The discussion in this article is about the criticism to Hu Hong in The doubt of Zhi yan Proposed by Zhu Hsi. The author is aiming to clear the dissimilar wayof thinking between the two philosophers to the effect that both their significant theory could be appeared. Hu Hong’s philosophical announcement alwaysintegrates the ontological and practical theory, which results to the ambiguity and give rise to the criticism from Zhu Hsi. Zhu Hsi possessed the position of thegoodness of nature to query Hu Hong about his no good and no evil opinion toward the theory of the human nature. In the definition of the mind and nature,master Zhu Hsi proposed the mind comprise the nature and the felling and argued with Hu Hong’s different opining. Concerning about the practical procedure theory, Zhu Hsi insist the cultivation should be built on daily life, and critic Hu Hong’s philosophy being short of this understanding. In this article the author will use the interpretational structure of the practical theory and the theory of being to analyze the different consciousness in these two systems and suggest that there exist no real conflict between them so as to explain both their philosophical thinking.

Most of the Western philosophers regard self-consciousness as a problem of theoretical philosophy, and conscience as a problem of practical philosophy.Both of them belong to different areas of philosophy. In contrast with this, some philosophers in the tradition of Confucianism tend to ascribe both concepts topractical philosophy. This tendency reaches its highest point in the writings of Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), the most important representative of ContemporaryNeo-Confucianism. Fichte (1762-1814) is one of few Western philosophers, who regard both concepts as the problems of practical philosophy. It’s worthy tonotice that both Mou Zongsan and Fichte come to this conclusion by criticizing Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. I argue in this paper the following two points: (1) Mou Zongsan and Fichte have similar idea of practical self-consciousness. (2) Mou Zongsan identifies practical self-consciousness with conscience; on the contrary, Fichte holds them to be heterogeneous, the former is pure thinking and the latter sensible feeling.

This paper analyses the usage of the two concepts of nature (xing) and artifice (wei) in the Xunzi. It will be suggested that each of the two concepts is given two definitions in the Xunzi and that in each case the two definitions form into a two-tier structure. That is, each concept has not only two aspects but the two aspects are also of two stages, one acting as the basis of the other. The two concepts could be further combined and gives us a three-tier structure of human agency. According to such an understanding, the natural endowment of human beings is the target of reflection and transformation. Human beings reflect upon our natural endowment and give it a form of expression, the result of which is human action. Through the accumulation of human action we could construct out of it some normative principles and form human culture. On the one hand, such a three-tier structure of human agency explains why Xunzi thinks that nature of humans is bad and that any good comes from artifice. It is because nature by itself does not have a proper form of expression and will only disrupt agency and give rise to bad consequences. A good form of expression and consequently good action could only be the result of artifice, which consists of perception, reflection and deliberation. On the other hand, such a three-tier structure also explains why Xunzi emphasizes nonetheless that nature and artifice must be joined together to accomplish order and flourishing. For without nature, there is nothing to be reflected upon and to be transformed. The three-tier structure of human agency discloses Xunzi’s vision that human beings are not the slave of our natural endowment but could deliberate and reflect upon our nature so as to bring about self-transformation and self-realisation. It is also through such a structure that Xunzi justifies Confucian rituals, for rituals are self-imposed normsand represent the best form of expression of our nature.

In Liu Xiang's “Other Records”, it is said: “Shi Zi was in the State of Chu, but probably in (Shu) Sichuan. Now according to the book 'Shi Zi', he has the name 'Jiao' and originally from the State of Jin. He became an adviser to Wei Yang, the prime minister of Qin. He was always consulted in the administration and legislation that Wei Yang (Lord Shang) contemplated and implemented. Later, When Lord Shang was executed, Jiao fearing complicity in and fled to Sichuan. Since then, he completed this book containing 60,000 words in 20 chapters. He died in Sichuan."Since the excavation of Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor at Ma Wang Dui in Chang Sha in 1973, scholars have come to understand the full aspect of the"School of Huang Lao" from the period before Qin to the beginning of Han. What the Royal Historian, Tai Shi Gong had characterized about "Daoism"as " bending to the alternation of Yin and Yang, adopting the positive aspects of Confucianism and Mohism, summing up the essentials of the school of Min(Names) and Fa (Legalist)," the scholars have come to appreciate this being essentially an integration of thoughts at the time of the Warring States from allprevious schools since the period of Spring and Autumn. As Ban Gu said about "Shi Zi", it "incorporates Confucianism and Mohism, combining Min andFa." In fact, it also includes the thoughts of Lao Zi and Yin Yang, and is a work from the Warring States period. Ban Gu classified it as one of the "Miscellaneous Schools."Lao Zi's "Dao" is an abstraction of prevalent principles and laws. It is not something that could be understood through sensory perception or that could be altered subjectively. Thus, Lao Zi emphasizes "non-intervention", "natural", "not to go against the nature of things", "cause over effect". Hence, "Shi Zi" also says in the chapter "Feng": "Once on the right track, no longer need wisdom and techniques." : "(care for the people, appreciate advisers, govern diligently) may appear different, but really belong to the same principle. And thus, in chapter "Fa Mung" :"Once the right analysis is made, it is applicable to every matter; once the right regulation is established, everything is so regulated." In the chapter "Qui Yan": “The old lived in a house without chimney and crack knows no fire alarm all his life.” In the chapter " Chu Dao": "Know the world without setting foot outdoor, govern the world without descending his court, for the principles are the same." In the chapter "Fa Mung": "An aware Lord does not need to enhance his hearing and sight, does not need espionage, does not expressly find out; for he observes when formations appears, listens when sound arrives and reacts when events transpire." "Shi Zi" assume the objectivity and universality of these principles and laws in order to distill and describe the thoughts of the different schools so as to establish its own school of thought. So it is in the study of "Shi Zi", one must grasp what in the original text and then proceed to compare it with Daoism, Confucianism, Mohism and Fa in order to fully interpret its thoughts and contentions.

This thesis is aimed to study the approach when Chi-tsang composed verses of commentary on the Nagarjuna founded and Pivgala annotated Middle Treatise(Chung-lun), how, through back and forth debating on the relativistic concepts such as “delusion” and “non-delusion”, “selfness” and “selflessness”, “arising/ceasing” and “non-arising /ceasing”, and finally summing-up to “mundane truth” and “noble truth”, he tried to bring up the notion of the “True Reality of AllDharmas”, and established the philosophical contents of Buddhist teaching. With argumentative analysis and elucidation done in this thesis the author expects to assist fellow scholars to understand and grasp a sideway viewpoint in Chi-tsang’s Buddhist thinking, so as to reflect on the essential philosophical issues of “by what it means to see ‘True Reality’ ”, and/or “what the so-called ‘True Reality’ is.”The bibliography of this thesis mainly consists the Commentary on The Middle Treatise (Chung-kuan-lun Su) and other Buddhist writings and commentary works by Chi-tsang. An Argumentative Explanation Approach is adapted as the study approach; as for the methodology, through conceptual connotation analyzing, subject backgrounds reestablishing, and multilayered probing and summarizing of the dogma, it achieves the goal of illustrating the objective that Chi-tsang set to establish the debates on the True Reality philosophy.The key argumentative points of this article are briefly summarized as follows:Chi-tsang suggests, based on the “Ultimate Emptiness” notion of the true reality of all dharmas dogma, since it is not possible to establish any ideas such as “being” or “non-being” or even “oneness” or “multiplicity”, therefore, when sutras and commentaries write about “selfness” or “selflessness”, or even “permanence” or “impermanence”, although some relativistic pedagogical meanings might exist, nevertheless, in essence the dogma is established with theonly intention to relate all phenomenon to the virtuous status of “nonattainment”. In addition, Chi-tsang points out that every causal dharma of falsephenomenon or illusory existence, at its heart “is real too.” Therefore, if we understand the existence nature of the illusory or false phenomenon dharma, knowing that it is dependent on arising, and furthermore cease to abide by illusory existence or false phenomenon, we then will be able to open the “Door of True Reality”.By the verses of commentary Chi-tsang teaches us the basic conceptual approach to opening the “Door of True Reality”, which is by griping without parting the “Causation” theory of “Two Truths” doctrine, to carry out analyzing and differentiating issues such as “being” and “non-being”, “permanency” and “non-permanency”, and even “arising” and “ceasing”, “delusion” and “non-delusion”, knowing that basically they are no more than causal hypothesis of “duality but non-duality” or “non-duality but duality”, therefore, in order to approximate the truth, we must liberate ourselves from the mental processing style which forms illusory external phenomena, that is to say, we need to extinguish “differential false thinking” which stops us from observing correctly the genuine truth of dharmas.

This paper aims to explore Chen Chien’s The Clarification of the Veiled Theories (Hsueh-Pu-Tung-Pien), specifically his comments on Wang Yang-ming’s The Later Chu Hsi: The Conclusion (Chu-Tzu-Wan-Nien-Ting-Lun) and Cheng Min-cheng’s The Way Is One(Tao-I-Pien), which, according to Chen, suffer from the same fault of reconciling and combining Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan. I will begin with a thorough investigation on Chen’s comments, sorting out as well as explaining the book’s merits and flaws, and weigh its intended effect. I endeavor to reevaluate this book in the hope of bring out a more constructive perspective on the issues concerning the reflections on the similarities and dissimilarities between Chu and Lu.

The aim of this essay is to elucidate John Rawls’s idea of public reason and its limits. According to Rawls, public reason is an ideal of democratic citizenship,which requires that the public discussion of fundamental political questions should be conducted solely in terms of reasons all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. Public reason can therefore produce a political consensus given the fact of reasonable pluralism of a liberal society.In this essay, I will begin by examining the idea of public reason proposed by Rawls. Next, I will consider four objections to this idea. Third, I will critically analyze whether and how the modified view of Rawls’s latest thoughts on public reason can reply to these objections. In conclusion, I point out that, without well-educated citizens, Rawls cannot resolve the problem of plebiscitory reason.

The forum of debate between Huang Zong-Yi and Chen Chien-Chu is a major publicly known archive in the transformation of Philosophy during the lastof Ming Dynasty and beginning of Ching Dynasty. It also represents the beginning of the transformation of the Confucian Learning of Song and Ming Dynasty transition to the practical Confucians of Ching Dynasty. In the studies by recent generations, they have either eye the thoughts of Chen Chien-Chu too much higher by thinking that the final years of thoughts of Huang Zong-Yi was changed by the effect from Chien-Chu or have eye the thoughts of Chien-Chu too much lower by thinking that it is equal to the tradition of born with Nature by Gau-Tze. Similarly, the studies by recent generations are also vague in defining the thoughts of Huang Zong-yi and can not give him a reasonable and pertinent status.Many Scholars have used the four rewrites of Huang Zong-Yi on the Mu-Ze-Ming by Chen Chien-Chu as their subject of studies or to stand with the first three view points of Huang Zong-Yi criticizing Chen’s thoughts being “Desire oriented”. Or to use the view point of the fourth rewrites on Mu-Ze-Ming of Huang Zong-Yi to think that the thoughts of later years of Huang Zong-Yi has leaned toward Chen Chien-Chu.I do not agree to that, my personal view point is that within the first three rewrites of Mu-Ze-Ming by Huang Zong-Yi he has misunderstood the thoughts of Chen Chien-Chu to think that Chien-Chu has denied the Confucians thoughts of Song and Ming Dynasty and become the tradition of later learning ofShun-Tze and Gau-Tze.In the fourth rewrites of Mu-Ze-Ming, he then clearly sees the theory of justice of exertion and fulfillment in Chen’s thoughts. Therefore I will not criticize it, but it can also be seen that Chien-Chu’s thoughts were not from the authentic Gi-San Learning. It has his own set of upright theory of justice, nevertheless this is not likely to become the later learning of Shun-Tze and Gau-Tze and will not degrade to the fallen scholarship either.

This paper begins with an analysis of Kant’s concept of “transcendental”, and proceeds to discuss some theoretical problems of transcendental cognition.Transcendental cognition refers to a kind of a priori cognitions about the faculty of cognition itself, which include the distinction between sensibility andunderstanding as well as their spatiotemporal and categorial forms. Although Kant’s transcendental philosophy aims to account for the possibility of objectiveexperience and knowledge by investigating into our faculty of cognition, the theoretical status of transcendental cognitions itself is rather unclear. On the onehand, they cannot be cognitions of the phenomenal self through inner sense, because these empirical cognitions could never serve as a foundation for thetranscendental philosophy. On the other hand, Kant also criticizes traditional rational psychology, rejecting the possibility of a priori cognitions of the noumenal self through reason alone. It is true that Kant denies every possibility of a priori self-cognition, but he does allow a kind of intellectual self-consciousness, i.e., the pure “I think” or “transcendental apperception”. Transcendental apperception is not cognition, but through transcendental reflection, we can analyze the structure of cognition. Yet, transcendental cognition is not primarily about the cognitive mechanism of human beings as a species. Kant’s transcendental philosophy is not cognitive science or transcendental psychology, but rather a kind of conceptual analysis of the structure of cognition of the finite rational being as such.

Suffering the problem of Ming-Shi-Xiang-Yuan（名實相怨） in Pre-Qin era, Zhu-zi （諸子）, which include Kong-sun Long, are thus paying more attentions tothe notion of Ming（名）. The principle of Yi-Shi-Zheng-Ming（以實正名） purposed by him, however, meets with no acceptant of contemporaneous Zhu-zi.The repulsion of Xun Zi, which argues that “making a delusory usage of Ming, could disturb (the orders of) Sh（i 實）(we have recognized)”, refers to the practiceof Kong-sun Long. Provoking criticism universally, the theory of Kong-sun Long is of so distinctive objective, that differs from the general notions of philosophy in that period. In short, the two diversions of Ming（名）, to which Kong-sun Long refers, are on one hand to signify (on certain individual), the “Wu Ming”; while on the other hand to refer (the nature of the individual itself), the “Shi Ming”, are discovered by Kong-sun Long. The value and doctrine of which highlighted by him is obviously the later, which overlooked in that period, would rather be regarded as Metaphysical rather than logical. It is even significant to discover and elaborate of philosophy of Kong-sun Long, while comparing with the thoughts of contemporaneous Zhu-zi and the other philosophers in the process of development of latter Chinese philosophy.

This essay explores Confucius’ hermeneutical method through his speeches, referencing, reading and discussion of the “Book of Odes”. It has the followingsections: 1. Preface 2. Clarification of terms in “poetry or odes”, the “Book of Odes” and “three hundred stanzas of the “Book of Odes” 3. The Pre-Confucianformation and use of the text 4. Confucius’ hermeneutical method with regard to the “Book of Odes”, and 5. Conclusion.The discussion focuses on (the hermeneutical method of) (1) The teachings of the “Book of Odes, (2) The analyses of Zhou dynasty musical lyrics which refer to the “Book of Odes”, and (3) Confucius’ references and readings of the “Book of Odes”. There are two stages of Confucius’ hermeneutical activity. First, the early years, based upon the Zhou Book of Odes stored in the court of Lu. Second, the later years, when Confucius re-edited the text to spread the‘philosophical principles of an ideal king’.The essay shows that Confucius’ hermeneutical method consists of taking passages out of context, the use of analogies, and the goal of developing the chivalrous and virtuous person. His hermeneutical activity combines historical and practical elements, and the use of theoretical implications.

The focus of this paper is on life as an academic concept and philosophy of life as a body of knowledge or a discipline, defining, clarifying, and examining relevant concepts or questions.The structure of this paper is divided into eight sections in terms of definition, clarification, questioning, and examination. The first section, “Introduction,” points out the theme and gives a general outline of the theme. The second section, “What Is Life?”, brings forward in the forms of list and succinct definition the most common definitions of life as organism in academic cycle. In order to develop a better definition of life, this paper makes a critical review of the above and, in a non-fixated and open manner, defines life as “a coherent base, mechanism, or principle which manifests life as such a process of life.” Such a definition not only avoids the deficiencies of narrowness, fixation,and closure but also makes it a suitable foundation for investigating philosophy of life, philosophy of religion, or Buddhist philosophy. The third section, “Clarifying Life and Related Concepts,” makes a distinction among human life, living creature, living entity, phenomena of life, livelihood, living, and death in order not to confuse life with these related concepts. The fourth section, “What Is Philosophy?”, concisely indicates what philosophy means from the light of philosophy as a professional field. The fifth section, “What Is Philosophy of Life?”, follows to define philosophy of life after discussing the concepts of life and philosophy. Philosophy of life is “the study of life with life as its main concern and philosophical inquiry and reasoning as the method.” The sixth section, “The Relation of Life to Philosophy,” discusses the relation between life and philosophy in terms of life to philosophy and philosophy to life respectively. The seventh section, “Clarifying Philosophy of Life and Related Disciplines,” makes a proper clarification among philosophy of life, biology, philosophy of human life, life studies, life-and-death studies, and thanatology. By means of contrast, this section makes the definition of philosophy of life clearer and more intelligible. The eighth section, “Conclusions and Prospects,” summarizes the key points of this paper and anticipates future discussions.The main objective of this paper includes at least the following two points. One is to offer a more rigorous and complete outline for the concept of life and philosophy of life by way of philosophical writing. The other is to present philosophy of life as less narrow than conducive to be connected with philosophy of religion and Buddhist philosophy, open to the religious way of life practice, and contributing to understanding the close relationship between theory and practice on the topic of life.

Crispin Wright (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998) has recently proposed that meanings and intentions be metaphysically construed as secondary properties. Just as what falls under the extension of a color concept is dependent on how a perceiver’s relevant responses or judgments made under suitable conditions, the contents of what a person means by a term or of what a person intends cannot be determined independently of the person’s relevant judgments. Wright’s position is called “Judgment-Dependence Account”, given the judgment-dependence nature of meanings and intentions.Paul Boghossian (1989) has pointed out that Wright’s judgment-dependence account violates an internal constraint, i.e., the “independence” condition, imposed by the theory itself. Consequently, Wright’s theory is fundamentally flawed as an account of meanings and intentions. In this paper, I argue that Wright’s judgment-dependence account is ambiguous. As a result, Boghossian’s criticism is effective against one version of Wright’s account, but it can be avoided on another version of Wright’s account. The aim of this paper is to clarify what Wright’s judgment-dependence account amounts to, by giving it a more plausible and reasonable version than some other versions such as the one under Boghossian’s attack. This paper ends with some comments on the significance and prospects of Wright’s proposal, based on the more plausible version of Wright’s judgment-dependence account, that meanings and intentions be characterized as secondary properties.

Exploring the metaphysical and moral status of human embryo, one of the most fundamental questions underlying many significant bioethical issues, this essay is divided into four parts. It is firstly to be shown that not only the traditional moral controversy surrounding abortion but also that of the most cutting-edge researches of embryonic stem cell and human cloning can not be properly dealt with without first addressing the question of the metaphysical and moral status of human embryo. Secondly, the meaning of the question will be precisely defined so that the discussion can be rightly focused. The metaphysical part of the question is concerned with the issue whether human embryo is an entity with personhood, i.e. whether it is at the same time a human person. The second part is accordingly the moral question whether a human embryo has the dignity of a person and therefore shall be treated as an end by itself and not as only a means, which again means whether it is morally wrong to kill human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind. The main arguments for and contra the personhood of human embryos are presented in the third part after a comprehensive account of personhood is offered as a basis for the discussion. Different arguments such as speciesism, identity, continuity, potentiality and, last but not least, benefit of thedoubt-argument are evaluated and appealed to. The thesis arrived at is that human embryos are persons or at least shall be treated as persons when the antithesis is notsufficiently and well grounded. The fourth and last part concludes the essay with the claim that in normal situations it is immoral to kill human embryos for the progress of the medicine and the welfare of the mankind.

This article aims to “deconstruct” the two approaches which have overwhelmingly influenced the history of the research on Xun Zi’s philosophy. In the first approach scholars have stuck to the idea of “Human nature is bad” as of the core of Xun Zi’s philosophy. In the second approach, scholars have urged that Xunzi had separated the sphere of men from that of Heaven. This article introduces critical viewpoints by three scholars on these two approaches, and then attempts to search for the third way to illuminate the characteristics of Xunzi philosophical system more systematically as a synthesizer of the pre-Qin Warring States’ thoughts. For this purpose, it focuses on the significant role of the concept of cheng (truthfulness) in Xunzi’s philosophical system on Heaven-human relationship, which has left in the dark by aforementioned two approaches. It delineates the analogical linkage by the concept of cheng between the expansion of virtue and the creation of all livings on earth. In Xun Zi’s thought, an ideal ruler can assimilate himself into the process of its natural providence by means of his promoting virtuous power of cheng. Here, Xun Zi’s image of ideal rules is an analogical synthesizer of these two spheres of Heaven and men, in stead of separating them into two different worlds.

當代心智哲學有兩個重要爭議：一是關於意識之現象特性 （phenomenal character）的表徵論（representationalism）與反表徵論 （ anti-representationalism） 之爭； 另一是關於經驗內容的概念論 （conceptualism）與非概念論（nonconceptualism）之爭。第一個論爭， 可稱為感質之爭（the qualia debate），討論意識的現象特性是否能完全 被表徵內容所窮盡。第二個論爭的焦點在於，知覺經驗的內容是否由 我們的概念能力（conceptual capacities）所參與構成，以致於完全是概 念性的內容（conceptual content）。大部分哲學家認為這兩個爭論互不 相干，或認為應該分開處理。在本文中，我指出這兩個爭議其實有一 明顯且重要的關連。那就是：在第二個論爭中若採取概念論的立場， 那麼在第一個論爭中就非得採取表徵論不可。更進一步說，本文要論 證兩件事：第一，概念論可以視為是一種特殊版本的表徵論。一旦釐 清這點， 持概念論者就需要提出理由來反對非意向性感質 （nonintentional qualia）的存在。原因是：如果知覺經驗除了意向性內 容之外，還具有非意向性的感質為其成分的話，那麼知覺經驗的內容 就無法完全是概念性的。第二，雖然McDowell 的概念論將知覺經驗 的內容理解為一種Fregean sense，而非理解為某種心理表徵（mental representation），這樣的立場仍然得面對「顛倒地球論證」（the Inverted Earth argument）的攻擊。概念論並不一定因此失敗，但任何為概念論 的辯護都必須設法回應這項攻擊。

本論文探討康德對於力的說明。這個題目在康德所處的時代中，位於哲學關懷的核心地位，但在他的各種《批判》裡，他卻沒有明示 地處理過這個題目。正如同時間與空間的本質以及人類意志的本質， 康德回應有關哲學家與自然科學家爭論力的本質之成果。然而，康德 並沒有在他的《批判》中，將力作為一個明示的主題，因而並沒有針 對力的概念，提供一個明示的先驗說明。不過，我論證，吾人的確可 以在康德哲學中尋獲一個有關力的先驗說明，而且這是一個經驗論與 理性論說明的綜合，只不過在一處意想不到的地方：在《第三批判》中，有關合目的性原則的討論裡。

The reading of the first chapter of Lao Zi is still debatable. Based on Bo-shu Lao-Zi, the earliest edition of Lao Zi which recorded this first chapter, and Wang Bi’s edition of Lao Zi, the present article would maintain that the reading of “wu ming” (without a name) and “yo ming” (with a name), “wu yu” (without desire) and “yo yu” (with desire), is more justifiable than the reading of “wu” (non-being) and “yo” (being).

Neo-Confucianism has now been well-known by the western society, for its influence on Chinese culture is immense. Among its proponents, Master Chu-Hsi is the most influential among them, the reason of which can be attributed to his fully speculative viewpoints and his comprehensive senses of philosophy problems. In Chu-Hsi’s theory, metaphysics is his most creative contribution to Confucianism. However, it is susceptible to being miss-understood by his contemporaries and today’s scholars, for his basic concerns about the metaphysics are so much different from the other Confucians. While the theory of the reality and the value are concerned by all the Confucian philosophers and they had provided many different yet profoundly metaphysical systems, Master Chu-Hsi notices the problems of the definitions of all the concepts concerning the reality and the ultimate value and develops a new metaphysical system discussing the problems of the reality of the whole Being in the universal, the moral potential difference between people and the animal.In this article the author is going to introduce Master Chu-Hsi’s metaphysical constructions and creations. The discussion will be proceeded as follows: (1) the reflection of the modern interpretational systems, (2) the definition of the concept of metaphysics in Chinese philosophy, (3) the original questions of Chu-Hsi’s metaphysical thinking, (4) the theory of the whole Being of the Universal, (5) the theory of human nature and the explanation of why the moral ability is different in the human beings, (6) the existential difference between human creatures and the animals, and (7) the meaning of the contribution of Chu-Hsi’s metaphysics in the history of the development of Confucianism.

“Ignorance” is generally considered a simplified form of expressing Socrates’ philosophy. Rousseau, once cited this expression in his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, has explicitly portrayed it as the core idea of Socrates’ view of virtue. The main argument of this paper will proceed to prove that passages of Apology cited by Rousseau are not made intentionally to further develop his own ideas. Instead, they do manifest an essential part of Socrates’ view of virtue. Having proved so, we nonetheless aware also that Socrates and Rousseau remain to be different concerning their views of virtue. They both hold “ignorance” being crucial in ethical significance; yet differ in its reference.Hence, we endeavor to distinguish their views on the basis of the label “understanding ignorance to be virtuous”. In the order of this article, we will proceed to see first of all Rousseau’s citation of Socrates’ words. Then, we move to a documentary analysis concerning the divergent opinions about this citation. After that, we illustrate Socrates’ view of virtue by distinguishing Socrates’ own thought from that of Plato in the persona of Socrates. With this distinction, we then approach to an examination of “the unity of virtue is knowledge” and “the understanding of ignorance”. With a similar structure of analysis, we finally come to the exposition of Rousseau’s view of virtue. We will vindicate that inDiscourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau successfully extended Socrates’ ideas from “admitting ignorance” to that “nature makes all people virtuous”. With this success, this article, while making explicit the divergence of their views of virtue, demonstrates a “spiritual correspondence” between Socrates and Rousseau.