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121.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 3
Avram Hiller
Climate Change and Individual Responsibility
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122.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 3
Benjamin Hale
Nonrenewable Resources and the Inevitability of Outcomes
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123.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 3
Derek Bell
Global Climate Justice, Historic Emissions, and Excusable Ignorance
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124.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 3
Edward Page
Climatic Justice and the Fair Distribution of Atmospheric Burdens:
A Conjunctive Account
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125.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 3
Darrel Moellendorf
A Right to Sustainable Development
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126.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 2
Anjan Chakravartty
Scientific Realism and Ontological Relativity
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127.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 2
Bence Nanay
What If Reality Has No Architecture?
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128.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 2
Devin Henry
Aristotle’s Pluralistic Realism
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129.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 2
John T. Roberts
Extra-Physical Structure in a Physical World? or, Is the Study of Life Provincial?
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130.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 2
Matthew C. Haug
Natural Properties and the Special Sciences:
Nonreductive Physicalism without Levels of Reality or Multiple Realizability
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131.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 2
C.S. Jenkins
Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?
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132.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 2
Daniel Nolan
Categories and Ontological Dependence
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133.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
Sydney Shoemaker
Realization, Powers, and Property Identity
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This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory of properties I have defended in several places. I held that it commits one to the claim that within any given world, properties with the same causal profile are identical, but not to the requirement that a property must have the same causal profile in any world in which it can be instantiated. I now think that this was a mistake. There is an argument from the account of realization I have offered to the conclusion that, if physicalism is true, properties of macroscopic objects have their causal profiles essentially. In what follows I will present that argument.Along the way I will correct what now seem to me mistakes in my earlier presentationsof the account of realization. And I will conclude with an additional argument for the causal theory of properties, one that does not tie it to the assumption that physicalism is true or to my account of realization.
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134.
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The Monist:
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94 >
Issue: 1
E.J. Lowe
How Not to Think of Powers:
A Deconstruction of the ‘Dispositions and Conditionals’ Debate
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135.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
John Heil
Powers and the Realization Relation
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136.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum
Spoils to the Vector:
How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers
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137.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
Jonathan D. Jacobs
Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers
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138.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
Sungho Choi
Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism
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139.
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The Monist:
Volume >
94 >
Issue: 1
Jessica Wilson
Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based Subset Strategy
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140.
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The Monist:
Volume >
93 >
Issue: 4
Niccolò Guicciardini
Introduction
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