philosophy of quantum mechanics |
101.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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20
Richard Healey
Quantum Meaning
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philosophy of religion |
102.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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20
Richard Schacht
Beyond “The Death of God”
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political philosophy |
103.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
20
John Kaag, Jamie Ashton
Drone Warfare and the Paradox of Choice
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This article employs Gerald Dworkin’s analysis in “Is More Choice Better Than Less” (1982) in order to understand the challenges and consequences of having enlarged the scope of military options to include precision guided munitions (PGM) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.1 Following Dworkin, we argue that having more strategic choices are not always better than less for a number of specific reasons. Unlike many philosophical discussions of the use of these military technologies, ours is an account of the prudential challenges and consequences of having widened military options, and the analysis self-consciously avoids making moral or legal claims concerning their use. It is simply an examination of the claim that widening the range of tactical options, to include these new weapon systems, is necessarily better. We will follow the outline of Dworkin’s argument in describing the current politico-military affairs. Our intent is to expose the practical costs associated with having tactical choices that include the use of these technologies. To be clear, the argument does not bear directly on the use of these technologies, but rather on the challenges associated with merely having the choice to use these weapon systems. Faced with the challenges associated with the option of having PGM or UAV capabilities, it may be judicious for countries to freely limit the military choices that they have at their disposal. This is not self-evident since the weapon technologies in question are not the sort that poses a clear and present danger to a large number of citizens, as was the case with nuclear weapons limited in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of the 1970s or 1980s. Therefore a more detailed philosophical argument is warranted. A final caveat needs to be stated: The argument is to be taken as a whole since no single aspect of Dworkin’s analysis is definitive in regard to the question of whether more choice is indeed better than less. Each aspect does, however, contribute to a deeper understanding of what enlarging the set of tactical means for modern militaries.
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104.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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20
Thom Brooks
A New Problem with the Capabilities Approach
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Martha Nussbaum’s “influential capabilities approach” offers us a powerful, universal standard of justice. The approach builds off of pioneering work by Amartya Sen in economic development. Much of the contemporary interest in the capabilities approach has focused upon how we might spell out a list of precisely which capabilities must be made universally available and protected, a list that Sen has not provided himself. Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is arguably the most successful attempt at defining these capabilities. In this paper, I will argue for a new problem with the approach that raises new questions about the capabilities approach more generally.
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philosophy of mind |
105.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
20
Pär Sundström
Two Types of Qualia Theory
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106.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Adam Kern, Oliver Wenner
Note from the Editors
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political philosophy |
107.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Gerald Gaus
Moral Constitutions
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108.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Samuel Freeman
G. A. Cohen's Critique of Rawls's Difference Principle
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reply |
109.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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P.M.S. Hacker
Crane on Intentionality
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epistemology |
110.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Fred Dretske
Challenging Closure: Is It A Way To Answer The Skeptic?
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ancient philosophy |
111.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith
Persuade Or Obey
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112.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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19
A.W. Price
Eudaimonism and Egocentricity
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lecture |
113.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Killing and Not Preventing Death
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aesthetics |
114.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
David E. Cooper
Beauty and the Cosmos
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philosophy of film |
115.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
19
Stephen Mulhall
Sharing a Dream of Skepticism
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lecture |
116.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
18 >
Issue: 1
Jeremy Waldron
What Are Moral Absolutes Like?
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philosophy of perception |
117.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
18 >
Issue: 1
John Campbell
A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley's Puzzle
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personal identity |
118.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
18 >
Issue: 1
Maximilian de Gaynesford
Integrity Over Time: Korsgaard and the Unity Criterion
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119.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
18 >
Issue: 1
Galen Strawson
"We Live Beyond Any Tale That We Happen to Enact"
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epistemology |
120.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
Volume >
18 >
Issue: 1
Duncan Pritchard
On Meta-Epistemology
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