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Patrick Bondy
Avoiding Epistemology’s Swamping Problem:
Instrumental Normativity without Instrumental Value
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122.
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T.J. Buttgereit
Caring for Identity: Disability and Representation
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123.
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Robert B. Tierney
Loving Persons by Cherishing Physical Objects
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124.
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Eric Reitan
Is Annihilation More Severe than Eternal Conscious Torment?
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In Hell and Divine Goodness, James Spiegel defends the surprising position that of the two dominant non-universalist Christian views on the fate of the damned—the traditionalist view that the damned suffer eternal conscious torment (ECT), and the annihilationist view that the damned are put out of existence—the annihilationist view actually posits the more severe fate from the standpoint of a punishment. I argue here that his case for this position rests on two questionable assumptions, and that even granting these assumptions there are intuitive reasons, reasons Spiegel has not addressed, for supposing that ECT is more severe.
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Thomas N. Metcalf
Against Indifference Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument
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Critics of the Fine-Tuning Argument for Theism have recently argued that even if the universe is fine-tuned for life, certain features of the universe are still surprising given theism, because God should be indifferent between those features and their contraries. In the first section of this paper, I summarize this sort of Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument. In the second section, I explain why contrary to initial appearances, these objections fail. In the third section, I present the Argument from Compatibility, which attempts to turn the tables by arguing that the paradigmatic features are more surprising given atheism than they are given theism.
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126.
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Emerson R. Bodde
Quotidian Apocalypse?:
Tosaka Jun’s Critical Theory in a New Age of Crisis
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127.
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Andrew Burnside
Critical Commodities:
Adorno on Beethoven and Jazz
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This paper is a critique of Adorno’s ideas concerning jazz from his own perspective. I approach the topic from a dialectical standpoint, accounting for the historical development of jazz in the African-American context while trying to understand why Adorno found nothing of the genre redeemable; he scorned jazz as an unoriginal product of the culture industry. Drawing on the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Fumi Okiji on jazz, history, and Adorno, I try to demonstrate the internal contradiction of Adorno’s dislike of jazz and appraisal of Beethoven. Although Adorno’s critical tools of the culture industry, deconcentration, and his usage of Lukács’s idea of reification are indispensable, Adorno should have consistently applied the subtle distinction between two intrinsically tied but nevertheless separate entities: (1) an artwork and (2) the mode of production in which it is developed.
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128.
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Andrew Russo
Worm-theoretic Persistence and Temporal Predication:
A Reply to Johnston’s Personite Problem
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129.
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Andréa Daventry
Seeing Oneself as a Source of Reasons:
Gaslighting, Oppression, and Autonomy
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130.
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Audrey L. Anton
Moral Idiots and Blameless Brutes in Aristotle’s Ethics
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Aristotle maintains that vicious people are blameworthy despite their moral ignorance, since becoming vicious was up to them (eph’ hemin) and whatever is up to us we are able to do or not do. However, one’s upbringing shapes one’s moral character. Together, these claims invite an objection I call the horrible childhood challenge. According to this objection, vicious adults who suffered horrible childhoods through which they were taught to adopt bad ends as though they were good should not be held accountable for their vice. Aristotle’s likely answer to this challenge reveals that, for Aristotle, a minimal degree of rationality is necessary for moral responsibility. I argue that, for Aristotle, a vicious agent is responsible for her vice only if 1) she is rational, which implies 2) she grasps a specific basic principle, thus consenting to become a certain kind of person through action. The thoroughly bad who satisfy both claims are moral idiots; those who do not may be blameless brutes.
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commentaries |
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Matti Eklund
Reply to Hernandez and Laskowski
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132.
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Kenneth G. Lucey
Traditional Epistemological Concerns Defended
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133.
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Abigail Pfister Aguilar
Commentary on Horn: Cosmopolitan Dreaming
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134.
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Deborah K. Heikes
Comments on Josué Piñeiro’s “Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory:
What Knowledge from the Margins tells us about Epistemic Peerhood”
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135.
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J. Harrison Lee
Comments on “Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds”
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136.
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E.M. Dadlez
Metaphor and Misconstrual:
A Defense of Tirrell’s Toxic Speech Metaphor against Shane Ralston’s Criticism
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137.
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Holly Longair
Conceptualizing Microagressions:
Comments on Heather Stewart
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138.
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G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Un/Examined Lives:
A Comment on Lamont Rogers’ “What Are Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Utopia?”
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139.
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Caitlin Maples
Commentary on “Utilitarian Aggregation”
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140.
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Justin Bell
Epicurean Philosophy, Change, and Curiosity:
A Commentary on Alex Gillham’s “Epicurean Tranquility and the Pleasure of Philosophy”
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