Businesses interface with the natural world through rights to property. The shape of these rights and the responsibilities we assign to managers are important determinants of both patterns of resource use and pollutant levels. Consequently, conflicts have arisen between regulating bodies, indigenous groups, andcorporations over the entitlements of businesses in the use of their property when that property is ecologically sensitive or significant.In this paper I develop an account of the ethical responsibilities of managers regarding their treatment of the environment and their use of natural resources. This account is based on a philosophical examination of the nature of property rights. After a tour of traditional arguments employed to defend the institution ofprivate property, I develop a new conception of property rights over objects that have a high natural resource component. I show that in today’s world, ethical concerns that motivated John Locke will yield property rights that are insufficiently strong to override a democratic say in overall use patterns and mustbe sensitive to factors such as need, scarcity, and the interests of stakeholders. I show a similar result for utilitarian arguments for property.On this foundation I develop a conception of property in key environmental resources that includes a stewardship element. To embody this, I suggest a set of ethical responsibilities for managers over certain natural resources that springs from it. I argue for obligations restricting harmful use patterns as a way ofincluding the other goals (eg public participation, sustainability) that we care about, in a manner which clashes least with the liberty of owners and the efficiency of production. The outcome is a set of rights and responsibilities that take global environmental interests into account, but preserve the thrust of what is good about the institution of private property: that it rewards labour and facilitates a stable and efficient free exchange system. As a version of private property, it retains many of the advantages of global capitalism while attaching responsibilities to business decision makers.

In this paper we discuss ‘sustainable management’ which is being advocated by some in the business community. It may be that a professed commitment to sustainable development is merely a way for contemporary businesses to continue with ‘business as usual’ behind its façade. We believe that if businesspractices are to change, then education must change to allow students to live the ‘good’ lives promoted both by early philosophers and now by those professing the merits of sustainable development. The sustainable development paradigm, if adopted fully, may result in the best of business decisions being made; it may provide humankind with a way to avoid the self-destruction which has been threatening throughout the 20th Century. Sustainable management requires business decision makers to consider how their decisions will affect the social and natural environments as well as their organisations’ profitability. It encourages a moral approach to business decision making and requires managers to recognise that genuinely long-term decision criteria will ultimately benefit their businesses, their societies, the natural environment and humankind. Although sustainable management is promoted as a ‘new’ paradigm, we argue that its principles should have been promoted through our educational systems for many centuries; they have not been.

This paper sets out and examines the presuppositions and presumptions of management educators. It is based on an empirical study of 25 management educators from three UK Business Schools who are responsible for management education and development. The aim of the study is not to generalise thefindings but to adopt an interpretive methodology to identify and question the hidden and unexamined presuppositions and presumptions of management educators that underlie management programme development and design. The author finds the presuppositions and presumptions problematic, inaccurate and uncritical, and they are responsible for producing and re-producing the practices of management for contemporary organisations and wider society. The author articulates these concerns in a philosophical manner in order to raise questions and challenge the embedded fads and wisdom. This paper concludes by inviting management educators to rethink management education and development and examine their own presuppositions and presumptions underpinning programme development and design.

Contemporaneously, management studies have focused considerable attention on postmodernity. This engagement is premised on a particular reading of modernity and this paper identifies the frequent implication that spiritual and anti-rational aspects cannot be located in modernist experience and thus seek responses within post-modernism. However, the paper suggests that the spiritual and the anti-rational are integral to modernity through modernistic constructions in the arts. While a tension between the rational and the anti-rational within modernity is occasionally acknowledged, art studies discussed underwrite the dominance of science as illustrated particularly through Greenberg’s account of abstract art. Alternative accounts of abstract art foreground the spiritual in the lives and work of some leading artists and the Theosophy Movement during the High, Modernist period (1890 - 1930). The surfaced tensions between the scientific and the spiritual at the heart of Modernity are related to management theory and its engagement with postmodernity.

As we enter the twenty-first century, a new set of unexamined assumptions that may be labelled managerialism is coming to dominate university life. In spite of the changes that have been taking place, semantics have largely remained stable. As a result, there has been little recognition of a need to examine the transformation carefully and critically. This paper seeks to explicate the changes, show how they express a common managerialist philosophy and critically analyze them. It does so by dividing the topics to be discussed into two sections: People and Program. The first section shows how conceptual assumptions in regard to central components of the university have changed. Students are now thought of as consumers, administrators as managers, trustees as directors and faculty as employee stakeholders. These conceptual renderings are consistent with and support a managerialist philosophy. The second section shows how apreviously accepted bright line between education and training has broken down so that what we thought of as education has become little more than ornamentation for what are basically training programs. In addition, the training programs have achieved a semantic victory by persuading us to refer to them aseducation. The program change is fully consonant with the people changes. The academy has become one more instance of the general management philosophy that dominates our societies. We have lost our role as autonomous critics and uncritically become a component of the larger arrangement.

For-profit universities are degree-granting institutions that are owned and operated by business corporations. This paper addresses two related public policy questions about for-profit universities. First, should governments and appropriate regulatory bodies permit for-profit universities to grant degrees in their jurisdiction? Second, should higher education policy be developed to create for-profit universities? In this paper, a property rights argument is presented to demonstrate that a corporation should have the right to offer degrees if certain regulatory tests can be met. In limited circumstances, governments might consider establishing for-profit universities, but only if they promote public goods.

Rationality bashing has become a popular sport. Critiques have quite rightly challenged models of rational planning that follow a linear progression from predefined ends to achieved goals. There have been several alternative theoretical and empirical developments including incrementalist projects, networktheories, critical communication approaches, and heuristic models.Notwithstanding critiques of linear models of policy-making and planning, rationality as a general idea remains an important reference point for designing and evaluating policy-making and for orientating planning projects. We suggest that the concept of rationality needs to be revised rather than abandonedand this article discusses how rationality in decision making may be reconstructed.We first review and critique some of the main preconceptions of rationality in policy-making and planning. We then discuss the nature and purpose of rationality from the perspective of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and in light of contemporary theoretical and empirical analyses. We position rationality as a procedural standard of excellence that evolves and informs practices in the context of problematic situations. We propose that a theory of rationality, as a guide for planning and policy, should be developed for application in concrete problematic situations and at the same time should play a normative role and be orientated to moral, socio-historical, and ecological considerations. Dewey’s pragmatist theory is a promising source for such considerations.In this article we identify four ‘pillars’ of pragmatism to support such a revised rationality construct: (i) situationality, (ii) normativity, (iii) philosophical via media between foundationalism and relativism, and (iv) democratic inquiry. We discuss the application of a pragmatist rationality, that we refer to as ‘situational transactive’ rationality, using a model of decision making that builds on current understandings in planning and policy science. Finally, we discuss some of the possible advantages and challenges of undertaking such a pragmatist revision of rationality.

In this article I will interpret John Dewey’s account of reflective thinking as if he were a philosopher of innovation management. From his pragmatist starting point, the problems involved in knowledge-processes relevant to innovation are analysed and re-conceptualised. By revisiting Plato and using the Deweyan analysis it identifies some categories of general applicability for understanding, designing and managing radical innovation processes. These categories are useful for conceptualising and talking about innovation, when knowledge is taken seriously, and when managing innovation is also understood as managing the production of new knowledge, that is of making the unjustified justified, and the unknown known.

In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodologicalsources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’. Weillustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’.

Modelling agency in economics rests primarily on the assumption of instrumental rationality. Managerial agency is more often analysed with a more complex ‘behavioural’ approach. This has led for years to a sterile debate about the usefulness of the abstract rationality postulate between those who think that it is all but sufficient and those who doubt if it is even necessary. This paper argues that positing an abstract (but real) rational core to managerial agency that is then ‘concretised’ towards actual managerial behaviour is the way forward. Rationality is a necessary but not sufficient characterisation of managerial agency. The theoretical argument is supported by reference to the case of the ill-fated Long Term Capital Management built around the Black, Merton and Scholes Nobel Prize-winning derivatives pricing model. It is argued that the 1998 failure of the portfolio was not the result of a failure of rational agency but of the complexities of its implementation.

In this paper, I explore the nature of strategic decision making. In particular, I am concerned with the interplay of rational reflection and intuitive insight in strategic contexts. I argue that it is in the very nature of strategic situations that they cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of the available evidence, and that hence there always is an intuitive element to strategic decision making. I consider a variety of ways to explain the notion of intuition and conclude that intuition and rationality ought not to be conceived as incompatible with one another. It follows, I claim, that the intuitive component of strategic thought allows for at least some degree of public accountability.

The influence of popular management gurus derives from two factors: the willingness of their management audience to outsource or subcontract thinking and the ability of gurus to deliver apparently relatively simple messages to an audience that probably does not want or need to think deeply, while retaining their leadership status. As managers look to management gurus to provide them only with reasons to be, to behave or act as opposed to reasons to think, per se, the nature of a popular guru’s output can never address the unseen innovating process which true leadership demands. As a result, popular management gurus are not in a position to promote insights, awakening or higher consciousness in others and cannot fulfil the traditional raison d’être of a guru as an enlightened being. The output of popular management gurus probably communicates more about their audience than it usefully communicates about the guru’s thinking.

Over the last decade, managers have increasingly emphasised the creation of tangible measures of intangible organisational properties. Many major corporations now include measures for intellectual capital, knowledge capital, reputational capital, and other such intangible assets on their financial ledgers. Counter to the rubric that ‘If it doesn’t get measured, it doesn’t get done,’ we argue that some intangibles are truly intangible, and attempts to apply tangible measures to them creates undue organisational stress and harms the underlying asset. Instead, managers may better foster the growth of intangible assets by placing less emphasis on outcome measurement and more emphasis on the process. Using New York University’s Office of Community Service as a case study, we illustrate how a Zen approach can augment tangible measures to create a truly ‘balanced’ organisational strategy. American firms have widely adopted the strict measurement practices of Japanese firms, but few have adopted the Eastern practice of Zen. A Zen approach fosters trust and provides flexibility that allows organisations to better achieve success in the long run.

As the world moves into the 21st century, business managers face new and daunting challenges to their legitimacy. Those who run the world’s 72,0000 multinational firms and their 828,000 subsidiaries face special difficulties.These firms constitute a global economy that has produced much that is useful, including wondrous technologies and great wealth for many. Nevertheless, one in five of the world’s six billion people lives in extreme poverty, surviving on less than $1 a day. Half the world lives on less than $2. In spite of roughly $1 trillion that has been spent to fight poverty around the globe in the last 50 years and vastly increased trade and investment, most people in Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia are poorer today than they were ten years ago, and most Africans were better off 40 years ago.2 Environmental degradation increases, as do disease and violations of human rights.Unreasonable as it may be to blame business for the world’s ills, the blame sticks, because the ills – like multinationals – transcend national boundaries and are in many ways beyond the power of existing governments to affect. And global government has yet to evolve. Furthermore, the governments of many countries lack either the will or the ability to reduce poverty within their jurisdictions, meaning that if MNCs do not do it, it won’t be done.In addition to the undesirable costs of the globalisation they have helped to create, managers are concerned also with the greed, crime and scandal in their own ranks. So it is appropriate to help them inspect the assumptions that have been used to justify their power and authority, and to consider whether those assumptions need renovation. This I shall do in Part I of this essay. In Part II I shall seek a historical perspective, because in many ways the criticism of business and globalisation today echoes the debate in the 1930s about which economic system was best, communism, socialism or capitalism. Capitalism, we suppose, has won, but if so, what is it? Is it the same everywhere – in China, Japan, Europe, Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere? If not, is the very word not misleading?

Stakeholder theory is a significant development in the drive to provide a foundation for intuitions concerning the moral responsibility connected to corporate decision making. The move to include the interests of workers, consumers, the communities and biological environment in which the corporations instantiations are located run counter to the view in which shareholders’ interests are paramount. The non-sale of the Hershey Foods company to Wrigley was the ultimate result of a massive call by stakeholders to put other interests before shareholder financial stakes, yet the discussion was notably not held in terms of stakeholder theory. Rather, the discussion was explicitly Aristotelian with opponents of the view arguing that the sale was improper because it ran counter to the essence or telos of the organisation. This case is no doubt unusual in that the founding documents of the organisation were appealed to in order to justify the claim that the essence of the corporation was to do more than enrich the shareholders. This paper intends to examine whether, in spite of this anomaly, the Hershey case hasanything general to say about the foundations of corporate responsibility.

In this paper we assess the adequacy of the idea of community as an ideal-typical model against which real organisations and their management might be critically evaluated. Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on practices suggests that some forms of work activity require something more than contractual relationships withinorganisations: if he is right then perhaps we should acknowledge the importance of some notion of community at work. However, among the criticisms of the community approach are that it ignores issues of power and the inevitable existence in organisations of interest groups based on different values and pursuing different objectives. It can also be seen as ineluctably managerialist and hence incapable of producing a coherent and sustainable account of organisational life. Is ‘community’ just a strategy of social, political or organisational control? Does it assume a particular discourse of political subjectivity, to do with the nature of subjects who exist in communities? We assess the extent to which the idea of community at work is fatally damaged by these objections.

In this paper I outline an approach to managerial decision making that incorporates the important role that metaphors and moral imagination play in our moral reasoning coupled with an organisational moral concept I call the Health of the Organisation. I have used this concept in my managerial (and philosophical) career to interpret and evaluate potential, and actual, courses of action. I have concluded that this concept fits in nicely with Mark Johnson’s analysis of the metaphor of morality is health, which he argues is one of the central moral metaphors in the conceptual framework that we use to interpret and evaluate actions from a reasonable moral point of view. He argues that metaphors are the essential components in defining the rational mental framework utilised in interpreting, evaluating, predicting likely outcomes from various alternatives, and choosing morally acceptable courses of action. I argue that the metaphor morality is health explicated as the Health of the Organisation can serve as an antidote to the unimaginative moral decision making processes that Patricia Werhane has shown can result in bad moral decisions. I do this by demonstrating that a healthy organisation is one that is optimally functional. This means that the components that make up the organisation are so structured that there is no better possible organisational arrangement available for achieving the goals designed to ensuresuccessful performance in the marketplace.