Cajetan’s analogy theory is usually evaluated in terms of its fidelity to the teachings of Aquinas. But what if Cajetan was trying to answer questions Aquinashimself did not raise, and so could not help to answer? Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia can be interpreted as intending to solve a particular semantic problem: to characterize the unity of the analogical concept, so as to defend the possibility of a non-univocal term’s mediating syllogistic reasoning. Aquinas offers various semantic characterizations of analogy, saying it involves, for instance: signification per prius et posterius; or a ratio propria which is only found in one analogate; or diverse modi significandi with a common res significata. Examined in turn, it is clear that none of Aquinas’s rules for analogy solve the semantic problem described. Cajetan thus cannot be reasonably expected to have intended his analogy treatise primarily as an interpretation or systematization of Aquinas’s teaching on analogy.

Scholars of Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy have traditionally devoted their attention to the question of which kind of analogy, that of proportionality or that of attribution, is the most relevant for Aquinas. However, a closer study of some of Aquinas’s crucial texts reveals that there are prior and more fundamental problems. A relevant difficulty concerns the characteristics of the focus of an analogical predication. A good understanding of what Aquinas means by the focusof an analogical predication requires four different steps. First, demonstrating whether the focus is a concept or an individual thing. Second, indicating whetherthe focus is in a causal relation with the other things involved in analogy. Third, establishing whether the focus involves an extrinsic or an intrinsic predication.Fourth, showing how the focus works when analogy is applied to the case of being. By examining the notion of the focus, we may learn of some of the originalfeatures of Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy.