Very early after the discovery of the first manuscripts of Qumran in Cave 1, the scholars were agree to describe the Essene world‑view as dualistic. The close study of each document reveals today a more complicated literary situation. The manuscripts of Qumran attest to three kinds of dualism : cosmic dualism, relative dualism, and human dualism. This taxonomy is not to take too strictly because the dualisms can be combined inside a text to reinforce and justify the Essene world‑view, especially the sectarian perspective. The combination is also a proof of the multiple state of dualism in Ancient Judaism. Moreover, we note the relationship between dualism and apocalypticism. The apocalyptical literature may be a source of diffusion of different types of dualism.

Gnostic studies in the XXeth century have been influenced by Hans Jonas’ The Gnostic Religion and his existentialist approach of Gnostic movements, until the discovery of the Coptic Nag Hammadi texts, in 1945, gave access to a series of documents coming from the Gnostics themselves. Progressively, the panorama of Gnostic sects and movements deeply changed, calling into question the notion of “dualism” used by the Church Fathers when refuting their Gnostic opponents. If Plotinus criticizes the Gnostic contempt of the world and their life without ethics, the recently commented texts from Nag Hammadi attest the use of the Platonic demiurge understood in the frame of the biblical version of the creation. The beauty of the world is not absent from Gnostic texts. The role of the Gnostic demiurge in documents like the Apocryphon of John or the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate, for example, shows that access to salvation is possible in a philosophical and theological system that is monistic. The heresiological category of “dualism” has too often hindered the study of the Gnostics which does not correspond to what the new documentation brings out.

Pauline anthropology is of a fundamentally Hebrew nature : the body‑σῶμα is a holistic concept that designates man as creature in the world. The body is the way “I” is present in the world : man does not have a body, he is a body. Portraying the whole person, the body is the “temple of the Holy Spirit”, the setting for a sacred presence that transcends humankind (1Cor 6 : 12‑20). However, this body is also the scene of a conflict between flesh and spirit. The flesh‑σάρξ concept does not apply to a part of man but to the whole of man as a precarious, fragile and mortal being. As such, the human being stands up as an enemy of God, taking his human condition on as the foundation of his values (Rom 8 : 5‑8). The Spirit‑πνεῦμα is God’s sphere of influence in the world, to which one becomes affiliated through his spirit. Flesh leads to death while the Spirit turns to life. These two forces compete for the human body. Yet, such a dualism is not by nature ontological but historical : one remains capable of choosing between remaining a prisoner of mortal flesh or letting the Spirit of God dwell in him (Rom 8 :10).

Known primarily through the heresiological writings, Hermogenes goes down in history as a dualist, almost a ditheist, who claimed the doctrine of two coexisting and ingenerated principles : God and the matter. Cleared up the commonplaces and the heresiological strategies of our sources, the analysis of the fragments and of the testimonies about Hermogenes shows that his doctrine was the expression of a specific ontological dualism : far from being an innovative thinker, Hermogenes refused the emerging doctrine of the “creatio ex nihilo” and affirmed the traditional view of the creation as the result of the demiurgic act of God who fashioned and ordered the preexistent matter. According Hermogenes, this dualism did not undermine monotheism, because God and the matter are unequal regarding their essence. It was on the basis of this axiom that he elaborated a theological system characterized by a sophisticate interlacement of anthropological, Christological and soteriological implications.

The term ‘Manichaean’ has come to be regarded as synonymous with a radical dualistic perspective, and is now utilised in all sorts of contexts such as literature and politics. Gardner examines what can be known of the actual teachings of the third‑century sage and self‑declared ‘Apostle of Jesus Christ’ known as Mani or Manichaios. His extant writings are surveyed in order to determine what he says about the nature of God and the origin of matter and evil. Particular attention is given to the terminology and symbolism applied to the idea of two eternal and opposite principles, the kingdoms of light and darkness. Gardner considers possible origins for Mani’s teachings in the Judaeo‑Christian, Gnostic and Iranian traditions ; together with the question of further developments within the community after its founder’s death.

As the most rigorous upholder of monotheism, the pseudo‑Clementine homilist is at strife with the Marcionite dualism. More precisely, he comes up against the Apelles’ doctrine, which is all the more dangerous as it establishes the unicity of God and reduces the demiurge of the world and author of the Law to a created power. The theory of the «false pericopes» of the Scriptures is specially directed against Apelles, in order to protect the identity between the supreme God and the Creator of the world. It seems that the conjectures about the origin of the Evil One, which attempt to avoid a new form of dualism, are also directed towards the refutation of Apelles : to the obedient demiurgical angel is opposed the providential function of the Evil One, who has to put the human beings’ piety to trial ; and against Apelles who maintains the severance between corporeal reality and God’ being, the homilist makes use of the audacious theory of the mixing of the elements to settle both the connaturality of the Evil One and of the body of God and the blamelessness of God with reference to the will of the Tempter, which is contingent.

Of all the approaches to the concept of dualism in Origen’s thought, this article concerns the issue which does not seem very obvious : his understanding of the expression heteros theos. Is it possible to call Jesus “the other God”, existing aside from the only God ? Thanks to the Dialogue with Heraclides, we can judge the profundity of the issue. According to the Dialogue, heteros theos resembles the language used by Marcion, in which “the other God” means the Demiurge, an antagonist of the merciful God. But the expression also invokes the Judeo‑Christian inspired Christology, in which “the other God” signifies a manifestation of the God Jehovah, or a secondary deity, subordinate to Jehovah. In his other writings, Origen usually avoids calling Christ heteros theos, precisely because of the similarity to marcionism and monarchianism. However, forced to resolve the theological problem presented in the Dialogue, Origen decides to explain the meaning of the term “heteros”. His explanations are inspired by Aristotle’s categories, much simplified and illustrated by examples from the Bible. Origen shows that “difference” can be understood as opposition, but there are other possible interpretations of the term. More than anything, it is relative towards a particular characteristic. Origen’s argumentation, in comparison with other discussions concerning the term (Justin Martyr and Tryphon, Peter and Simon the Magician), illustrates that the understanding of God as “different” may lead to the emergence of dualistic concepts, which are often very radical.

Augustine is a particularly interesting author for anyone who wishes to question the topic of dualism, because of the diverse and complex way this topic is adressed in his writings. After having been listening to the Manichean as an “auditor” for almost ten years, he raised many critics against the manichean thesis ; but in spite of this critical position, several of his later opponents, from the Donatist and mostly from the Pelagian heresy, often reproached him to have remained a crypto‑Manichean. This paper focuses on working out the original image Augustine had about the manicheism, as providing a coherent answer to some ethical and metaphysical problems, then as being nothing more than a false response he had to break with. This task will then lead us to question his potential residual manicheism, considering his controversy with Julian of Eclanum, in order to identify the arguments by which Julian supports the accusation of augustinian Manicheism, and to assess the extent to which this accusation is or is not admissible.

The Augustinian definition of the concept of natura rules out any form of dualism : all nature depends on God, it is what God wanted ; but, in the case of man, nature changes according to the actual relation to God, just as the image of God in the soul can be distorted by sin or reshaped by grace. This historical conception of nature sets Augustine against the Manichaean and Pelagian conception of nature as a static datum.

This paper summarises the issues of dualism in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. Dualism was a central topic for him to understand gnosticism in late antiquity, and it became also a key concept to understand moral nihilism of the XXth century. Jonas demonstrates that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit ‑ which enables him to elaborate the heuristic method to shed light on gnostic dualism ‑ was in fact itself based on a dualistic anthropology. On the one hand, Jonas attempted to reply to it with a philosophical biology ; on the other hand, his reply to the cosmological dualism thanks to his speculative and mythical concept of the weak God.

The paper reconsiders Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic forms as causes together with its wider implications for the differences but also similiarities between the two philosophers. Analyzing the relevant texts of Metaphysics A 9 and Generation and Corruption II, 9, where Aristotle addresses the hypothesis of forms as put forward in the Phaedo, it discusses two interpretative options : that Aristotle takes these forms for an imperfect anticipation of formal causes, and that he sees them as an aborted attempt at grasping the efficient causation whose proper discovery Aristotle claims to be uniquely his own. Although both readings have their virtues and can be defended from the Aristotelian perspective, their check against the text of the Phaedo reveals that, in this context, efficient causation distinct from material causation is quite plausibly the issue Aristotle has in mind first and foremost. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle’s broader critical stance towards forms as causes : while he seems to detect a split in Plato’s own understanding of the relation between the forms and causation (a split between the direct yet unclear influence of universals such as the forms of the large or the beautiful on the one hand and the clear causal scheme of the craft-like model of producing things on the other hand), he is equally critical (if not scornful) of the craft-like model as personified by the demiurge of the Timaeus. However, other passages from the Metaphysics (and also from the Generation of animals) suggest that some features of precisely this model, once it is carefully stripped of its personal aspect, may ultimately bear on Aristotle’s own conception of efficient cause.

Questo articolo discute un aspetto specifico della teoria causale di Plotino, ossia la critica che egli rivolge alla funzione della causa finale nella sua spiegazione della struttura e della generazione della realtà a partire dal principio primo situato al suo culmine. A tale fine, sono esaminati i capitoli 1-3 e 25 del trattato VI 7 (38) delle Enneadi, in cui la questione della causa finale è posta con chiarezza, innanzitutto nel quadro di una lettura e di un’interpretazione del racconto cosmologico del Timeo di Platone e del ruolo che assume il demiurgo in questo racconto, quindi nel quadro di una critica della concezione aristotelica del primo motore immobile come fine ultimo di tutte le cose.

The first part of this article focuses on Plotinus’ account of demiurgic causation in treatise VI, 7 [38]. Plotinus’ position is based on two assumptions : 1) the sensible cosmos is rationally ordered and its order depends on an intelligible prior cause ; 2) this order does not reflect any rational design on the part of the cause, since the cause has no reasoning or calculation in it. This view is spelled out against the background of Plotinus’ gradualist metaphysics (theory of the “double activity”) and with respect to Plotinus’ philosophical sources (Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics). The second part of the article focuses on Porphyry, on the anonymous commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and on Iamblichus. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry has no hesitation in employing concepts drawn from Aristotle’s logic as a resource for expressing his metaphysical theories. This approach can interestingly be set in parallel with that of the anonymous commentary to Plato’s Parmenides assigned to Porphyry by Pierre Hadot (see In Parm., XI, 5-19). A hitherto unnoticed parallel between these lines and Porphyry’s view on the divine hierarchy criticised in Iamblichus’ Response to Porphyry (I, 4, p. 7, 21-11, 4, Saffrey – Segonds) provides a new argument in support of Porphyry’s authorship of the Parmenides commentary.