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21.
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The Monist:
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83 >
Issue: 2
Lawrence Sklar
Topology Versus Measure in Statistical Mechanics
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22.
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The Monist:
Volume >
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Issue: 2
Sheldon R. Smith
Resolving Russell’s Anti-Realism About Causation:
The Connection Between Causation and the Functional Dependencies of Mathematical Physics
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In "On the Notion of Cause," Bertrand Russell expressed an eliminativist view about causation driven by an examination of the contents of mathematical physics. Russell's primary reason for thinking that the notion of causation is absent in physics was that laws of nature are mere "functional dependencies" and not "causal laws." In this paper, I show that several ordinary notions of causation can be found within the functional dependencies of physics. Not only does this show that Russell's eliminitivism was misguided, but it shows that Russell's opponents, such as Nancy Cartwright, who think that mere functional dependenciescannot capture causal claims, also underestimate the causal content of such equations.
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23.
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The Monist:
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Issue: 2
Mark Wilson
The Unreasonable Uncooperativeness of Mathematics in The Natural Sciences
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24.
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The Monist:
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83 >
Issue: 2
Books Received
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25.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Mario Mignucci
Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication
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26.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Deborah Brown
Immanence and Individuation:
Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars
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27.
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The Monist:
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83 >
Issue: 1
Jan Berg
From Bolzano’s Point of View
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28.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Peter Simons
The Four Phases of Philosophy:
Brentano’s Theory and Austria’s History
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From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day, philosophy in Austria has progressed through four phases. Theparticularities of the first three of these phases have prompted a number of commentators rightly to distinguish a characteristic Austrian, as distinct from German, way of doing philosophy. The main figure of the second phase was Franz Brentano, and his distinctive theory of the four-phase cycle of philosophical development is outlined, and critically compared to other views of the development of philosophy. In Austria itself the caesuras between the phases were marked as much by political as by philosophical events, and the paper shows how philosophy in Austria has been notable in all its phases for the high level and overwhelmingly negative effect of political interference in intellectual life, a doleful saga which continues to this day.
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29.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Erwin Tegtmeier
Meinong’s Complexes
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30.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Ingvar Johansson
Determinables as Universals
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31.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Per Lindström
Quasi-Realism in Mathematics
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32.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
D. M. Armstrong
Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking
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33.
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The Monist:
Volume >
83 >
Issue: 1
Johanna Seibt
Constitution Theory and Metaphysical Neutrality:
A Lesson for Ontology?
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