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101. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Mirela Oliva Immortality in Heidegger
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This paper argues that Heidegger’s description of death as a phenomenon of life opens a path to immortality different from the classical arguments. In the first part, I will explain why, for Heidegger, the account of immortality must start from a phenomenology of death, and I will analyze the characteristics of Being-towards-death. Then, I will discuss the relationship between immortality and death’s revelation of Being. Finally, I will examine the Christian background of Heidegger’s conception of death and immortality, and I will address some objections.
102. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Jon W. Thompson Individuation, Identity, and Resurrection in Thomas Jackson and John Locke
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This paper outlines the views of two 17th century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection. I show that Jackson and Locke each depart from central 17th century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in section II). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings. Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife. I outline these (quite different) defences in sections III–IV. I then argue (section V) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source. I argue that matter might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies and in the case of resurrection.
103. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Suárez’s Notion of Analogy: Scotus’s Essential Order in Disguise?
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Suárez’s theory of analogy is commonly considered problematic, insomuch as it attempts to combine the assertion of perfect unity and precision of the concept of being with the insistence that it is not univocal but analogical. In this article I first attempt to identify the precise nature of the problem in Suárez’s account (critically evaluating some older and recent approaches) and then propose an interpretation of Suárez’s notion of analogy according to which what Suárez calls “analogy” is basically the same thing as Scotus’s essential order (sans the formal distinction). I suggest that Suárez’s distancing from Scotus is often merely verbal, and that much of the confusing aspect of his doctrine stems from his idiosyncratic terminology. In corroboration of my interpretation I adduce the assessment of Suárez by the Scotist B. Mastri, and I provide some broader context to clarify Suárez’s relation to other theories of analogy, medieval and post-medieval.
104. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Anthony T. Flood Aquinas on Contrition and the Love of God
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St. Thomas Aquinas treats penance as both a sacrament and a virtue. In either form, penance’s principal human act is contrition—a willed sorrow for one’s sins and an intention to avoid future sins. A look at Aquinas’s understanding of penitential contrition reveals a complex interplay of the different objects of love, the gift of fear, and finally friendship with God. This article offers an analysis of Aquinas’s accounts of penance and contrition with respect to these key elements. I argue that contrition performs a fundamental role in countering, restoring, and safeguarding a proper ordering of love and attainment of the ultimate good of union with God. In short, contrition is the act that directly counters the interior disorder wrought by sin and provides an ongoing counter to the threat of additional disorder. Sin’s disorder is the aversion to God and conversion to self, while contrition involves the aversion to self and a conversion to God.
105. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Christopher-Marcus Gibson What’s the Good of Perfected Passion?: Thomas Aquinas on Attentiveness and the Filiae Luxuriae
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I raise a difficulty for Thomas’s views on the passions I call the instrumentalizing problem: Can well-ordered passions contribute to good human activity beyond merely expressing or rendering more effective the independent work of intellect and will? If not, does that not raise the risk that we are merely handicapped angels? I develop a response by examining Thomas’s discussion of the filiae luxuriae, intellectual and volitional flaws arising from lust. I draw on Thomas’s understanding of one filia, blindness of mind, to help sketch an account of the good habits it opposes: the acquired virtue I term attentiveness and the corresponding Spiritual gift of understanding. These good habits, I argue, render their bearers responsive to natural and supernatural reasons that guide them in the conduct of life. By partly constituting these habits, well-ordered passion makes an indispensable contribution to human activity at its best.
106. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Justin W. Keena Plato on Forms, Predication by Analogy, and Kinds of Reality
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I argue that Plato held a kinds of reality theory, not a degrees of reality theory, and that this position solves otherwise intractable problems about the Forms, notably the Third Man critique. These problems stem from the fact that Plato applied the same predicate bothto a Form (ness) and to its participants. Section I shows that this creates serious difficulties for the Forms, whether the predicate is taken in the same sense or in totally different senses. Section II presents the evidence that Plato had a third way of applying that predicate (namely, by analogy) which obviates those problems. Finally, section III explains how predication by analogy requires a kinds of reality theory, but is incompatible with a degrees of reality theory. Thus, Plato’s kinds of reality theory validates the third way of predication discussed in section II, which in turn solves the problems enumerated in section I.
book discussion
107. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
David McPherson Précis of Virtue and Meaning
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108. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Richard Kim Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism, Natural Law, and Objectivity
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109. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Christopher Toner McPherson’s Impiety
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110. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Gregory Beabout Meaning Seeking Animals, Enchantments, and Flourishing
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111. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
David McPherson Replies to Kim, Toner, and Beabout
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book review
112. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Gary M. Atkinson Cooperation with Evil: Thomistic Tools of Analysis.
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113. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Christopher Baglow The War that Never Was: Evolution and Christian Theology
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114. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Travis Dumsday Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
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115. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
John Froula Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: a Thomistic Analysis
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116. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
C. Jeffery Kinlaw Fichte’s Ethics
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117. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
D. T. Sheffler The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich Von Hildebrand
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118. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer Aesthetics
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articles
119. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Christof Betschart The Constitution of the Human Person as Discovery and Awakening
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Scholars strive, in their treatment of Stein’s work, to express both a phenomenological concept of the human person, characterized by conscious and free spiritual activity, and a metaphysical concept of the person, seen as an individual essence unfolding throughout life. In Stein’s work, the two concepts are not simply juxtaposed, nor is there a shift from one to the other. Stein integrates her phenomenological research into a metaphysical framework. In the present contribution, I endeavor to show that Stein’s interpretation of Husserl’s concept of constitution focuses on the question of whether this constitution is to be understood realistically or idealistically and on the question of the constituting subject. I shall argue that Stein’s interpretation of constitution is closely linked to the lived experience she calls already in her early writings “self-discovery” and “awakening.”
120. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 95 > Issue: 1
Gregory R. P. Stacey Perfect Being Theology and Analogy
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Thomas Williams has argued that the doctrine of univocity (the thesis that God and creatures can be predicated of univocally) is true and salutary. Such a claim is frequently contested, particularly in regard to the property—if there be any such—of existence or being. Inspired by the thought of Francisco Suárez, I outline a way of understanding the thesis of the analogy of being that avoids the criticisms levelled by Williams and others against analogy. I further suggest that the metaphysically committed version of univocal predication favoured by many analytic philosophers of religion causes difficulties for the practice of perfect being theology, which is often taken to play an important role in the construction of kataphatic philosophical theologies. My exposition of the analogy of being is, I suggest, better fitted to the practice of perfect being theology and, thus, salutary for the practice of Christian natural theology.