This paper discusses Kant’s dealing with a fundamental of modern politics, that is, the concept of sovereignty, as well as its own capacity to reshape political order. Overcoming failures and fallacies that traditionally such a concept has maintained, Kant’s political philosophy focuses on the way to reach international peace institutionally. Starting from the discussion of contradiction in sovereignty, the paper briefly analyzes the analogy between individuals and states; finally, core elements of Kant’s cosmopolitan thought will be presented. Kant’s project basically seeks to rewrite the early modern relation between politics and philosophy promoting republicanism, which is, mainly, a theory that shares state’s powers and defends representation. Extending such a political way from domestic to a world domain, Kant’s final solution for a World Republic implies a change of paradigm (though not completely expounded), by which modern sovereignty gets reassessed into a blended institutionalized coercion that emphasizes vertical power-sharing, so it realizes a cosmopolitan model of world order.

In the current political discourse and in the day-by-day public debate, discussions about justice come frequently together with the word “dignity”. In some way, this second term constitutes the aim of the first one. Justice is a worthy public objective precisely because governmental actions seek for the realization of everybody´s dignity. Situations of exclusion are unacceptable because then somebody is treated as being an outsider of the human race. However, in the theoretical approaches to the issue, only a few times does justice run side by side with dignity, at least in explicit and clear terms. It’s true that words like respect or self-respect, appear frequently when the question is about the rules of fair distribution or the scope of human rights, but there is among the thinkers some kind of reluctance to use the notion of “dignity” as a central part of the foundations of social justice. John Rawls, for example, uses only three times the word in all of his classic A Theory of Justice. Probably philosophers think that the notion of human dignity introduces some essentialism in the rational argumentation, and inevitably some theological bias. At best, the introduction of the word does not improve the reasoning in any way. In this paper I affirm that there are good reasons to link philosophical foundations on justice with adequate notions of human dignity. Not for theological of metaphysical reasons, but for practical reasons. If we do not introduce the dignity dimension, our constructions about justice will remain speculative exercises. The public have good and rational arguments to bind justice with dignity.

It is a mark of our age that the long-standing relations between politics and religion founded long ago along the axis of liberal-democratic principles have turned out to appear problematical. Recently raised religious demands and movements put on the agenda a common question: to what extent are such demands and movements compatible with the principle of the peaceful co-existence of diverse cultural forms, which is the essential reference point of any democratic imagination? It a cliché that fundamentalism understood as the opposite of temperateness in holding and practically following up religious convictions constitutes the limit for tolerating religious demands and movements within liberal-democratic regimes. Such a quantitative distinction between fundamentalism and “moderate” forms of religiosity paradoxically work out for the increase of tension between religiosity and democratic political life, because it implies that non-fundamentalist forms of religiosities are indeed “diluted” forms, while fundamentalist forms represent genuine and uncompromising loyalty to the religious creed. This paper investigates the possibility of making a qualitative distinction between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist forms of religiosity by employing the categorical duality between zealotry and piety, which can then serve as the criterion for the acceptability of religious demands and movements within democratic political spheres.

The author considers the fact that feminism has two ways of development in the political sphere of the society: either formation of an independent political force or marginalization determined by inadequate view about the interpretation of the political realm gender dimension. According to the author, feminism is threatened by erosion and decay in case of its invading the non-political sphere and transference of opposing categorical divisions associated with the idea of “masculine” politics elimination. Since the non-political sphere becomes the field of generating sub-political civil initiatives, the positive prospect for political feminism is not to engender political issues, but to determine certain forms of civil participation and influence within society and social dialogue; as well as the frames of political representation, while maintaining the non-political sphere autonomy.

In the paper I want to suggest an environmental argument in favor of global distributive justice. This argument aids in the understanding of the idea of a global share of burdens and benefits which comes from natural resources. A similar argument was raised in the past, together with the demand for the restraint of deforestation in Brazil, for example, even though the rain forests are natural resources located in its territory. The argument I suggest regards the atmosphere as well as greenhouse gas emissions as common, and hence, its distribution should be grounded on considerations of global justice. If rich countries think that they are sovereign to do whatever they like with natural resources which are within their territories, then poor countries should have the right to do the same with greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere above their territories, and consequently make an uninhibited and unrestrained use of these resources. Rich countries who reject this idea have to accept the idea that they should share part of their wealth with poor countries, from which they ask for restrained development.

The paper examines the problem of object determination of political philosophy in the context of scientific knowledge of politics and political practice. Political philosophy has special status among the variety of the humanities and social sciences that consider politics as their subject. Political philosophy in its specific is in value-oriented attitude of the researcher to the object of his interest. A possible result is the recognized social practice of such political action that is an action of a political philosopher. Value-oriented position of the political philosopher differs in essence from manipulation practice which subject acts for the purpose of private or group interests’ realization misleading concern of their true intentions. The aim of the political philosopher is political enlightenment. He is a scientist and a researcher of politics, speaking for truth, and a political actor, influencing politics, at the same time.

The 2008 and 2012 presidential elections in the United States of America showed that democracy and demographics are correlated in a microcosmic nation, where the concept of majority ethnic group is becoming an endangered species. President Obama’s reelection victory can be attributed, among other factors, to the Obama Code, or Obama’s “effective way to bring the country together around fundamental American values” (Lakoff). The victory was also due to his domestic ‘Diplobamacy’, i.e., Obama’s cultural understanding of, effective dialogue and communication on domestic issues and policies relative to gender, class, race, immigration, and age, also referred to as ‘Gender Diplobamacy’, ‘Class Diplobamacy’, ‘Race Diplobamacy’, ‘Immigration Diplobamacy’, and ‘Millennial Diplobamacy’. Throughout President Obama’s first term and during both presidential campaigns, he showed that not only did his biracial identity allow him to better understand the complex demographic and cultural realities of today’s USA, but it also allowed him to see our common humanity and interests in a networked global village. The Obama Code and Diplobamacy allowed Obama to forge a new majority through “the coalition of the ascendant” (Stengel). In the 21st-century’s multipolar world, “the Obama Doctrine” prefigures a new era of multilateralism, renewed internationalism, global democracy, and cosmocitizenship.

Of the many ideological blind spots that have afflicted political perceptions and analysis, none has been more debilitating than the equation of democracy with liberalism. Thus those who attempt to derive propaganda value from such an equation are vulnerable, as the US government has found, to the rhetorical counter attack that in opposing democratically elected governments, such as that of Hamas or Hugo Chavez, they are not merely being anti-democratic, but are in illiberal opposition to human rights and civil liberties also; an argument quite independent of the same charges emanating from their support of, for example, the governments of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore The Council of Europe has drawn attention to the US government’s inhumane, humiliating, degrading and cruel treatment, including torture, of prisoners, at Guantanamo, and the torture of prisoners in the supposedly secret or “black” prisons operated both by the CIA, and other countries, where the torture of prisoners, often illegally or extra judicially rendered to them, has been outsourced. In light of this the paper takes up a discussion of the nature of the relationship between Liberalism, Democracy and Torture as it is germane to the current legitimation crisis facing supposedly liberal democracies.

In this paper I argue that the attempt to develop practice dependence as a middle path between cosmopolitanism and social liberalism ultimately fails. In particular, I contend that the only type of practice dependence that can coherently be defended collapses into cosmopolitanism. I trace the origin of practice dependence theory from Cohen and Sabel’s work (Cohen and Sabel 2006) through Sangiovanni (Sangiovanni 2008) and Valentini (2010). After discussing the various different types of practice dependence, I argue that the only type of practice dependence that stands up to scrutiny is functionalism, but that if functionalism is true, it commits us to cosmopolitanism.

Religious dialogue is a trend and characteristics of the contemporary religious development, it has a historic significance. Religious dialogue is based on the existence of religion in a diversified society. This is not a problem of which theoretical possibility needed to be discussed and studied, but a historical fact which can be derived by the religious history of the development of China. Diversification is not only the basis of religious dialogue, but also the logical premise of democracy: without the existence of diversification, equality and freedom, as the essence of democracy, there will be no basis for discussion. Such understanding of the nature of democracy has a positive and practical significance.

Experience itself, Gadamer argues, can never be science. It is a non-scientific deliberation. This paper aims to critically analyze the recovery of the concept of “hermeneutical experience” (Erfahrung) in Gadamer’s philosophical investigations. Focusing mainly on Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and Method and his later writings on ethics and politics, this examination will allow us to discuss a) the imaginative development of Gadamer’s interpretations on Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis as practical judgment and its political repercussions for modernity, b) a construction of a possible dialogue between Aristotle’s proto-hermeneutical inquiry on praxis and Hegel’s phenomenological account of the experience of conversation, c) a critical engagement with both Habermas’ procedural conception of political philosophy, through which the role of philosophy is largely restricted to the problem of designing procedures for determining the validity of generalizable, collectively binding norms and Derrida’s unconditional and anti-foundational idea of ethics where the call of the other; the arrival of the other, of a singular event, is a burden, an infinite political responsibility; and finally d) a more aesthetic and non-cognitivist idea of experience where there is an openness to the tragic nature of human action.

The issue of ideology is a very important proposition in Marxist theory. In the course of their scientific exploration to establish historical materialism and in their critique of the whole of capitalist society and culture, as represented by Germany, Marx and Engels always treated materialist inquiries into ideological issues as the focus of their struggle with idealism. By adhering to the fundamental intellectual principle that man’s social being determines his social consciousness, they defined ideology’s reactive mechanism and social function in terms of the interrelationship of economic, political and mental life; defined its subjective mechanism and class attributes in terms of the mutually generative and prescriptive relations between social consciousness and social entities; and defined its cognitive features and its character of practicality in terms of the forms of existence of social consciousness and the relationship of knowing and doing. From this they constructed three dimensions and nine perspectives for interpreting ideological phenomena and clarified intellectual tenets and a scientific methodology for understanding ideology.

The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate Chantal Mouffe’s adaptation of the concept of the political proposed by Carl Schmitt. It is my claim that her adaptation is contradictory to Schmitt’s assertions on the political. The rigidity of the concept of the political cannot lend to promising adaptations for democratic theory. The primary interest lies not, therefore, in possibility or cogency of her adaptation, but rather with the consistency of basing this view on Schmitt’s concept of the political. In this aim, I argue, Mouffe fails to find the correct theoretical background. I thus offer three reasons for misappropriation of the concept of the political: misconstruction of the friend-enemy distinction along the adversary-enemy lines; Mouffe’s claim that consensus is unreachable; and different views of ontology in Mouffe and Schmitt.

Nietzsche’s connection with the Anarchists sounds rather peculiar since he is known for his hostility towards anything socialistic. However, this paper makes use of “elective affinity” – a term deriving mainly from Johann Goethe and Max Weber, which I intend to adopt in the way Michael Lowy did in his essay on Jewish libertarian thought – in order to present various hints of this connection. For Lowy, elective affinity is a kind of dialectical relationship that develops between two social or cultural configurations and cannot be reduced to direct causality or to ‘influences’ in the traditional sense. It is a mutual and active attraction that can end up even at a fusion. Hence, hints of this affinity will be presented, firstly, by locating the “presence” of Nietzsche in the thought and politics of anarchist thinkers – and especially in Gustav Landauer – and, secondly, by recognizing fragments of the anarchist worldview in certain aspects of the Nietzschean philosophy and life.

In this work, I explore the question of whether Karl Marx did characterise capitalism as unjust and condemn it as such. I argue that he did not. Proponents of the view that Marx condemned capitalism as unjust contend that his use of terms such as ‘robbery’, ‘theft’, and ‘embezzlement’ against capitalist exploitation necessarily commit him to moral condemnation of capitalism. In addition, his vision of a communist state where the principle, ‘from each according to his ability to each according to his needs’ will apply, proves that some principles are essentially more just than others on a tran-historical standard of justice. I argue that Marx’s texts vindicate him of moral indictment. Exploitation of workers under capitalism as espoused by Marx, conforms to the capitalist mode of production, hence, the transaction through which the workers are exploited by the capitalist and the distribution relations ensuing from this relation are just. Marx’s use of ‘robbery’ and cognate terms, I argue, is metaphorical, hence, not a proof of his condemnation of capitalism. I further argue that the need principle is not a principle of justice, for Marx had firmly stated that communists do not preach morality.

This paper tries to discuss the concept of inclusive toleration, conceived as that toleration which is not based on empirical considerations –more kantiano- nor it needs political justifications, but it is rooted on individuals’ dignity conceived as a metaphysical preconception and not as the result of public recognition. To see the scope of the concept we analyze John Locke’s views in his Letter concerning Toleration, and John Rawls’ ideas on the cooperation of free individuals who voluntarily and rationally interact to arrive to political agreements. It will be argued that Rawls’ position is more inclusive than Locke’s, though it still has obvious shortcomings.

The public sphere plays a crucial role in the functioning of liberal democracy. As a sphere conceived ideally independent of state control and economic influence, it serves as the sounding board of social and political concerns, where communications take place, ideas are exchanged, and arguments are put forward. The liberal notion of the public sphere relies on values such as inclusivity, transparency, equality, and rationality. This paper explores the limits of the liberal notion of the public sphere by looking into the recent media transformation, which blurry the boundary between public and private, change the form and content of the circulation of information, and are decoupling the communicative from the political realm. Taken together these media transformation ask for a reconsideration of the dominant model of the public sphere.

This paper examines Aristotle’s conception of responsibility through three different interpretations present in contemporary ethics and political philosophy. The topics of moral and political responsibility are discussed within Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, which contain an emphasis on human character and its components, the virtues. Discussion on responsibility has been present in one form or another within the history of western philosophy since its very beginning. As there has not been any universally recognized, continuous process of definition, the writings on responsibility by Aristotle are still as valid source as any other of the more recent theories on the subject. Aristotle doesn’t have a directly translatable word for “responsibility”. Therefore some interpretation has to be used. If ethics and political philosophy of the last decades are looked at, it seems that there have been several different approaches to Aristotle’s conception of responsibility. In this presentation three of these approaches are examined: (a)responsibility for action, (b) responsibility for character and (c) political responsibility. Through these three interpretations of Aristotle’s responsibilityit is reflected upon, what of his ideas could be utilised in contemporary discussion on responsibility.

This article examines the contemporary political-social crisis of Europe, tracing causes of such crisis in the project of the EU or, more precisely, in fundamental contradictions and intrinsic difficulties of EU theories and practices in relation towards the concept of the political and concept of democracy. Investigating various, principal as well as particular examples of the gap between EU forms and European realities, with special reference to processes of depolitization, the author, in dialogue with both philosophical conceptions of radical left and right, lines out new shapes of discursive movements and social impulses for action. In final part of the article, coming from the thought on true democracy as an alternative to the current EU project, the choice between politics and anti-politics is presented. In such light, rethinking of both the contemporary situation and the future of Europe, doubtlessly refers to the event of the political based on freedom, equality and justice.

The paper attempts to briefly examine some basic issues of Aristotle’s political philosophy. The first part presents some perspectives based on the interaction between the concepts of justice and equality. It also presents an example taken from Plato’s Politeia for the importance of justice as a value which can educate good citizens. The second part refers to citizenship and the need for a community to have a prevailing middle class, characterized by the value that Aristotle defines as “civic virtue” [πολιτική αρετή]. The last part of the paper explains the concept of “civic virtue”, which has to be connected with abilities, middle solutions and distance from extremes. It also deals with advantages concerning democratic and lawful systems of government, which should be supported by educated individuals, according to what was previously referred.