Overt racism and discrimination have been on the decline in the United States for at least two generations. Yet many American institutions continue to produce racial disparities. Sociologists and social critics have predominantly explained continuing disparities as results of continuing racism and discrimination, albeit in increasingly covert, anonymous forms; these critics suggest racism and discrimination have to be understood as historical, systemic problems operating at the level of institutions, culture, and society, even if overt forms are now rare. With increasing reliance upon a proliferation of notions including “institutional racism,” “institutionalized discrimination,” and “glass ceilings,” however, scholars and critics alike have grown increasingly dependent upon statistical data on inequalities and institutional outcomes as grounds for theoretical and political inferences concerning collective motives or prejudices. In this crucial respect, insights from beyond studies of race and inequality, drawing especially on Wittgensteinian and Schutzian contributions to social thought, stand to illuminate the pragmatic, moral reasoning at work in the institutional racism argument and similar approaches. Such reflexive attention to a central conceptual resource of contemporary social criticism stands to bring attention back to the basic empirical and critical questions of how to study and engage with continuing inequalities in the post-civil rights era. These questions can certainly be addressed through theoretical stipulation and political claims-making, but a more viable conceptual and empiricalfoundation for both theory and criticism can be gained by attending more respectfully to foundational issues of meaning and interpretation in the human sciences and human relations.

A well-worn trope used by phenomenologists is that things that remain invisible or unnoticed in the course of our everyday being in the world reveal themselves in instances of breakdown. This paper borrows this trope to explicate one instance of breakdown, that of traumatic spinal cord injury (TSCI). We use the phenomenology of Heidegger, especially his formulation of ecstatic temporality presented in Being and Time, to illuminate the temporal issues surrounding this radical rupture in Dasein’s being in the world through data collected from field observations of inpatient rehabilitation, interviews with persons with TSCI, and with their rehabilitation providers. Specifically, we explore the breakdown in temporality (the rupture on thrown projection) that occurs in persons who experience TSCI across three interconnected existential dimensions – understanding, attunement (mood), and falling. We conclude by discussing the value this approach to human temporality might have for both social scientists interested in human temporality and to practitioners interested in research related to the rehabilitation process.

This article discusses two central methodological postulates (adequacy and subjective meaning) pertaining to the social sciences brought forward by Alfred Schütz, and as presented by Lester Embree’s ‘Economics in the Context of Alfred Schütz’s Theory of Science’. The relationship between the postulates and the actual practice of economics is discussed. The author shows how Schütz’s writings describe a spectrum of methods that ranges from low abstraction and an attempt to understand individual plans and purposes on the one hand to highly abstract and aggregate modeling on the other. It is argued that the distribution of economic contributions is heavily skewed toward the latter. The second part of the article presents recent work by economists who have resisted this trend, and who have begun to expand our understanding of economic processes by taking seriously the notion of economics as a social science.

Although Schütz’s relationship with the Austrian school of economics was an intimate one, Lavoie and other Austrian scholars have challenged (a) Schütz’s characterization of praxeology as an objective science of subjective phenomena and (b) the ability of Schütz’s phenomenology, which emphasizes the subjective meanings of actors, to really make sense of spontaneous social orders. It is my contention, however, that Schütz can be adequately defended against both these charges. First, for Schütz, the claim that social science is an objective science of subjective phenomena need not imply apodictic apriorism nor solipsism. Second, in spite of his emphasis on subjective meanings, the study of spontaneous social orders need not be difficult to justify.

The aim of this article is to explore how a self-referential social system, although it is not a human being, can be said to “observe.” For this purpose, the article reformulates Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems as sociological phenomenology, or the de-consciousness philosophized phenomenology, because a social system has the same structure of intentionality as consciousness: Just as consciousness is always consciousness of something, communication is always communication of something. In correlation to this communicative intentionality, communicated environments come and go as social phenomena. A social system is not a thing, but an autonomously observing subject. Hence, this systems theory takes on the role of a second-order observer: It observes how social systems as first-order observers observe self-referentially because phenomena given to the natural attitude of the first-order observer constitute multiple social realities in daily life. Therefore, the theory of self-referential social systems is not objectivism, but a variation of mundane subjectivist phenomenology.

Hisashi Nasu, Lester Embree, George Psathas, and Ilja Srubar (eds.), Alfred Schutz and His Intellectual Partners; Sandra P. Thomas and Howard R. Pollio, Listening to Patients, A Phenomenological Approach to Nursing Research and Practice; Matthew Ratcliffe, Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation

This study focuses on family members of clients with Chronic Renal Insufficiency (CRI) in hemodialytic treatment, signaling the importance of their participation in care aiming toward an adaptation of a new reality in one’s life. The objective of this study is as follows: to understand the meaning attributed by significant family members to their participation in caring for the client with CRI in hemodialytic treatment. This investigation was developed using a qualitative research modeled after Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological approach, namely to increase understanding in interaction with the other as a process of facilitating an understanding of one’s experience that constitutes the newly constructed reality. The subjects of the research were ten family members noted significantly for their care by the clients of a hemodialytic center from the state of Espírito Santo (Br). The results allowed to identify the care activities developed by the family members. The phenomenological interview consisted of a central question: what do you have in mind when caring for a family member with CRI? The analysis of the responses pointed principally toward two categories: the well-being of the client and the well-being of the family member, or caretaker. Generally, this demonstrates that the care given to the client by the family member is intended to enhance the health care needs of both the client and the family member, or caretaker. These perspectives support the quality of care through the nurse’s action in planning health and nursing care for the client as well as for the client’s family member, allowing recognition of each as a subject of his or her professional action.RESUMO: Este estudo focaliza os familiares dos clientes com insuficiência renal crônica (IRC) em tratamento hemodialítico, sinalizando a importância de sua participação nos cuidados tendo em vista a adaptação a uma nova realidade de vida. Tem como objetivo: compreender o significado atribuído pelo familiar significativo à sua participação no cuidado ao cliente com IRC em tratamento hemodialítico. Constitui uma pesquisa qualitativa, utilizando a abordagem fenomenológica de Alfred Schutz como método, entendendo a interação com o outro um processo facilitador de compreender as experiências e vivências que constituem uma realidade construída. Os sujeitos da pesquisa foram dez familiares apontados pelos clientes de um centro de hemodiálise no Estado do Espírito Santo como significativos no cuidado. Os resultados permitiram identificar as atividades desenvolvidas pelos familiares como cuidado. A entrevista fenomenológica consistiu da questão central: o que você tem em vista ao cuidar do seu familiar com IRC? A análise dos depoimentos apontou para duas categorias Bem Estar do cliente e Bem Estar do familiar ou cuidador.. O típico da ação demonstra que os cuidados dispensados ao cliente pelo familiar visam a atender tanto as necessidades do cliente quanto daquele que cuida. Estas perspectivas subsidiam a ação do enfermeiro para buscar a qualidade da assistência, planejando ações direcionadas ao cuidado da clientela, inclusive seus familiares, reconhecendo a ambos como sujeitos de sua ação profissional.

Forty-five children between the ages of nine and twelve years, who were forced to flee their native Sudan and seek refuge in Egypt, were interviewed about their everyday life in Cairo. Phenomenological analyses of the transcripts revealed the physical, social and technological dimensions to their encounter with a new cultural world. The interviews also revealed the extent to which the children had to face racism, discrimination and social exclusion. Specific analyses of children’s difficulties in learning a new form of Arabic and their involvement in play and games indicated that a refugee child develops his or her self-identity as a stranger by reflecting on particular confrontations with the new environment. Finally, comparative analyses across age groups led to the construction of a phenomenological-developmental model of the child refugee. Both the model and the findings are discussed in the context of Alfred Schutz’s (1964a) essay The Stranger, George Herbert Mead’s (1967) communicative model of the self and Binnie Kristal-Andersson’s (2000) psychological framework for understanding migration.

Starting from the experience of the Other, phenomenology takes otherness as something which withdraws from my own experience and exceeds the limits of our common orders. Radical otherness is something extraordinary, arising in my own body, situated between us and striking us before we look for it. Psychiatry confronts us with a peculiar sort of pathological otherness which in ethnopsychiatry is doubled to an otherness of a higher degree. We encounter the anomalies of other orders as if we were dipping into the Other’s shadow. This brings up many questions. How is the pathic related to the pathological, the normal to the abnormal? How can psychiatry take account of the intercultural Other without sacrificing its otherness to universal points of view? How is the unconsciousness of our own culture connected with that of other cultures? To what extent does intercultural otherness affect our intracultural otherness? Is there an alternative to the extremes of fundamentalism and globalism, which tend either to repress otherness or to level it?

The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of psychotherapy as ethical care, a mode of healing practiced in societies rich in the phenomenaconcerning the operations of collective life. By contemplating and establishing the four concepts: situated negativity, therapeutic locale, bodily experience(insituated negativity), and speech as action, the author is able to delineate the modes of therapeutic interactions right at the locale between the therapist andthe patient in order to disclose the structure of interpersonal thwartedness and connectedness within psychotherapy. Viewed in this perspective, psychologicalsuffering is always the suffering of situated negativity. Healing, however, is not to cancel this negativity but to let it become a source of new ways of existence.This reverse of attitude toward negativity involves ways of “talking” into bodily experience in psychotherapy. The meaning of ethical care thus can be describedas: what the therapist aims to approach through speech is not positive normative ethics, the socially recognized “should-be,” but the situated negativity whichdenotes an expelled position from normative interpersonal ordering and which is to be experienced as nameless and full of forces. Situated negativity is not thatwhich to be eliminated but the source to be appreciated by both the therapist and the patient.

This paper explores how Schutz’s ideas enrich and extend the ethic of care promulgated by feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings,Sara Ruddick, and Eva Feder Kittay. Using Schutz’s ideas about the I-Thou relationship, systems of relevances, and growing old together, the authorlays a foundation for continuing dialogue between feminist theorists of care and Schutzian phenomenologists.