論 著 / articles |
121.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 33
王文 方
Wen-Fang Wang
虛擬條件句理論述評
Comments on Theories of Subjunctive Conditionals
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本文解釋、並評論了從1940 年代至1970 年代中幾個重要的、有 關於虛擬條件句的理論。這些包括可共同性支撐理論、嚴格條件句理 論、世界選擇語意論、集合選擇語意論、與範圍語意論。我駁斥了可 共同性支撐理論、嚴格條件句理論與世界選擇語意論,同時論證說,某種形式的集合選擇語意論或範圍語意論是到目前為止最為合理的理 論。連帶地,我論證說,VW 系統是到目前為止最合理的虛擬條件句 邏輯系統。在本文的餘論中,我進一步指出了這些語意論在科學哲學、小說討論、與確定描述詞理論中的可能應用。
This paper explains and comments on the most important theories of subjunctive conditionals from 1940s to 1970s. These include cotenability theory, strict conditional theory, world selection semantics, class selection semantics and sphere semantics. I refute cotenability theory, strict conditional theory and world selection semantics as inadequate, while argue that some versions of class selection semantics or sphere semantics are the best semantic theories among all that we have seen for subjunctive conditionals. Accordingly, I also argue that Lewis’s VW is the most satisfactory logic system for subjunctive conditionals among all the systems we have checked. In the final part of the paper, I point out some applications of these semantic theory to fiction discourse, definite descriptions and topics in philosophy of science.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 33
林遠 澤
Yuan-Tse Lin
論康德定言令式的共識討論結構──試從理性存有者的道德觀點闡述康德的 先驗規範邏輯學
The Consensual Structure of the Categorical Imperative in Kantian Ethics -An Explication of the Transcendental Norm Logic from the Perspective of a Rational Agent
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本文嘗試把康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》中對於「定言令式」 的分析,理解成一門闡釋道德判斷之理性基礎的「先驗規範邏輯學」。在涉及行動決定的倫理學領域中,理性討論的證成活動被康德理解成 一種純粹意志的根源性行動。這種在定言令式中表達出來的純粹意志的 根源性行動,為我們的意志決定與行動的正當性提出理性的證成基礎。本文將分別透過純粹意志的「理念」與「原則」,說明康德如何基 於定言令式的理念,闡發吾人做為一理性存有者所必然擁有的先天道 德判斷知識,以及他如何透過定言令式在不同程式中的表達,建構了 關於道德正確性的具體判斷原則。透過對於康德先驗規範邏輯學的闡述,本文將進一步指出,康德 以「定言令式」做為道德的基本原則,在其可普遍化的道德判準中,事實上隱含了一個追求共識的理想化討論結構。這與當代學者試圖將 康德倫理學轉化成開放地參與公民社會的正義理論,具有內在的理論 一致性。
In this article I interpret Kant's "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" as a transcendental norm logic. The rationality of moral judgements is seen to be based on the idea and the principle of pure practical reason. But we find also that Kant does not succeed in separating this idea and principle from psychology and anthropology.The rational authority of moral duty can be shown only in actually open discourse which consists of giving good reasons for actions. The consensus structure of the pure will allows for the universalization of moral judgements. My attempt is to draw this connection in a reconstructive manner.
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123.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 32
林義 正
Yih-Jing Lin
論中國經典詮釋的目的與方法──以《春秋》的詮釋為例
Aims and Methods in Hermeneutic Interpretations of the Chinese Classics—the case of the Chunqiu
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目前中國學界在西方詮釋學的激盪下,對自家傳統經典的詮釋活 動開始進行反省:到底中國經典詮釋是怎樣進行的?本文以《春秋》 的詮釋為例,論中國經典詮釋的目的與方法,並依以下各節:一、前 言,二、《春秋》經籍的詮釋體式,三、《春秋》詮釋歷程的轉折,四、經典詮釋的目的面向,五、經典詮釋的方法面向,六、結論,企圖揭開中國經典詮釋活動的底蘊。在《春秋》的詮釋學裡,要對孔子為何 作《春秋》?如何作《春秋》?是作經還是修史?方法是借事明義?還是直書其事?其意是新周還是從周?等諸問題作說明,其實這些都 關聯著詮釋的目的與方法。傳統《春秋》類的著作表現在詮釋、書法、 批評與考訂四個方面上,詮釋著眼於義,書法著眼於文,批評與考訂 著眼於文本原義與史事真實的考究。傳統對《春秋》的詮釋總是離不 開詮釋者的目的與方法,目的在致用者,其方法採取託比或見指不任 辭的方式,不免以己意解經,其失也誣,故有回歸本義之舉;通本義 與致其用往往構成經典詮釋目的的兩端,因應詮釋目的的兩端,在方 法上也就有了即事存真與借事致用二式,這便是中國經典詮釋活動的 底蘊。
Under the stimulus of Western hermeneutics, Chinese scholars have begun to reflect upon the basis of their own tradition of hermeneutical interpretation. This paper discusses the hermeneutic basis of interpreting the Chinese classics with reference to the Chunqiu, in four sections: (1) Introduction, (2) Forms of interpretation, (3) Changes of direction in interpretation, (4) Aims of interpretation, (5) Methods of interpretation, (6) Conclusion. Hermeneutical studies of the Chunqiu raise the following questions: why and how Confucius composed the Chunqiu, was this a composition or revision of history, did he use events to reveal ethical meaning or did he record events faithfully, did he aim to revitalize the Zhou or simply followed the Zhou? These questions involve aims and methods of hermeneutical interpretation. Traditional works on the Chunqiumanifestly concern interpretation, forms of writing, criticism and evidence. These involve, respectively, meaning, literary form, origins of text and meaning, and accuracy of historical events. Thus, traditional interpretations are inseparable from aims and methods. Aims could be based on motive of use or application and methods could be based on analogical comparisons. However, these lead to subjective interpretations and misunderstandings. This gives rise to the thought that there is a need to go back to understanding original meanings. Thus, in terms of aims, we invariably find these two extremes of motive of use or application on the one hand, and understanding original meaning on the other. Similarly, in terms of method, there is the idea of preserving the truth of events on the one hand, and the motive of use or application on the other. This is the underlying basis of the problem of hermeneutic interpretation of the Chinese classics.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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關永 中
Wing-Chung Kwan
不敖倪於萬物、不譴是非──與莊子懇談 見道及其所引致的平齊物議
Not to Rise above the Myriads of Things, nor to Condemn Agreements or Differences──Dialogue with Chuang-Tzu on Mystical Enlightenment and its Appeasement among Entities and Controversies
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本文是作者前兩篇論文〔i.e.〈上與造物者遊──與莊子對談神秘 主義〉《臺灣大學哲學論評》第二十二期,1999:137~172;〈獨與天 地精神往來—與莊子對談神秘經驗知識論〉《第三個千禧年哲學的展 望:基督宗教學與中華文化的交談會議論文集》〔丁福寧主編‧(臺北: 輔大,2002):105~156〕之延續,以莊子〈天下〉篇評莊學內文作為反思的起點,藉其中所提供之線索來考察莊子內外各篇之脈絡大要。〈天下〉篇作者看來在邀請讀者們站在神秘主義眼光來探討莊學;為 此,本文作者也因應地以神秘主義觀點來檢視莊子理論。本文扣緊〈天 下〉篇「而不敖倪於萬物,不譴是非,以與世俗處」之語,來與〈齊 物論〉內容連接,從中體認〈齊物論〉之論旨。〈齊物論〉以南郭子綦之經驗作為神秘見道之典型,藉此彰顯出「平齊物議」之效用。讀者 唯有站在神秘見道的前提上體認「天籟」與冥合「真宰」,始能參悟到 得道者所臻至之「齊物」、與「齊論」之化境。
In a certain sense, this article is a continuation of the main themes of our two previous essays, namely, “Above, he Seeks Delight in the Creator — a Dialogue with Chuang-Tzu on Mysticism” in Philosophical Review xxii, 1999: 137~172, and “Solely Communicating with the Spirit of the Universe — a Dialogue with Chuang-Tzu on Epistemology of Mystical Experience” in Philosophical Perspective for the Third Millennium: the Dialogue between Christian Philosophy and Chinese Culture (Taipei: Fu Jen Catholic University, 2002) 105~156. We start with the following sentences from Chuang-Tzu’s “Tien xia”, “(He) did not try to rise above the myriads of things. He did not condemn the agreements and differences of others so that he might live in peace with the prevalent views.” (James Legge’s Translation) We compare the meaningsembedded within these sentences with Chuang-Tzu’s “Ch’u Wu Lun”. We get to the affirmation that a person who attains Mystical Enlightenment may be able to make appropriate adjustment concerning any possible contradiction among things and any possible contention of arguments.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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王曉 波
Hsiao-Po Wang
論中國經典詮釋的目的與方法──以《春秋》的詮釋為例
Tao Generating the Law: The Philosophy of Tao and the Law in the Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor
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一九七三年出土的《黃帝四經》,帶動了近三十年的戰國黃老思想 的研究。有了《黃帝四經》,學者才得以看到史稱「黃老」之「黃」。《黃帝四經》的內容正是太史公所稱「因陰陽之大順,采儒墨之 善,撮名法之要」的道家,是以老子的哲學整合春秋各家學術思想,而開啟了戰國的「黃老之學」。自子產「鑄刑書」、晉「鑄刑鼎」,李悝「造法經」,春秋戰國時代 成為宗法封建轉向法治專制的時代,《黃帝四經》反映了以老子哲學整 合各家學說的時代思想,影響了戰國法家慎到、申不害、韓非。
The Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor , unearthed 1973 in Mawangdui, leads the way of the study of Huang-lao thought since. And with it, the Huang of historian’s Huang-lao came to the eyes of scholars nowadays.Contents of The Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor are exactly the description of Taoists by Tai Shi Gong (Historian of the Emperor) that “bending to the alternation of Yin and Yang, adopting the positive aspects of Confucianism and Mohism, summing up the essentials of the school of Min (Names) and Fa (Legalist).” Therefore the philosophy of Lao Tzu integrated thoughts of all school of Chung Qiu Era, and lading the foundation of the study of Huang-lao thought in the following Warring States period.Zichan casted the Penal code, Jin Dynasty had the Penal Tripod, and Li Kui wrote Bible of Legalists, all spelled out the transformation of the society of patriarchal feudalism to that of legalist monarchy. In The Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor we see the thought of that era, that is thoughts of every school of that period integrated with Lao Tzu Philosophy, which had its effect on Shen Dao, Sheng Bu Hai and Han Fei, legalists of the Warring States Period.
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蔡耀 明
Yao-Ming Tsai
「不二中道」學說相關導航概念的詮釋進路 以佛法解開生命世界的全面實相 在思惟的導引為詮釋線索
Interpretative Approach to Navigating Concepts Concerning the Doctrine of Nondual Middle Way Maneuver into Buddhist Approach to UnfoldongThorough Reality of the Life World
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本文試圖以解開生命世界的全面實相在思惟的導引為詮釋線索,闡明佛法「不二中道」學說用以建構的關鍵概念,包括不二、中道、非我、無常、生滅、緣起、空性,而這些深具導航作用的概念,其意 涵的詮釋進路一經打通,在排除觀念迷航的基礎上,不僅可藉以理解 佛法以「不二中道」為標幟所要彰顯學說的基本思惟方針與實踐旨趣,而且在思惟明燈的逐一點燃下,還可藉以續航在生命世界的實相 大海。深受相對概念的影響,二分式的或二極化的思惟形態或觀點,在 日常語言、哲學思辨、宗教論說,不僅無孔不入,甚至早已鑲嵌成思 惟或觀點的基本結構,很容易被視為理所當然,而難以覺察,且難以 甩脫。以檢查且揚棄二分式的思惟形態而起家的不二中道,其基本概 念與基本議題通通不落俗套,不論在哲學或宗教,都提出開創式的做法,一方面,提供獨特的眼光,從基本的結構,檢視哲學或宗教的嵌 入招式,另一方面,也開闢出哲學或宗教可以走的或許更加深刻、通 暢、或長遠的道路。本文最主要的任務,在於解明「為什麼將生命世界看成不二中 道」,「如何看成不二中道」,以及「看成怎樣的不二中道」。基於以達 成這一系列的任務為重,研究方法的工作要項即落在概念的釐清,議 題的解析,意涵的闡明,以及理路的鋪陳。在論述架構的安排,由強調不二中道和全面實相為宗教哲學或生命哲學極富創意的基本概念入手,先做關鍵概念的界說和釐清,尤其 區別於二元主義、一元主義、和多元主義,凸顯不二中道的非實體觀 念以及從根本揚棄二分式的思惟形態。接下來,一方面,避免廉價的 嫁接或庸俗的套用;另一方面,除了強調以佛教經典專業修煉的經驗為詮釋所依據的網絡配備,還特別闡明思惟的多重向度之開啟,不僅 讓詮釋工作的張力較有機會淋漓盡致發揮出來,也是抽絲剝繭地揭示 實相的一項利器。本文主幹的部分,按照非我、無常、生滅、緣起、空性、中道的 順序,這些都是佛教哲學極具特色的基本概念,串連成共構的主軸,猶如一系列導航的概念,基調在於拆解日常語言的慣用所衍生的遮 蔽、限定、或封閉,包括對象化、事物化、個體化、外殼化、區別化、概念化等問題,從而由縱貫的取向一躍而入,搭配因緣生滅變化的視角,將生命世界的實相,一層又一層揭露開來。在這一連串由基本概 念接續運作的進程,一棒接著一棒,登向巔峰的,正好是不二中道,亦即,拆解相對概念的區別化,從區別化的對峙與桎梏掙脫而出,傾 全力打通緣生緣滅的接連環節,進而趨向覺悟和涅槃。若以佛教解脫 道骨幹經典的《阿含經》為依據,不勝枚舉的經證在在顯示,不二中 道藉由非實體觀念,從個體的閉鎖獲得釋放,並且藉由非二分式的思 惟形態,從周遭邊界的封閉得到釋放,以如釋重負的姿態,心無旁騖 地導向縱貫的因緣生滅的變化之流,生命世界的實相就這樣一一豁顯而出。
The purpose of this paper is to present Nondual Middle Way as guidance in ways of navigating to unfold Thorough Reality of the Life World, and to explain the intent and rationale of Nondual Middle Way in Buddhist doctrine.With expediency and prevalence of comparison and contrast, dichotomous ways of thinking and viewpoints have not only taken root in philosophical thinking and religious discourses, but have also been absorbed into the basic structure of everyday life, and are easily taken for granted and thus hard to detect or throw away. With its uniqueness of basic concepts and basic issues, Nondual Middle Way, originating from the inclination to spot and drop dichotomous ways of thinking, offers a creative point of view for bothphilosophy and religion. This unusual way of thinking is able to provide an extraordinary viewpoint to inspect the basic structures of philosophy and religion, and thus point out a way that might lead to further and deeper discussion in both fields.The undertaking of this paper is to answer the following questions: “Why should we view the life world as Nondual Middle Way?”, “How can we view it as Nondual Middle Way?”, and “As what kind of Nondual Middle Way should we view it?” In order to answer the series of questions, the major methods employed in this paper focus on differentiating concepts, analyzing issues, elucidating connotation, and constructing argument.Concerning the configuration of discourses, this paper firstly define and make clear major concepts by emphasizing that Nondual Middle Way and Thorough Reality are very innovative basic concepts for philosophy of religion and philosophy of life. In order to emphasize the idea of non-substantiality and to drop dichotomous ways of thinking from the very beginning, Nondual Middle Way is distinguished from dualism, monism, and pluralism. Then this paper seeks to exclude easy borrowings and rough copies of ideas. In addition, experience of practicing Buddhist teachings as a profession in accordance with related scriptures is also taken seriously as a reference for interpretation.Moreover, for the sake of making a more pertinent interpretation and to reveal Thorough Reality layer by layer, great emphasis is put on the explanation ofmethods of unlocking multi-faceted ways of thinking.The main subject matter of this paper is composed in sequence of concepts such as not-self, impermanence, birth and death, dependent arising (dependent origination), emptiness, and middle way. These distinctive concepts in Buddhist philosophy collectively form an axis that is set to remove shades, limits, and seals, such as problems of objectification, reification, individualization, demarcation, discrimination, and conceptualization, which derive from the daily language that are commonly used. From the point of view of conditioned arising and ceasing, the Thorough Reality of the life world is revealed layer by layer. And it is precisely Nondual Middle Way that pushesthese basic concepts rolling, settles problems of comparison and contrast, breaks free from the tension and limitation of discrimination, makes a breakthrough in a series of conditioned arising and ceasing, and leads to Enlightenment and Nirvā a in the end. Various examples in the Āgama Sūtras show that the idea of non-substantiality helps to free Nondual Middle Way from seals of individualization, and by non-dichotomous ways of thinking, borders around Nondual Middle Way are removed. Nondual Middle Way is thus able to approach the variations of causal conditions, and the Thorough Reality of the life world is thus unfolded.
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Issue: 32
陳平 坤
Ping – Kun Chen
《呂氏春秋》與《淮南子》的感應思維
The Thinking of Resonance (Kan-Ying) in Lu Shi Chun Qiu and Huai-nan Tzu
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《呂氏春秋》與《淮南子》是秦漢時期以道家哲學為主軸的兩部 重要典籍。本文扣緊「感應」思維、以及其所涉及的義理問題,嘗試 分析與探討呈現在這兩部著作中的感應論述,而希望能對這個議題展 開稍進一步的思索。本文首先解釋「感應」觀念之義涵,接著指出感應思維所關注的 哲學問題重點,然後以此理解為背景,開始分析《呂氏春秋》以「類 同」為基本規定的「精氣」感應論述,以及探討《淮南子》從氣類相 動到天人感通的感應思想,並且重點指出繼承《呂氏春秋》的「用意」、致「誠」等,足以獲致感應最大效果的主體修為之外,而為後者所較詳細強調的「無為」、「虛靜」等功夫涵養。最後,本文則是針對與感 應思維有關的「歷時性」(Diachrony)與「同時性」(Synchronicity) 二概念,進行初步論究,藉以揭出在感應思維之領域內所可能開發的 其他研究課題。
Based on Taoism, Lu shi chun qiu and Huai-nan tzu are two classics of the Qin and Han dynasties. This study is centered on the thinking regarding “Resonance” (Kan-Ying) and the philosophical views it involves. The study also analyzes and discusses the statements of resonant thinking in these two literary texts to offer an insight into this issue.Starting with explaining the concept of “Resonance”, the study then points out the philosophical issues that resonant thinking focuses on. In this context, the study analyses the resonant statement of “Essence-Energy” (Jing-Qi), which is a fundamental principle of “similarity and sameness” in Lu shi chun qiu. Then, it discusses the resonant thought of the “joint movement of Energy” and “Communication between humans and the universe” in Huai-nan tzu. In addition, it illustrates that the inherited concepts of “single-hearted devotion” and “complete sincerity” can achieve the maximum effect of resonance in Lu shi chun qiu, and the idea that the “complete sincerity” emphasizes the ability to exercise “non-action” and to maintain “emptiness-tranquility” in detail.Finally, the study explores the concepts of “Diachrony” and “Synchronicity” related to resonant thinking so as to develop some other possible issues of philosophical research in the field of resonant thinking.
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陳榮華
Wing-Wah Chan
高達美光的形土學與真理概念
The Metaphysics of Light and the Concept of Truth in Gadamer's Philosophy
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高達美在〈真理與方法〉指出,他的詮釋學是由光的形上學 所指導,則他的真理概念也應在光的形士學的指導下o於是,本 文嘗試由光的形上學說明高達美的真理概念。本文首先指出,高達美光的形上學中所說的光是指語詞之 光。語詞的存有不是「在˩ ( presence ) ,而是照亮( illumination) , 由語詞之光照亮出來的,是一個事件,因此,真理是指一個被語 詞之光照亮出來的事件( event )。於是,根據語詞之光的性格, 便可以說明高達美詮釋學的真理概念。本文嘗試從以下三個方向 討論高達美的真理概念: 1.從光的本性論真理概念, 2.從光的來 源論真理概念, 3.從光照耀的方向論真理概念o在結論中,我將高達美的真理概念與傳統哲學真理理論的符 應論和融貫論作一簡單比較,指出高達美真理概念的優先性。
In Wharheit und Methode, Gadamer claims that his hermeneutical inquiry is guided by the metaphysics of light. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that this kind of metaphysics also guides his concept of truth. This essay is an attempt to elucidate the Gadamerian concept of truth in tenns of his metaphysics of light.I first point out that the light in the metaphysics of light is the light of word. Since the nature of light is to illuminate, the Being of word is illumination rather than presence. Moreover, as whatever is illuminated is an event, the meaning of truth is not the correspondence of proposition to fact, but an event illuminated by the light of word. I then continue to suggest that analysis of the light of word can reveal a full view of the Gadamerian concept of truth. This concept of truth is approached in tenns of the nature of light, the source of light, and the direction of light. Finally, I briefly indicate the priority of the Gadamerian concept of truth to the traditional concept of truth as correspondence and coherence.
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林義正
Yih-Jing Lin
論中國經典詮釋的二個基型: 直釋與旁通 以〈易經〉的詮釋為例
Internal and Crossover Interpretations as Two Fundamental Hermeneutic Prototypes of interpreting Classic Chinese Writings: Taking The Book of Change (I Ching) as an Example
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中國經典詮釋傳統有沒有自己的特點?經筆者研究之後,風 覺到傳統經學的實踐中確實有宜釋與旁通二個基型,可惜沒有受 到學者充分的注意o故本論文為了具體討論起見,特別以《易經〉 的詮釋為例,依以下各節:一、前言,二、對「中國經典詮釋基 型」的界定,三、《易》籍著作的詮釋體式,門、直釋型詮釋的 方法與問題,五、旁通型詮釋的方法與問題,六、結論,來論述。 其中第四、五兩節又各立細目,詳細討論詮釋的方法與問題。中 國經典的詮釋體式是依字一一句一一章一一篇一一卷逐次解釋而成立低層的訓話、章句、j主、瓷、解、疏、說、傳,甚至更有 不泥於文句,而依義理而成立高層的釋義、通釋、通義,乃至最 高層的哲理詮釋。其詮釋可歸納成二個基型, 即各經本身在歷代 所表現的宜釋詮釋與異經彼此互釋的旁通詮釋。在中國經典詮釋 傳統中,此兩型詮釋之於經典正猶乾坤之於易,經典在詮釋中表 現其生生不息的生命力。
What characteristics the long-standing tradition of Chinese classics interpretation nlanifests? The author suggests that, though largely neglected, the interpretations of Chinese classics can be categorized into two prototypes. To bring these two prototypes into light, the author will analyze a variety of interpretations of The Book of Change (I Ching). In the first section, the author gives an overview of the issue. In section 2 and 3, the author defines the two prototypes at stake and investigates their relationships with various forms of interpretations of some selected texts in The Book of Change. The author then goes on to discuss the merits and costs of the two prototypes in section 4 and 5, before concluding in section 6. It will be argued that both internal interpretations-interpretations that seek internal coherence within a particular writing-and crossover interpretations--interpretations that seek overall coherence among several different but related writings---are flowers growing out of efforts to understand the philosophy of classic Chinese writings. They are fundamental to the everlasting life of the tradition of Chinese classics interpretation, just as as Qián and Kūn are fundamental to the change of every entity.
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陳平坤
Ping-Kun Chen
茍子的「類」觀念及其通類之道
Xunzi's Concept of “Categorization" and His Method of Realizing the “Categorization"
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茍子是戰國時期繼孟子之後的一代大儒。而茍子學說,以 明辨天人之分,主張人之性惡,提倡禮義法度,重視積學而取 法後王為其主要特色。不過,在茍子學說中,異於這些特色而 實能貫通其名實論、倫理學說、以及人道理想的一大觀念一一 「類˩ '尤其內涵豐富義理,而應受到更多重視與探發。因此, 本文嘗試透過「類」字含意的分析論述,闡釋它在哲學理論層 面的主要涵蘊,同時也想藉此探察苟子所尚聖人「知通統類」 的相關教學重點。經過以文義解析起主要方法的論究之後,本文初步釐清與歸 納出「類」字在日常語意之外的哲學義蘊;亦即在茍子學說中, 「類」字具有( 1 )名實論或知識論意義的「名理」、與( 2 )倫 理學意義的「文理J '以及( 3 )政法學意義的「法理」等三大內 涵。而茍子批判「無類」、「知不能類」的人事與言論,期求實現 「知通統類」、能夠「推類」以應萬變的理想人格,就中的主體 條件,乃是必須具備專壹、虛靜的「大清明」心境;至於其養成 之道,貝IJ落實在積「學」、修「行」的種種「兼權」以「解蔽˩ 的功夫之上。
Xunzi was a renowned leading scholar following in the footsteps of Mencius in the Warring States period. WIllie Xunzi's Confucian teaching took a central focus that all people were evil, and emphasized an etiquette and morality-led doctrine that mainly featured a predominant focus on accumulating study and following later kings' teaching. Nevertheless, among Xunzi's teachings, a significant concept of his that set it apart from the aforesaid characteristics but served essentially to integrate his practical theory, moral doctrine and humanistic ideology had been the “categorization/class", which is containing the abundant philosophic theory, so that should be paid attention to and probing into by more scholars. In light of which, the thesis has attempted to interpret its main significance in philosophy through analyzing and interpreting the meaning of "categorization" , and to explore methods of knowing the “intergration of categorization統類"Upon undergoing a theoretic study premise primarily adopting literature analysis and interpretation, the thesis has initially discerned and recapped the philosophical significance of the phrase “categorization" other than its common usages, meaning that in Xunzi's teachings, the phrase "categorization" has three distinct meanings of, (I) logical doctrine in the sense of knowledge acquiring theory; (2) the cultural doctrine in the sense of morality; and (3 ) the legal doctrine in the sense of the science of the law. And the preeminent criterion in what Xunzi's had criticized of the assertion, people and things of ignorance and inability to understand the “intergration of categorization統類", or achieving an adaptable ideal character through reduction reasoning lies in how one needs to possess an undivided, humble clear mind, before one is able to perfect oneself through accumulated learning and disciplinary training.
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王曉 波
Hsiao-Po Wang
自道以至名,自名以至法 ── 尹文子的哲學與思想研究
Dao leads to Ming, Ming leads to Fa──Studies of Yin Win Zi's Philosophy and Thought
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自唐銊、羅根澤判定《尹文子》為「偽書」後,《尹文子》 乏人研究,但據晚近學者研究,今本《尹文子》即劉向所見之《尹 文子》,其內容亦與先秦諸子所論述之尹文子思想主張一致,《尹 文子》思想內容涉及道、名、法,正是劉向所言:「自道以至名, 自名以至法;以名為根,以法為柄。」並反映戰國初期,由宗法 封建過渡到法治專制的政治社會的思想。他以道家自然主義論形 名,以形名論建立其法治論,開啟了後代法家刑名法術的先河。他的形名論保留了中國邏輯史豐富的史料,並區別了「名」、「分」 及「名」、「稱」的不同,影響了後來的名家;他主張的「萬事皆 歸於一,百度皆準於法」,更是後來法家韓非所奉為圭臬者。
Scholars indifference to Yin Win Zi were affected by the conclusion of Tang Yue and Luo Gen Zhe, that is, one "book of dubious author". Yet studies of Scholars nowadays pointed out that the Yin Win Zi we read today is the same of what Liu Xiang of Han Dynasty read, and its contents is the same of the thought of Yin Win Zi introduced by scholars of Xian Qin. Dao (Way), Ming (Names), Fa (Law) in Yin Win Zi are exactly what Liu Xiang commented: " Dao leads to Ming, Ming leads to Fa, Ming is fundamental, and Fa means of governing." It reflects the political and social thoughts of Early Warring States Period, corresponding with the transitional period of society of patriarchal, feudal to that of autocracy of law. His argument on Xing (Forms), Ming (Names) based on Daoist's Naturalism, his governing by law based on his theory of Xing and Ming. It's the foundation Yin Win Zi established on which later Legalist School of Xing, Ming and Fa expounded their arguments. His arguments on Xing, Ming is the main sources of historical material of Chinese Logic History. The difference between Ming (Names) and Feng (Duties),between Ming and Cheng (Agreement) he pointed out affected later Legalist School. "All things ends in one, all rules bases on law." Those view of his became criteria to later Legalists Han Fei.
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孫效 智
Johannes Sun Hsiao-chih
生殖性人類複製的安全風險與個體獨特性問題
Ethical Issues of Safety and Individuality in Reproductive Human Cloning
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當複製實驗的腳步以飛快速度向前奔馳時,人們最感到困惑 與憂慮的問題是:「人類複製」的研究與發展本身是否會涉及某 些嚴重的倫理問題?而當「人類複製」成為事實時,它對於人類 的倫理、法律及社會又會產生怎樣的衝擊?這些問題的探討隨著 各國或明或暗地競逐胚胎幹細胞研究及人類複製研究的事實,已 經愈來愈形迫切。本文的探討將集中在生殖性人類複製 (reproductive human cloning)的兩個倫理議題,亦即安全風險與 個體獨特性所涉及的倫理問題。文分六部分,首先簡單介紹人類複製的議題背景,接下來說明本文的議題範圍及方法論,第三部 分指出反對與贊成生殖性人類複製的各種倫理論據。第四與第五 部分則將討論焦點放在安全風險與個體獨特性所引伸出來的倫 理議題。最後則做一簡短結論。
The dramatic progress of experiments on cloning raises many perplexing and worrisome issues: Is the step from Dolly to human a fiction never coming true or will it be made possible in the near future? If it becomes reality, what impacts would it bring about in the ethical, legal and social dimensions? These issues become more andmore urgent after the Korean scientists successfully applied the technique of SCNT to reproduce cloned human blastocysts in the year of 2004. This article focuses on two significant ethical issues of reproductive human cloning, i.e. the problems of safety and individual uniqueness. I firstly clarify the objective facts related to the ethical judgments of reproductive human cloning. Secondly, I define the issues to be explored and present my methodology. Thirdly I will introduce the fundamental ethical positions underlyingvarious arguments for and against reproductive human cloning. And then, in the fourth and fifth parts of the article, I will deal separately with the problems of safety and individuality.
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Francisco Calvo Garzón
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Game-Theoretical Semantics and Referential Inscrutability
賽局理論語意學與指涉之 不可測度說
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This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine´s polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine´s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translationsuggested by Hintikka´s Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka´s semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka´s behavioural data tells against Hookway´s proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed toenjoy.
此篇論文有兩部分,第一,我將討論分別由Hookway 及Calvo Garzon 所提出對Quine 的指涉之不可測度說的兩個辯護。第二, 我將討論Hintikka 的賽局理論語意學如何延伸Quine 徹底翻譯之 行為判准。我將論證,Hintikka 語意學所提出的行為判准將可限 制不當的語意理論。尤其是,我將說明儘管Hintikka 的行為與料 不符Hookway 的方案,它仍說明了為什麼我所謂的不當語意理 論享有一般語意理論所享有的特權地位。
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Aysel Doğan
Aysel Doğan
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities and Causal Determination
其他可能性原則與因果決定論
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Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-stylecounterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specificunderstanding of determinism and compatibilism.
有些相容論者相信其他可能性原則已為Frankfurt 的反例所 駁斥,而這讓支持因果決定與道德責任為相容的相容論者有機可 乘。但捍衛其他可能性原則的不相容論者則堅持此原則,以及因 果決定與道德責任的不相容性。在此篇論文中,我將論證 Frankfurt 的反例無法指出其他可能性的錯誤,但這不會導致不相 容論的成立。事實上,我將證明,在一種對決定論與相容論的理 解下,其他可能性原則與因果決定論及相容論者是相容的。
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王曉 波
Hsiao-Po Wang
「歸本於黃老」與「以無為本」──韓非及王弼對老子哲學詮釋的比較研究
“Resorting to Huang Lao” and “Non-Being” ── Comparative Study of Han Fei and Wang Bi's Interpretation of Lao Tzu's philosophy
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韓非是戰國時代韓國的庶公子,王弼是漢末三國時代魏國的 豪門之後,相隔六百多年,而都留下了對《老子》哲學的詮釋之 作。韓非有《解老》、《喻老》,王弼有《老子注》,又各自在詮釋 中改造了老子的哲學建立了自己的思想體系。韓非成為先秦法家 的集大成者,而王弼則成為魏晉玄學的奠基者。同樣是詮釋《老 子》,但韓非用的方法是「參驗」,王弼則是「得意忘言」;韓非 的「道」是「與夫天地剖判也具生」,王弼的「道」是「先天地 生」;韓非是主張「以法為本」,王弼則是「以無為本」;韓非主 張「無為而無不為」,王弼主張「無為而為之」。所以韓非的哲學 思想建立了秦漢以後的專制帝國,王弼的哲學思想則引進了隋唐 佛學。
Han Fei is a descendent of former aristocracy who livedduring the Warring States Period, while Wang Bi livedduring the Late Han. Although separated by six hundredyears, they have both left us with annotations dealingwith the philosophy of Lao Tzu. Han Fei wrote"Interpretation of Lao Tzu" and "Expounding Lao TzuMetaphorically," while Wang Bi is known for "Annotating onLao Tzu." In their annotations of Lao Tsu's texts theysuggested new interpretations and systems of thought. HanFei became leading legalist of Xian Qin period, and WangBi laid the foundation of metaphysics school of Wei & JinDynasty. Lao Tzu was interpreted differently by Han Feiand Wang Bi. Han relied on method of "comparing and examining," while Wang emphasized "comprehending and let aside words." Han's argument is "in the Beginning there was Universe" and then "Tao". On the other hand, Wang held that Tao comes "before the Beginning of the Universe." Han maintains that law is essential while for Wang the essential theUniverse." Han maintains that law is essential while for Wang the essential is Wu (Non being).Han believed that "inactivity activated all deeds", while Wang countered by asserting "inactivity is activation".Thus, Han's philosophy helped establish autocratic empires since the Qin and Han dynasties. Wang's interpretation of Lao Tzu helped introduce the Buddhist philosophy during the Sui and Tang dynasties.
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王志 銘
Chih-Ming Wang
道德神學在道德上是必然的嗎?
Ist Eine Ethikotheologie Moralisch Notwendig?
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康德的道德神學,企圖把信仰建立在人類理性的基礎上。他 一方面駁斥知性經驗與思辨理性對於掌握「靈魂不朽」與「上帝 存在」命題的無能力,另一方面卻在實踐理性的基礎上確立這兩 命題的必然性。因而強調:道德必然引至宗教。然而這又不可理 解為道德法則自身必然直接產生宗教,而是以道德法則為線索,加上人性追求幸福本能的需求,也就是德福一致的最高善,才是 宗教信仰的必然基礎。因此康德說宗教的必然性不是客觀的,而 是道德上主觀的一種確信。從而這種宗教信仰的需要,即在於掃除道德障礙乃至激勵道德決心,而不可反過來將道德法則的客觀 必然性建立在宗教信仰的基礎上。在這種理性信仰中,人所應關 切的仍只是:是否成為有德而配享幸福,而不是如傳統基督教信 仰那樣仰望奇蹟、神恩,乃至救贖與祈禱。然而為了保障吾人之道德決心,必然要運用最高善的理念 嗎?縱使承認確有一種道德上的報應,上帝信仰是唯一的選擇 嗎?放在西方基督教文化的架構裡,我們能夠確信道德必然引至 信仰?還是應該反過來說信仰必然引至道德?在下面的文章裡我將論述:康德的最高善理念裡的幸福仍無 法擺脫「不確定概念」的困難,其次則是「靈魂不朽」與「上帝 存有」就道德報應理論的其他可能類型(例如佛教)而言並無其 必然性,最後將指出宗教信仰不必藉助於道德需求仍有其存在的 必要性,並指出康德對基督教核心教義的錯誤理解。
The ethical theology of Kant aims to vindicate the religious belief on the basis of human reason. Although he argues on the one hand that the knowledge of experience and the speculative reason are ineffective for making clear the statements of the immortality of soul and the existence of God, he, on the other hand, maintains on thebasis of the practical reason the immortality of soul and the existence of God. Consequently, Kant stresses that morality is bound to lead to religion. However, the afore-mentioned argumentation of Kant is not be understood as that the moral principles themselves should directly lead to religion, from Kant’s point of view, the indispensable foundation for the religious belief has to be built with the framework of moral laws as well as the human instinctive desire for happiness, that is, the Highest Good of the proper proportioning of virtue and happiness is the true basis of the religious belief. Accordingly, Kant insists that the “moral necessity” to “assume the existence of God” is “subjective, i.e., a need, and not objective, i.e. duty itself.” Therefore, the necessity of the religious belief in Kantian viewpoint means to eliminate the moral obstacles so as to aspire the moral resolutions, not on the contrary, that the necessary objectivity of moral laws is established on the basis of religious belief. With such a rationalreligious belief, what the faithful should be concerned about is to introspect oneself whether one’s virtue is worthy of happiness, and not to behave in accordance with the traditional Christian ways to rely upon praying and look to divine grace, miracles as well as redemption.Can the Kantian postulate about the subjective moral necessity be proved true? If we acknowledge the Kantian statement about the subjective moral necessity, then, we should ask further, whether the Christian belief in God is the sole choice? If not, do we still need an ethical theology? Furthermore, even taking the western Christianculture into consideration, this paper also aims to examine whether the Kantian issue that morality has to lead to religious belief is unquestionable? Or, is it possible that religious belief is bound to lead to moral behavior?This paper aims to examine first the happiness within the Kantian notion of the Highest Good still remains an uncertain idea. Secondly, in comparison with the other theories of the moral retribution (such as that of Buddhism), the immortality of soul and the existence of God can not be proved as the only two valid presumptions for the issue of the moral retribution. Thirdly, this paper will point out that the notion of moral demands is not necessary for maintaining the raison d’etre of the religious belief, and that Kant’s perception of the Christian core-doctrines is incorrect.
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林火 旺
Huo-Wang Lin
審議民主與公民養成
Deliberative Democracy and Civic Education
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本文檢討程序民主和憲政民主的缺點,針對這些缺點指出審 議民主可以克服這些缺點,然而一個成熟的政治,不能只依賴制 度的建立,而必須培養能夠維繫且強化這個制度的公民。審議式 民主政治所需要的公民素養,除了具有自由主義民主公民應有的 知能和德行之外,還需要具有推理和理性批判力、自主性和相互 尊敬、以及開放的心靈,而最適合從事這類公民教育的單位就是 學校。最後本文進一步指出,一個健全的民主社會還需要培養公 民具有同情的想像力,這樣才能使多元差異的社會,維持和諧穩 定。
This article examines different forms of democracy and concludes that deliberative democracy has some merits in contrast with procedural democracy and liberal democracy. However even deliberative democracy cannot function properly without well-educated citizens. To be a good citizen, people should develop certain skills and virtues pertain to a deliberative democracy, such as the ability of critical reasoning, autonomy, mutual respect, and open-mindedness. Schools are the most important places for civic education and hence should emphasize more on their common purposes. Moreover, a healthy society also requires citizens acquire a kind of sympathetic imagination, which is an ability to put oneself in other’s shoes. With this people with diverse views can live together cooperatively and peacefully.
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陳榮 華
Wing-Wah Chan
海德格與高達美的時間概念
The Concept of Time in Heidegger and Gadamer
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本文是要檢討海德格與高達美的時間概念,說明它與他們哲 學的關係。我要指出,無論海德格前期和後期的時間概念,在理 論上無法讓海德格完成他的哲學工作──存有意義的探索,但高 達美的時間概念,卻可以讓他得以詮釋存有的意義。本文首先分析海德格的前期作品《存有與時間》中的時間概 念,繼而說明他的後期作品(時間與存有)的時間概念。我指出,這兩個概念在理論上無法讓人完成存有意義的詮釋過程。然後,我從三個觀點分析高達美的時間概念, 它們分別是 (Gleichzeitigkeit, contemporaneity),節慶(Fest, festival)中的時間和 充實時間(erfuellte Zeit, fulfilled time)。我認為,高達美的時間概 念可以讓人完成詮釋的過程,因此亦可以理解存有的意義。由 此,高達美的時間概念在理論上是可以證成的。
This essay analyzes the concept of time in the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer in order to show its relationship with both philosophers’ discussion on “Being”. I point out that no matter in his early or later writings, Heidegger’s concept of time is in conflict with his concept of understanding. Therefore, Heidegger’s quest for the meaning of Being cannot be accomplished. In contrast the Gadamerian concept of time makes the understanding of the meaning of Being possible.In the first part of this essay Heidegger’s concepts of time are revealed by an analysis on his two major works: Being and Time and On Time and Being. I argue that the concept of time revealed in these two books makes the understanding of Being impossible. In the second part Gadamer’s concept of time is discussed by an investigation on the following terms: contemporaneity, time in festival and fulfilled time. I show that the Gadamerian concept of time is in harmony with the understanding of Being. ThereforeGadamer’s philosophy can accomplish the task of illuminating the meaning of Being. Finally I show that it is justified to accept the Gadamerian concept of time in the interpretation of Being.
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黃懿 梅
Yih-Mei Huang
論富蘭克福特式的例子與其他可能性的原則
On Frankfurt-style Examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
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在討論自由意志問題中,我們要問:為什麼我們應該關心自己是否有自由意志以及決定論是否是真的?我們之所以關心自己是否有自由意志是因為我們關心道德責任。一個行為者如果沒 有自由意志,那麼就不能要求他負道德責任。這個原則就是其他 選擇可能性原則”(the principle of alternative possibilities 簡稱 PAP)。PAP 是這樣的:一個人為他所做的行為道德責任,那麼他能做其他不同的 事。Harry G. Frankfurt 在“ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (Journal of Philosophy 66, 1969, pp.829-39) 一文 中,提出反例,證明PAP 是假的。針對Frankfurt 所提出的反例,有不同的回應。最普遍的反應是:認為在反例中確實有其他選擇 的可能性—微弱的自由(flicker of freedom)。有各種不同理由支持 這個觀點。Fischer 反對這微弱的自由可以做為道德的基礎。另外有的哲學家認為反例中預設因果決定論,行動者不要為他的行為 負道德責任。Van Inwagen 認為PAP 不成立,但他提出另外三個 原則來重新建立做其他不同事的能力與責任之間的關聯。本論文討論Frankfurt 的反例是否反駁了PAP。反例是否是真 正的反例?(1) 反例中是否確實有其他選擇的可能性?(2) 反例 中的行動者是否要負責?(3) Van Inwagen 的三原則是否有效地把 做其他不同事的能力與責任關聯在一起?以釐清能有其他選擇 的可能性與道德責任之間的關聯,以便對自由意志問題的能有比 較有效的探討。
There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities” (hereinafter : PAP) which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39)The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.
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蔡耀 明
Yao-Ming Tsai
《佛說不增不減經》「眾生界不增不減」的修學義理:由眾生界、法界、法身到如來藏的理路開展
Buddhist Doctrine of "Neither Increase Nor Decrease in the Realm of Sentient Beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa: A Doctrinal Development from the Realm of Sentient Beings, Dharmadhātu, Dharmakāya, to Tathāgatagarbha
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本文主要探討《佛說不增不減經(Anunatvqpurnatva-nirdewa)》 「眾生界不增不減」的修學義理;至於落實的辦法,則以眾生界、法界、法身、如來藏等關鍵字詞為環節,闡發眾生界之所以不增 不減在理路的根據與開展。如果僅就粗淺的經驗所及,通常大致傾向於認為,在時間之 流的沖刷下,一定範圍內的眾生數目,要不是增多,就是出現減 少的情形,也就是說,幾乎不可能維持在零增加且零減少的水 平。然而,《不增不減經》不僅拒絕接受表面上看似有增有減之 見解,而且擺明了就在經典的標題,高高掛出眾生界「不增不減」 為其主旨。本文扣緊既是《不增不減經》的主旨也是本文主題所 關注的「眾生界不增不減」,沿著關鍵字詞,逐一打開其間之意 涵、根據、和理路。在論述架構上,總共分成五節。第一節,「緒論」,就論文的構成項目,由研究主題到研究目標,逐一交代全 文的構想與梗概。第二節,切入經典主旨——「眾生界不增不 減」——並且就其義理構成,透過系列的提問,展開深度的解析。第三節,切換到「法界」,論陳此一關鍵字詞如何一方面使經典 主旨得到確證,另一方面又使經典在論述的觸角和理路都獲得重 大的拓展。第四節,進一步切換到「法身」,透過此一關鍵字詞,論陳經典主旨如何漸次延伸且一一貫穿眾生、聲聞、緣覺、菩薩、和如來等生命形態和佛法修學專業的身分,不僅出之於一貫的著眼點,統整地述說各式各樣的生命形態和佛法修學專業的身分何 以分別造成,而且面對生命相續形形色色的差異,恰好成全經典 主旨的甚深義。第五節,「結論與展望」,總結全文要點,並且針 對後續相關的研究,預做前瞻。本文採取的研究進路,以佛法的修學為著眼點,爬梳與闡明 經典在修學所展開的理路,由此形成對修學義理的一份理解。至 於預期達成的目標,以如下三點最為首要。第一,對《不增不減 經》,做出相當完整的鑽研。第二,以經典主旨和關鍵字詞打通 《不增不減經》的理路,凸顯整篇經文在義理上的整全性與連貫 性。第三,直接藉由《不增不減經》的鑽研,以接近原汁原味的 內涵,開啟生命哲學的一扇門窗,並且認識法界、法身、如來藏 等概念所可能指向的理趣。
The present study examines Buddhist doctrine of "neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa in terms of a doctrinal development focusing attention on keywords from the realm of sentient beings (sattva-dhātu), dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, to tathā-gatagarbha. The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that there is neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, a doctrine which is often linked to the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or the Mādhyamika school. In this paper, I look into just such a doctrine, as it is found in a Chinese traslation of the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, a Buddhist scripture translated by Bodhiruci in 525. Several passages of this scripture were cited in the Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, a treatise still preserved in Sanskrit, Chineseand Tibetan, and give us textual sources for research into the Chinese translation of this scripture.In the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, the very way in which the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings is defined and verified through the employment of the dharma-dhātu theory, a theory which, in turn, is verified by reference to theories of dharma-kāya and tathā-gatagarbha. So in order to understand this scripture's discursive construction of the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, we must explore its conception of such keywords as dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, and tathā-gatagarbha.It is my hope that an examination of such a scripture with the focus on the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective.
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