου ανθρώπου και “εξαντικειμενίζεται”, για να αποτελέσει σταθερό κριτήριο ανθρώπινης δράσης, ατομικής αλλά και κοινωνικής. Στο πάνθεο των αξιών – προσωπικών, κοινωνικών, πολιτικών, οικονομικών – η δικαιοσύνη ως ακριβοδικία ή ως “ισότιμη αντιμετώπιση” (fairness) καλείται να αναλάβει τo ρόλο του “ρυθμιστή της εφαρμογής των αξιών”. Σταθμίζει τις σχέσεις ελευθερίας και ισότητας, η προσφυής αναλογία των οποίων προσφέρει στην Κοινωνία την μέγιστη ωφέλεια. Εξ άλλου, έχει αναγνωριστεί ότι το δίκαιο δεν νοείται ως αξιολογικά ουδέτερο, όπως το έχει οραματιστεί ο νομικός θετικισμός, αλλ’ ότι το εμπνέει και το εμπλουτίζει η ιδέα της δικαιοσύνης μέσω της νομοθεσίας της αλλά και μέσω της Δικαστικής Εξουσίας, κατά την ερμηνεία και απονομή της Δικαιοσύνης. Παρ’ όλη όμως την διαχρονική παρουσία και αναγνώριση της δικαιοσύνης ως υψίστης αρετής και αξίας σήμερα, η εκτροπή των παγκοσμιοποιημένων αγορών, αναστατώνει τις δομές των κοινωνιών, ενώπιον μιάς αμήχανης δικαιοσύνης.