Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 21-40 of 48 documents


book reviews
21. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Robert J. Deltete Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of Evolution
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
22. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Michael Ewbank Culture and the Thomist Tradition After Vatican II
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
books received
23. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 3
Books Received
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
24. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Jacob Howland Storytelling and Philosophy in Plato’s Republic
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Scholarly convention holds that logos and muthos are in Plato’s mind fundamentally opposed, the former being the medium of philosophy and the latter of poetry. I argue that muthos in the broad sense of story or narrative in fact plays an indispensable philosophical role in the Republic. In particular, any account of the nature and power of justice and injustice must begin with powers of the soul that can come to light only through the telling and interpretation of stories. This is implicit in Glaucon’s Gygean tale. Read in connection with the earlier tale of Gyges in Herodotus, Glaucon’s muthos shows itself to be a story about storytelling and interpretation, knowledge of self and others, and the discovery of the roots of justice and injustice.
25. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Christopher Gilbert Catholic Cartesian Dualism: A Reply to Freddoso
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Alfred Freddoso has argued that Cartesian dualism cannot serve as the model for a philosophical anthropology that will be consistent with the plain sense of Church teachings. I disagree. Although the interpretation of Cartesian dualism to which Freddoso objects is not unwarranted by the Cartesian texts, a close reading of those texts suggests a diff erent interpretation. I shall defend a reading of Cartesian dualism that departs from the one which Freddoso discusses. I shall then demonstrate that this alternative reading is consonant with the teachings of the Church.
26. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Alan Baker Malebranche’s Occasionalism: A Strategic Reinterpretation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The core thesis of Malebranche’s doctrine of occasionalism is that God is the sole true cause, where a true cause is one that has the power to initiate change and for which the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects. Malebranche gives two separate arguments for his core thesis, T, based on necessary connection and on divine power respectively. The standard view is that these two arguments are necessary to establish T. I argue for a reinterpretation of Malebranche’s strategy, according to which the Necessary Connection Argument alone is sufficient to establish T. The Divine Power Argument, which is anyway weaker, is needed not to support T but to bridge the gap between T and full-fledged occasionalism. Specifically, it is needed to rule out the existence of causal powers in nature, a scenario which is consistent with T but inconsistent with occasionalism.
27. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Sean J. McGrath The Facticity of Being God-Forsaken: The Young Heidegger and Luther’s Theology of the Cross
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The early Freiburg lectures have shown us the degree to which Heidegger is influenced by Luther. In Being and Time, Heidegger designs a philosophy that can co-exist with a radical Lutheran theology of revelation. Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity constitutes a polemic with the Scholastic idea of a natural desire for God and an accommodation of a theology of revelation. However, Heidegger’s implicit assent to the Lutheran concept of God-forsakenness is philosophically problematic. To be God-forsaken is not to be ignorant of God; it is to be abandoned by God, to have a history of dealing with God that has resulted in a decisive rupture and distance. But if this is a theological position, as Luther would be the first to argue, it can be justified only theologically.
28. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
John D. Caputo Hauntological Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Christian Faith: On Being Dead Equal Before God
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Using Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, I advocate a theory of interpretation as a conversation with the dead, of the same sort Kierkegaard was practicing in the last discourse of his book. I do not mean reading the works of dead white European males, but looking at things from the perspective of the grave where, as Kierkegaard says, we are all equal before God. I will maintain that the creative conflict of interpretations arises from the ambiguity of this conversation, from the difficulty we have in making out just what the dead are saying, which I will relate to what Derrida calls the absolute “secret.” Whence the Derridean idea that only as “hauntology” is hermeneutics possible. I insert the interpretation of religious faith within this hauntological hermeneutical framework.
29. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Joseph L. Lombardi Against God’s Moral Goodness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
While denying that God has moral obligations, William Alston defends divine moral goodness based on God’s performance of supererogatory acts. The present article argues that an agent without obligations cannot perform supererogatory acts. Hence, divine moral goodness cannot be established on that basis. Defenses of divine moral obligation by Eleonore Stump and Nicholas Wolterstorff are also questioned. Against Stump, it is argued (among other things) that the temptations of Jesus do not establish the existence of a tendency to sin in a divine being. Hence, Stump’s Christological objection to Alston’s denial of divine moral obligation fails. Some counterexamples to that denial offered by Wolterstorff also fail. It is concluded that claims of divine moral goodness remain problematic.
30. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
A. T. Nuyen Sincerity and Vulnerability
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The aim of this paper is to explore the perplexity of the notion of sincerity, chiefly by examining Lionel Thrilling’s account in his Sincerity and Authenticity. I will show that his account is problematic if interpreted as a “truthfulness account.” However, I will also show that his basic insight can be preserved in my own account of sincerity as a kind of congruence between the agent’s avowal and those beliefs, feelings, and dispositions that constitute the agent’s “true self.” The latter include a set of minimally morally acceptable beliefs, feelings, and dispositions that constitute the agent’s moral integrity. Further, the context of sincerity is one in which the agent realizes that his or her integrity, particularly the moral part, is vulnerable.
book reviews
31. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Robert E. Wood The Aesthetics of Natural Environments
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
32. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Patrick Lee Modern Writings on Thomism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
33. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
André Goddu Le Phénoménalisme Problématique de Pierre Duhem
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
34. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Peter M. Candler, Jr. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2: Spiritual Master
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
books received
35. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 2
Books Received
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
36. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 1
John F. Crosby Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
37. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 1
Joshua Miller The Writings of Max Scheler
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
38. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 1
Max Scheler On the Rehabilitation of Virtue
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Max Scheler’s essay on virtue, first published under a pseudonym in 1913, begins with some reflection upon the decline in his era of a concern for virtue. Its central theme is a phenomenological exhibition of the Christian experience of humility, reverence, and related concepts, together with an exploration of their historical and social embodiments in Western culture. The core of humility is a spiritual readiness to serve, related to love, that produces in its possessor a liberation from the ego. The core of reverence is its sense of what surpasses our vision. It has the power to reveal to us the deeper value and being in all things. The paper contains elements of a polemic directed against scientific naturalism.
39. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 1
Eugene Kelly A Postscript to Max Scheler’s “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The translator of Scheler’s essay, “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue,” presents an account of the context of this essay in Scheler’s work and of its relevance to his concept of the ordo amoris and to his critique of Kant. The translator discusses the intended audience of the essay, its moral purpose, and the method of its procedure. The postscript further reflects on the essay’s central themes of humility and reverence, suggesting avenues for a critical assessment of Scheler’s conclusions. It ends with some reflections on the contemporary value of Scheler’s contributions in this essay to a historical and philosophical understanding of the conflict between science and religion.
40. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 79 > Issue: 1
Dietrich von Hildebrand The Personality of Max Scheler
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Dietrich von Hildebrand, a close friend of Max Scheler since 1907, wrote this assessment of Scheler’s personality and philosophical style in 1928, just months after Scheler’s death. (Dietrich von Hildebrand, “Max Scheler als Persönlichkeit,” Hochland 26, no. 1 [1928/29]: 70–80.) He explores the extraordinarily rich lived contact with being out of which Scheler philosophized. At the same time he acknowledges the lack of philosophical rigor in many of Scheler’s analyses. He brings out the restlessness of Scheler’s mind and person that resulted from a one-sided passion for coming to know things; Scheler was not able to dwell with things or persons once he had come to know them. Von Hildebrand also explores the relation of Scheler’s thought to Catholicism and offers an interpretation of Scheler’s abandonment of Catholicism in his last years.