The paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of the temporality of chronic pain. First, I maintain that the field of presence constitutes the exhaustive horizon within which chronic pain is lived. Secondly, I argue that chronic pain is a form of depersonal-ization in that it cuts the field of presence from the past and the future. Thirdly, drawing on some recent phenomenological and neurological findings, I argue that the past and the future, despite their apparent irreality, continue to affect the present “behinds its back”: either through implicit bodily memory, or through implicit bodily anticipation. Thus despite its depersonalizing effects, chronic pain is a deeply personal experience. In my conclusion, I turn to the therapeutic significance of such a phenomenology of tem-porality. I maintain that if chronic pain is nested in implicit temporality, then to confront it, one must become conscious of its effects and, if possible, neutralize their meaning.

I consider two criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology that claim to find support in Husserl’s own Crisis. The first holds that the crisis-problematic entails a concession to the power of historical tradition that Husserl evades. The second holds that the crisis of science is a permanent feature of reason, though Husserl naively promotes its resolution. Against the first, I argue that the systematic question addressed by the historical method of Crisis is not “What can we know?” but “What are we entitled to hope?” The debate about historicism thus obscures that Husserl’s historical reconstructions represent a practical extension of phenomenological reason. Against the second, I argue for a dis-tinction between two concepts: “Krisis der Wissenschaften” and “Unwissenschaftlich-keit der Wissenschaften.” While the latter includes elements of Sinnentleerung inherent to science, the former refers to a wavering faith in science’s Lebensbedeutsamkeit that phenomenology can reasonably claim to stabilize.

The article considers the problem of the redefinition of the concept of phenomenol-ogy after Heidegger’s critique of the idea of presuppositionlessness, Ricoeur’s criticism of the beginning of the transcendental ego, and Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl’s perceptual apprehension.

Should contemporary phenomenology be considered as a series of heresies or is it still possible to follow the direction of classical phenomenology to renew it? Does a classical phenomenology exist at all? We can already observe in Husserl’s work a kind of stratification of phenomenology which makes it possible to affirm that from its beginning phenomenology has been already deconstructed and revised, never closed in a specific ontological field. Rather it is an indication of a method, of a cognitive praxis with a transcendental status. That opens phenomenology up to continuous revisions according to the object to which consciousness is addressed. This methodological essence of phenomenology explains its wide thematic modulation and its claim to be applied as a method to everything that has a phenomenal nature. As a way towards phenomena, the aim of phenomenology still today goes on deciphering the conditions of phenomenality and its reception by subjectivity.

Hans Blumenberg’s reflection is grounded on the phenomenology of history that can be considered as one of the most heretical Husserl’s developments. Blumenberg sees these developments as a way of thinking, a “source” of inspiration, a “legacy” and a sort of “legitimacy.” The purpose of this paper is to stress two different but connected ques-tions on this heresy: on the one hand, the path of Blumenberg’s phenomenology not as continuum of historical substances, but as “reoccupation” of problems that a thinker bequeaths to another; on the other hand, the metaphor, as Blumenberg’s “semantic anomaly” and Husserl’s Lebenswelt images (e.g. “ground,” “horizon,” “leap”) as “infi-nite” heresy of their premises.

In order to better understand the notion of history proper to phenomenology, I un-dertake a brief case study. Namely, I investigate Martin Heidegger’s relation to Edmund Husserl in the years preceding Husserl’s appointment to Freiburg, with a special focus on an occasional writing by Heidegger from 1912. The application of historical method not only dismantles the teleological constructions which mark Heidegger’s own account of his early discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also present a young thinker eager to absorb cutting edge, though not necessarily consistent, developments from contemporaneous philosophy. Heidegger’s early approach could also be conceived as a window onto an elusive brief period of phenomenology before its transformation into a Movement, thereby illustrating the positive contributions of the historical approach to the history phenomenology.

The paper analyses Martin Heidegger and Edith Stein’s conceptions of phenomenol-ogy. These analyses provide a basis to explain Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s thought. The author presents Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology which assumes that the understanding of being is a fundamental category, and, next, elucidates Stein’s personal phenomenology. Heidegger and Stein, both Husserl’s students, change his conception: Heidegger introduces a new method and goal of investigation, Stein adds to it the Chris-tian faith. In the last part, the author shows how Stein proves the incompleteness of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, death and temporality, in her view, the main shortcom-ings of his thought. Stein accuses him of saying nothing about the possibility of eternity and of taking into account only finite existence. The author of paper claims that Stein’s appraisal stems from her understanding of phenomenology which differs from Heidegger’s one.

Hannah Arendt brings the traditionally ontological practice of phenomenology into social and political philosophy. She does this in two ways: by employing phenomeno-logical methods in her approach to examining the world around her and by showing how phenomenology is related to ethical life through her description of thinking. In this article, I explore the first of these ways by locating Arendt’s methods in relation to Martin Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology, as given in the Being and Time. Arendt’s usage of phenomenological methods is clear in her examinations of banal evil and modern judicial systems. These topics lead to a discussion of how thinking, for Arendt, is a phenomenological activity that has bearing on ethical life. I will turn to Arendt’s essay, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship” to clarify how phenome-nology, as characteristic of the thinking Arendt prescribes, is ethically important.

This article presents an ambiguous approach of two main representatives of dialogi-cal philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber, towards Husserl’s phenomenolo-gy. It is demonstrated that Levinas is not an anti-phenomenological postmodernist. Although he does not implement all the Husserlian methodology, he imitates Husserl’s philosophical rigor in exploring forgotten horizons. Buber’s theory of knowledge is analyzed from Levinas’ perspective. The closing part is devoted to a still unexplored area of Buber’s ecophenomenology. It is demonstrated that by indicating on complete relationship with nature, and showing gaps in classical phenomenology Buber makes a unique contribution to the phenomenological heritage.

The paper presents the process of auto-constitution of consciousness, its main parts and levels. It also explains the principles of working, temporal extension, source of dynamics, unity, aim etc., as well as a relative independence from other systems among which consciousness is placed.

The paper analyzes elements of Andrzej Półtawski’s (Roman Ingarden’s student) realistic position within phenomenology. His views are centred on embodied, dynami-cally understood consciousness.

This paper argues that the unicity of the signification of words makes intercompre-hension possible, and explores the possibility of a pure or rational ontology as providing a space for communication between cultures. Therefore no culture has any proprietary right over that ontology.

Contrary to Western philosophy, oriented to grasp and solidify the principles of es-sential being (ontos on), Buddhism seeks to understand the existence of human beings and the significance of suffering in human life. In East Asian languages human beings are described as inter-beings in that they are enveloped by the topos of life and death. Our life is bound to the moments of emerging and vanishing, being and non-being in an essential unity. Dōgen’s philosophical thinking integrated this conception with the em-bodied cognition of both the thinking and the acting self. In the phenomenological per-spective, early Martin Heidegger emphasizes that being is bound to a fundamental sub-stantiality which borders on the Abgrund falling into nothingness. According to Dōgen, the unity-within-contrast of life and death is exemplified in our breathing because it achieves a unity of body and cognition which can be called “corpus.” In a perfect con-trast, the essential Heidegger’s reflection grasps the fundament of being in the world, which represents the actualization of a thinking-being-unity. The goal of this compari-son is to grasp what is the essentiality of being, life, and recognition (jikaku 自覚), bounded to embodied cognition.

In his book, The Fragile Absolute, in the chapter “Why Is the Truth Monstrous?”, Slavoj Žižek discusses Buddhism. Specifically, he claims that Buddhists have always found it difficult to explain, “how is it that the primordial was disturbed, and that desire emerged; that living beings got caught up in the wheel of karma, of attachment to false reality?” (2000. The Fragile Absolute, London: Verso, 73). Ultimately, Žižek suggests that in Buddhism “this fall into perversion is original, the original monstrous cut/excess, and the opposition between nirvana and desire for false appearances is there to conceal this monstrosity” (ibid. 74). Notwithstanding, in his singular views on Buddhism, Žižek does raise the question concerning the source of samsara, the source of cyclic existence, which he explains by using the concept of primordial disturbance that falls into perver-sion. This article discusses this Žižek’s concept and confronts it with the Buddhist un-derstanding of the source, causes, and the mode of emergence of cyclic existence.

The first section of this paper examines the discursive procedure employed by Socrates to subvert common preconceptions of important socio-behavioral notions. The point of reference will be the concept of courage which is the main concern in Plato’s Laches. The key characteristics of paideia can be exhibited by reconstructing the procedure common sense is subjected to in this example. The second section discusses the tremendous influence this pattern of inquiry has had on traditional philosophy. Particular attention is drawn to the way it confers superiority to philosophers in “pedagogical” discourse and to the fact that this privileged stance can by no means be taken for granted under present circumstances.

This essay considers the concrete consequences for human lives of social and economic values. Through case studies indicative of the Victorian age, early 20th century and contemporary 21st century, the evolutionary change in specific values is exhibited. Values are recognized as essentially shaping human conduct, while the exercise of individual choices in this milieu has resulted in progressive shifts breaking up the rigid adherence to values, establishing the possibility in some areas for greater tolerance, such as in the area of mores determining the institution of marriage. The destructive nature of corruption through material values is also presented.

Ren xing shan (human nature is good) is a famous thesis of Mencius. But it is questionable whether the Mencian concept of ren xing is an exact equivalent of the Western concept of human nature, and whether Mencius really thinks that all human beings are naturally moral. This paper suggests that when talking about ren xing, Mencius actually refers to both human being and human becoming. Ren xing may have a root in the nature of human being, which is a “mandate” endowed by the “Heaven.” But the complete notion of ren xing should be construed in terms of the process towards full human becoming. “Human nature is good” does not guarantee complete virtue for individual human beings. However, the human being has the capability of pursuing the moral direction along life’s path, and should take the responsibility of maintaining the right moral direction of human becoming, and thus should avoid veering from this moral path. This interpretation may provide a more consistent understanding of the metaphysical foundation, theoretic system, and self-cultivation practice of the Mencian ethics.

This paper focuses on the relationship of myth with the ancient regime and on the transformation of poetic wisdom into poetic politics. The basic idea of this study claims that the political life in ancient communities was been projected into a mythology, and, in turn, a mythology often legitimizes political life. By reading Plato’s Timaeus and Novalis’ Heinrich von Afterdingen, this study aims to bring out the connection between the ancient and modern political regimes.

The paper presents the role of the experience of historical transformation in the modifications of the historical conscience: the fragmentation, the marginality and the removal from the rational foundation of values. It associates the postmodern world with different forms of losing the sense of values, the lack of measure and nuance in appreciation, the weak preoccupation for identity, authenticity, conscience of values in human behavior. In order to discuss the theory of values the paper introduces Rickertʼs theory of the autonomy of value, Andreiʼs and Vianuʼs conceptions on the system of values, Schelerʼs hierarchy of values, and Hartmannʼs concept of knowledge of value.