Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would for Hume be causally dependent on being perceived; that Hume’s collapse of the object/perception distinction leads him to the view that objects have as “gappy” an existence as our perceptions of them, and that cases of coherence falsify the generalizations that would need to hold for inferences from coherence to qualify as causal reasoning.

It is generally assumed that in early modern Britain, chivalry—allegedly typified by the Crusades—was considered a negative or even ridiculous ideology until its rehabilitation by the pre-Romantic movement. However, this paper argues that Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers had already shown a deep interest in its historical role and influence on modern civilization. That Hume shared a broad interest in chivalry with contemporary philosophers does not undermine the novelty of his thought on this topic. In fact, the pioneering and unique aspects of his contributions can be clarified by setting them in context.