論 著 / articles |
21.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 58
林薰香
Shing-Shang Lin
論海德格對康德「敬重」之詮釋─《現象學基本問題》:
和《康德與形上學問題》之研究
On Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Achtung
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康德於《單純理性限度內的宗教》(Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,1793)指出人格性本身(die Persönlichkeit selbst)乃伴隨與之不可分的敬重之道德法則理念,在《實踐理性批判》(Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,1788)說明敬重是對法則的敬重,是一種通過理智發揮效用的情感,源自純粹實踐理性。海德格對情感與敬重的,於存有論上闡釋道德情感與人格性(海德格稱之為人的本質、主體性)的關係。本文主要討論海德格在《康德與形上學問題》(Kant und das Problem derMetaphysik,1929)與《現象學基本問題》(Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie,1975)對康德的道德情感與敬重概念進行現象學式之詮釋,以瞭解海德格有關敬重的觀點,進而釐清海德格如何將敬重與人的本質建構關聯起來,藉以進一步瞭解敬重對人的本質與實際的自我之構成有何重要性。
In “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793), Kant points out that personality itself (die Persönlichkeit selbst) always comes along with the idea of a moral law of respect (Achtung) which is intelligence affecting feeling caused only by pure practical. And Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of feeling and Achtung elucidates the ontological relation between moral feeling and personality (Heidegger calls this the essence of the human or subjectivity).This paper discusses Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie, specifically, the phenomenological interpretation of moral feeling and the concept of Achtung. The purpose of this paper is to understand how Heidegger relates Achtung to the essential constitution of being of the human, and thereby to grasp the significance of Achtung for the actual construction of the self.
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22.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 58
Kok Yong Lee
李國揚
Knowledge and Pragmatic Factors
知識與實用因素
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The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status.
在面對風險轉換案例的時候,一般人直覺上覺得,這些案例顯示,諸如風險這類的實用因素(pragmatic factors)對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識,扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義(intellectualism)的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義,當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候,實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論,可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證,實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷,而只會通過影響我們的知性角度(epistemic perspective),間接地影響我們的知識判斷。
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23.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 57
黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
張載「中正」概念研究─定靜工夫視點下之嘗試性解讀
A Study of the Concept of Moderation in Zhang Zai’s Philosophy
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本文以先前研究周敦頤「聖人定之以中正仁義而主靜」之定靜工夫成果為切入點,試圖對張載《正蒙•中正》之義理結構進行工夫論式之分析研究。而筆者透過文本文獻分析及相關研究之佐證,發現到〈中正〉宏大之哲學思維中的確具有與周敦頤「中正仁義而主靜」相呼應之思維結構存在。其中筆者所持之論證要點在於〈中正〉文脈論述中事實上具有「中道」→「體正」→「四毋說」→「誠」→「安仁、好仁、惡不仁」之論述命題存在。而這些命題所涵蘊之義理及論述邏輯確實可與周敦頤「中正仁義而主靜」之實踐邏輯相通,並且于深層之義理透視下,張載中正概念可還原為「中靜形正」之根本形式。尤有甚者,張載在此實踐思維基礎下,更進一步透過《孟子•盡心》內容,巧妙地將儒學「仁義禮智信」概念帶入,從而讓我們可以在文本之抽絲剝繭中,看到張載論述「仁義」概念之後,繼而提出「篤信」→「好學」→「禮智」命題以推演「仁→義→信→禮→智」實踐結構之用心。由此我們可以知道,張載不僅呼應了周敦頤定靜工夫之論述內容,他在此架構下所連結開展出之儒學義理,更是〈中正〉重要之學術貢獻所在。
Based on the author’s previous research on the dingjing skill in Zhou Dun-Yi’s “a saint settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice”. This paper attempts to investigate the argumentation and structures of Zhang Zai’s On Moderation. With the evidence of textual analysis and related research, I found that the magnificent philosophical thought of On Moderation certainly has thinking and structures corresponding with Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.”The main idea of this paper is that the context of On Moderation in fact has the theses of “moderation”→ “etiquette”→ “four nos”→ “sincerity”→ “implementing benevolence at ease, being fond of benevolence and disliking cruelty.” The argumentation and logic of these theses truly interlinked with the practical logic of Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.” Additionally, to take a look at its profound argumentation, the “moderation” concept of Zhang Zai could be restored to the original form of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance.” Furthermore, on the basis of the practical thought, Zhang Zai further skillfully introduced the concept of “benevolence, justice, courtesy, wisdom and sincerity” through Mencius Jinxin. Upon making a thorough investigation, we conclude Zhang Zai’s dedication of deducing the practical structure of “benevolence → justice → sincerity → courtesy → wisdom” from the theses of “sincere belief”→ “being studious”→ “courtesy and wisdom”. We can thus know that Zhang Zai not only responded to the content of the dingjing skill of Zhou Dun-Yi, but also made important academic contributions in elucidating the Confucian Philosophy.
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24.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 57
蕭銘源
Ming-Yuan Hsiao
新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題
New Dispositionalism and Intrinsic Fink Problems
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史密斯(2003)建議,我們可以用傾向來理解其他可能性,並以此解消法蘭克福(1969)對其他可能性原則提出的挑戰,文獻上稱此進路為新傾向論。根據史密斯,在法蘭克福的案例中,行動者的其他可能性只是被干預者遮蓋,而不是被干預者消除。而這就顯示出,行動者仍舊保有其他可能性,法蘭克福的案例並不是其他可能性原則的反例。科恩與韓福德(2007)反對史密斯的論點,他們指出,在不承認內在遮蓋者的情況下,史密斯的新傾向論將無法解消某些法蘭克福式案例,對其他可能性原則的辯護並不全面,所以並不令人滿意。在這篇文章中,筆者將論證,科恩與韓福德對史密斯的批評並不完全成立,因為他們的批評預設了有爭議的傾向的條件句分析理論。
Smith (2003) proposes a dispositional account of alternative possibilities, called New Dispositionalism, to resist Frankfurt’s claim that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (or the ability to do otherwise). He argues that, in Frankfurt’s case (1969), the agent’s alternative possibility is masked by the intervener, but it is nevertheless a present alternative possibility. Frankfurt’s case, hence, is not a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities at all. However, according to Cohen and Handfield (2007), Smith’s account is shown to be untenable for the reason that it does not work for all Frankfurt-type examples unless it is implausibly committed to intrinsic finks. In this paper, I argue that Cohen and Handfield’s criticism is not conclusive since it presupposes the debatable conditional analysis of dispositions.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Wim De Reu, C. Lynne Hong
魏家豪
What is the Wheelwright Bian Story About?
輪扁故事旨趣何在?
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《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事,看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性;若 連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看,如此詮釋誠然有跡可循,而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子• 天道》中,另有其他段落以「書」為題,本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈 絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題,分別探 究:書的功能何在?為何批判書?書中少了什麼?依據《莊子•天道》提供 之線索探討上述諸問題時,可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環;換 言之,技藝與語言等議題,或許無關於其宏旨。
《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事,看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性;若連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看,如此詮釋誠然有跡可循,而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子•天道》中,另有其他段落以「書」為題,本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題,分別探究:書的功能何在?為何批判書?書中少了什麼?依據《莊子•天道》提供之線索探討上述諸問題時,可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環;換言之,技藝與語言等議題,或許無關於其宏旨。
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26.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018
廖欽彬
Chin-Ping Liao
務台理作與洪耀勳的思想關連─「辯證法實存」概念的探索
Mutai Risaku and Hung Yao-hsün: A Study of the Concept of “Dialectical Existence”
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務台理作(1890-1974)是京都學派創始人西田幾多郎(1870-1945)的得意門生,於1928 年被任命為台北帝國大學哲學科教授。務台的黑格爾研究為洪耀勳的「辯證法實存」概念帶來了直接的影響。「辯證法實存」雖非洪耀勳以自明的方式提出,卻是他作為自身哲學發展的基礎來加以闡釋與演繹的概念。此概念亦非洪耀勳的獨創,而是成形於吸納黑格爾的精神哲學、海德格的實存哲學以及西田幾多郎、田邊元(1885-1962)、務台理作所接受、消化與轉釋的西洋哲學。雖說如此,「辯證法實存」這個概念在台灣當時的歷史處境(殖民地處境)及洪耀勳哲學的特殊性中,顯然有別於京都學派,具有近現代哲學在台灣異化的歷史性意義。本文首先闡明1930 年代的黑格爾研究狀況以及西田與務台的黑格爾研究之異同,接著探討務台的黑格爾研究及「表現世界的邏輯」如何影響洪耀勳的「辯證法實存」概念,最後思考洪耀勳哲學在東亞的哲學發展脈絡中所處的境遇。
Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) is one of the disciples of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and founder of the Kyoto School. Appointed as the professor of philosophy in Taiwan Imperial University in 1928, Mutai’s research of Hegel directly influenced Hung Yao-hsün’s notion of “dialectical existence.” Hong did not develop this notion in a clear way, but it actually served as the foundation of his own philosophy. Moreover, this notion is not Hong’s invention, but it is a concept developed in his dialectical ontology, which is a result of his reading and understanding of the philosophy of spirit by Hegel, the existential philosophy by Heidegger, and the reception and transformation of Western philosophy by Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Mutai Risaku. However, Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence” has a special context, namely the context of Taiwan under the colonization of Japan. Different from the Kyoto School itself, Hong’s philosophy is historically significant as the alienation of Western modern philosophy in Taiwan. In this paper, I shall first describe studies of Hegel in the 1930s, and explain the difference between Nishida’s and Mutai’s reading of Hegel. Then I turn to discuss how Mutai’s study of Hegel and “logic of the expressive world” influenced Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence”. Finally, I shall reflect on Hung’s philosophy in the context of the development of philosophy in East Asia.
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27.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018
蔡龍九
Lung-Chiu Tsai
高攀龍對王學修正之相關探究
Gao Panlong’s Modifications of Wang Yangming’s Philosophy
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本文欲探究高攀龍對王學思想的批判與認同,並釐清他的批判是否恰當。筆者初步發現,他對陽明學本身的批評,相較於王學末流的思維相對和緩,而較著重於「無善無惡」這個內涵上的不接受;然而在工夫方面,曾試圖採取陽明思想上的部分精要。此外,他對陽明思想的「心」及其描述,則採取一種回歸程朱思維的視角來反省。根據此文細部探究,欲清楚說明他對朱熹與陽明學說分別提出甚麼樣的修正,且試圖「兼顧」二學的內涵是否合理。
This paper shall explain and evaluate Gao Panlong’s criticism of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. Compared to his criticism of Wang’s followers, Gao’s criticism of Wang himself is rather mild: much of his objection is to the concept of wushan wu’e. With respect to his own account of gongfu, however, Gao actually incorporates some of Wang’s crucial ideas. Furthermore, he reverts to the Cheng-Zhu position when reflecting on Wang’s understanding of xin. So, through a careful reading of relevant texts, this paper shall specify Gao’s modifications of Zhu’s and Wang’s philosophy respectively and, on that basis, evaluate the coherence of his reconciliation between the two thinkers.
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28.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018
馮鳳儀
Foong-Ee Pong
讀《莊》以自我轉化─以「活動幅度」為根據的「擬道之勢」
Self-Transformation Through Reading the Zhuangzi: A Dao-Embodying Pose Based on the Notion of Amplitude
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本文嘗試建立《莊子》「與世俗處」的理論基礎及實踐策略,俾使讀者能循此脈絡在莊書中發現具有啟發性的線索。本文透過分析莊書中支離疏(理想人物的象徵/體道者)與人臣(非理想人物的象徵/有成心者)的活動特性,一方面突顯「成心」形塑人的內心與身體特性,另一方面彰顯不為成心束縛的內心與身體特性。有成心者受限於世俗規範而以「人亦無疵」為目的,體道者則跳脫成心限制,得以在己身所處的生存脈絡中實現最適合自己的生命型態。體道者的活動幅度大而不具特定模式,體現一種彈性與創造性;有成心者的活動幅度小而依循特定模式,體現一種僵固性與規律性。讀《莊》以自我轉化,關鍵在於不受限於成心、具體展現彈性的處世之道。「擬道之勢」是一個輔助策略:透過模仿體道者大而不具特定模式的活動幅度,修道者得以反省自身為成心所約束的一面,並體現彈性(就與人互動而言)與創造性(就自我實現而言)。
This article shall explicate the theory and praxis of how to live with others under conventional norms in the Zhuangzi. The theoretical aspect is explicated by analyzing the amplitudinal quality of the movements performed by two types of characters─a bodily deformed figure (the ideal person) and a ritually formed figure (his foil). The main difference between the two is the absence of chengxin (成心,the completed heart-mind) in the former and its presence in the latter. A person restricted by chengxin adheres strictly to conventional norms in order to avoid criticism. By contrast, a person not restricted by chengxin deals with these norms in an adaptive and creative manner. Because of this difference, the movements of a person restricted by chengxin have a narrow amplitude, and so they exhibit inflexibility and stubbornness, while the movements of the ideal person have a wide amplitude and therefore manifest flexibility and creativity. The key to self-transformation is, then, to live without the restriction of chengxin, to concretely exhibit such flexibility concerning norms. To approximate such a state, one can adopt the practical strategy of what I call “Dao-embodying posing”. Roughly put, in imitating the wide amplitude manifested in the movements of the ideal person, one gains flexibility in social interaction and creativity in one’s own life.
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論 著 / articles |
29.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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劉滄龍
Tsang-Long Liu
論尼采的美學自由
On Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Freedom
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尼采承繼赫爾德對「美學」(Ästhetik)的理解,進一步開展美學與自由的關聯,藉由美學的進路實現「自然人」(Naturmensch),呼應盧梭「回到自然」的宣言。富含美學意義的「自然」以超善惡的非道德主義,要解放基督教式的禁欲身體。尼采頌揚文藝復興式的教養(virtù),並以歌德的「高尚教養」與「體態靈巧」為例,將「善惡對立的道德」從美學的角度轉化為超善惡的「好壞」。高貴的人就像藝術天才一樣,善於調動身體的多元力量,不把壞的排除,而是肯定命運中的偶然性,在趨於毀滅的現代性生活中,開發矛盾力量的動能,讓足以裂解生命的衝突性力量成為創新生活風格的泉源。自由遊戲的力量是藝術活動的主要形式,也是生命活力的表徵。本文將從力量、自然與自由之間的關係作為討論線索探究以下課題:藝術的解放力量是主體權能的展現還是去主體化的過程?若藝術活動涉及個體解放的自由,是否也有政治自由的向度?尼采美學思想與啟蒙批判的關係為何?
Nietzsche ascribes to Herder’s views on aesthetics and further develops the connection between aesthetics and freedom. He advocates an aesthetic realization of a “human of nature” (Naturmensch) echoing Rousseau’s call for getting “back to nature.” The concept of nature in Nietzsche’s aesthetics leads us towards a non-moralism beyond good and evil, its purpose being to liberate the body from Christian asceticism. Nietzsche celebrates the virtuosity of the Renaissance and takes Goethe’s combination of “noble upbringing” and “bodily dexterity” as an example of aesthetically transforming the “binary opposition of good and evil” into the “non-moralism of good and bad.” Cultivated individuals, like artistic geniuses, are good at mobilizing the multiple forces intrinsic and extrinsic to the body, without excluding the bad; yet, they still recognize the contingency in their destinies. In modernity, which is essentially self-destructive, conflicting forces, capable of destroying life, in effect become the source of innovative lifestyles. Free play is the main form of artistic activity and a sign of life’s vitality. This paper takes the relationship between power, nature and freedom as a lens through which to explore the following questions: Does the power of artistic liberation manifest and reinforce subjectivity or is it actually a process of desubjectification? If artistic activities involve individual liberation, is there any dimension of political freedom involved therein as well? What is the relationship between Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas and critiques of the Enlightenment?
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30.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
《太極圖說》「中正」概念之工夫實踐還原:
以《管子》中靜形正言說為核心
The Concept of Moderation in Zhou Dun-Yi’s Annotations to Taijitu from Perspectives on Dingjing Thought in the Guanzi
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一般認為周敦頤《太極圖說》或《通書》受到《中庸》及《易傳》影響,因此周敦頤定靜功夫思維自然而然也就被認定為來自《中庸》或《易傳》。不過筆者透過先前研究〈《管子》定靜思維對周敦頤定靜工夫之影響─以朱丹溪三重鬱說思維結構維視點〉之分析結果,發現《管子》之「中靜,形正,天仁地義」實踐論述系統,的確可以對應於「定之以中正仁義而主靜」言說。如此一來,《太極圖說》之中正概念便可以援用《管子•內業》「中靜形正」之觀點,而從另一個角度予以慎重地看待。所以筆者首先根據劉蕺山與牟宗三之詮釋觀點作一爬梳,之後再就日本學者荻原擴、岡田武彥之幾種觀點以為對照,從而發現《管子•內業》之「中靜形正」所開展之解釋格局,其不僅在概念上可以邏輯涵蓋荻原擴將中正解為「至公」;另一方面就哲學公案上又可滿足朱子所謂「中正仁義之外別無主靜一事」的形式要求。因為在「中靜形正」模式下,我們的確可以將周敦頤主靜說擺入中正概念之中,並且透過「內靜外敬」實踐模式擴展了周敦頤之工夫論述張力。同時在此思維結構下,由於「中靜」之無欲概念具有指涉本體義之可能,從而保全了周敦頤宇宙本體論的形上高度。
In general, people think Annotations to Taijitu or Tongshu (Penetrating the Scripture of Change) were influenced by Zhongyong and Commentary to The Book of Changes. Therefore, the dingjing skill and thought of Zhou Dun-Yi were also considered to be originated from Zhongyong or Commentary to The Book of Changes. However, based on my previous research “Influence of the Guanzi’s Dingjing Thought upon Zhou Dun-Yi’s dingjing Skill: From Perspectives of Thought and Structure of Zhu Dan-Xi’s Triad Melancholy Theory,” it showed that the implementation and discourse system of “with tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance, the world can enjoy benevolence and righteousness” in the Guanzi could certainly correspond to the argument of “one settles himself in moderation, benevolence and justice.” As a result, the concept of moderation in Annotations to Taijitu could interpret from the viewpoint of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye (Internal Work) of the Guanzi and be understood more concisely from another perspective.Therefore, the author first organized the interpretations of Liu Ji-Shan and Mo Zong-San, compared with several viewpoints of Japanese scholars Hiroshi Ogiwara and Takehiko Okada and achieve a possible explanation of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye. On the one hand, the concept could logically cover the argument of Ogiwara who interpreted moderation as “utmost righteousness.” On the other hand, it could satisfy the form of the so-called “no tranquility existing without moderation, benevolence and justice” of Zhuzi in philosophical documents. As in the mode of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance,” we could place the doctrine of emphasizing tranquility of Zhou Dun-Yi in the moderation concept and expand the strength of Zhou Dun-Yi’s theory of self-cultivation through the implementation mode of “inner tranquility and outer respect.” Thus, the concepts of “tranquility in mind” and “without desire” contain ontological significance, and are comparable to the cosmological discussion of Zhou Dun-yi.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 56
吳澤玫
Tse-Mei Wu
論羅爾斯的穩定性論證
On Rawls’s Arguments of Stability
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羅爾斯在前後期的正義理論裡,系統地探討並嘗試解決穩定性問題,即在當代社會存在合理多元的事實下,如何促使公民自願接受並遵守社會制度的相關規範,以維繫正義且秩序良好的社會?在《政治自由主義》裡,羅爾斯提出重疊共識的論證。他主張持不同合理全面性學說的公民都會同意「作為公平的正義」這種政治正義觀,以之規範社會主要制度。公民將基於這樣的共識,自願遵守相關規範,因而能在多元價值之中確保社會的穩定。本文的目的在於探討重疊共識的論證能否成功解決多元社會的穩定性問題。首先說明羅爾斯關切的穩定性問題為何,其次說明他為什麼放棄《正義論》裡的穩定性論證,改採重疊共識的論證。第三,本文將分析羅爾斯如何證成重疊共識,主張這樣的共識可以解決穩定性問題。第四,本文檢視並批評重疊共識的論證。筆者將指出,這個論證是失敗的,任何採取社會正義原則層次的論證都無法成功解決穩定性問題。最後,本文將提出一種奠基於道德心理的穩定性論證之初步形式。這樣的論證取向不但相容於羅爾斯的觀點,且是理論上可以成立的。
John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to “justice as fairness” and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability.This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls’s claims but is also theoretically defensible.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 56
王介成
Chieh-Cheng Wang
《墨子》身體觀探研─以「修身」為核心
On the Concept of Body in the Mozi
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本文旨在從「修身」概念出發對《墨子》的身體觀進行探研。首先本文指出,《墨子》的身體乃由「形─心─氣」構成,此合於先秦諸子對人身體之理解。形即形軀;心則首重其認識義,同時也和「善」、「愛」、「志」、「性」有所關聯;氣在《墨子》中雖未具理論規模,但氣會隨志而現亦是我們了解〈所染〉的關鍵。基於這樣的身體形構我們可看出,《墨子》所修之身並非僅是生理形軀之身,而是一身心合一之身,透過修養(做工夫)學者的身心形態得以發生轉化。本文以為,所謂工夫不單限於內在的心性修養,只要能使人的思想、行為有所改變,無論是由內而外或由外而內的方法皆可稱為工夫。據此本文從《墨子》中析理出「去」、「反之身」、「立志」、「力事」、「學」、「辯」六種工夫。最後本文發現,《墨子》修身的目的與理想是成就墨家式的人才為天下興利除害,這樣的身體則內含「知無欲惡之身」、「力勇之身」與「交利之身」三種身體向度,此三種身體共構成《墨子》身體觀的最高理想。
This essay aims to discuss the concept of body in the Mozi through the investigation on self-cultivation. First of all, this essay tries to indicate that the body in the Mozi is constructed by‘xing (形, “body”) ─xin (心, “heart”) ─ qi ( 氣, “energy”)’which is in accord with the Pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding to the body. While xing refers to the flesh-bloody part of human being, the concept of xin focuses on the aspect of cognition and is closely related to the concept of shan (善, “goodness”), ai (愛, “love”), zhi (志, “will”) and xing. Despite the concept of qi has not been fully developed in the Mozi, it remains significant in understanding On Dyeing (〈所染〉). Based on this framework on the body, we could assert that the cultivated body which implied in the Mozi is not merely a physical body constituted by flesh and blood, but an integration of mind and body. Through the cultivation (gong-fu 工夫), the physical-mental state of the practitioners will then begin to transform. This essay reveals that the domain of gong-fu should not be restricted in the immanent cultivation of xin-xing ( 心性, “mental disposition”). Regardless of using the approaches of inside-out or outside-in, any practice could change one’s thought and behavior could be regarded as “gong-fu”. Thus, this essay generalizes six kinds of gong-fu from the Mozi, namely qu (去, “removing”), fan-zhi-shen (反之身, “self-reflecting and self-justificating”), li-zhi (立志, “determining”), li-shi (力事, “performing one’s duty”), xue (學, “learning”) and bian (辯, “debating”). This essay concludes that the purpose of self-cultivation on the Mozi is to establish an ideal model of Mohism, so as to promote benefits and eliminate harms for the society. This interpretation of body complies with three dimensions, which are zhi-wu-yu-e-zhi-shen (知無欲惡之身, “the body with intelligence neither desiring nor disliking anything”), li-yong-zhi-shen (力勇之身, “the body with power and bravery”) and jiao-li-zhi-shen (交利之身, “the body with mutual aid”).
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Issue: 56
曾怡嘉
Yi-Jia Zeng
評Alexander Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy
A Review of Alexander Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy
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蘇格蘭哲學與思想史近年為英語學界之新興研究領域。身為該領域之先驅、蘇格蘭啟蒙研究首屈一指的學者,亞歷山大•布洛迪有鑑於此趨勢,以本書叩問「何謂蘇格蘭哲學」之根本問題,並提供讀者一部十分全面的哲學史著。布洛迪成功地在書中兼顧歷史與哲學的深度,闡明蘇格蘭哲學的本質與重要性。他主張蘇格蘭哲學必須放入歷史脈絡之中研究,因為它並不僅是一項哲學的志業,更是數世紀以來凝聚蘇格蘭民族的文化傳統。若缺少過去思想家們齊力建構此一智識文化,近代以降的科學、文學、政治與文化發展恐怕舉步維艱。本文旨在評論《蘇格蘭哲學史》;同時概覽布洛迪任教於格拉斯哥大學時從哲學到歷史的學術轉向。他對蘇格蘭哲學文化的投入值得當代歷史學家與哲學家關注,其作品開啟了思想史與哲學史對話的契機;文末將透過本書探討目前英語學界思想史與哲學史之互動關係。
Scottish philosophy and intellectual history have become the increasingly fashionable fields of academic studies. Alexander Broadie, one of the pioneers and an accomplished scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, returns to the basic question, namely, “what is Scottish philosophy?”, and presents a comprehensive work on the history of Scottish philosophy. Broadie successfully elucidates the nature and significance of Scottish philosophy both historically and philosophically. He argues that Scottish philosophy must be studied in its historical context, for it is not only a philosophical enterprise but also a persistent tradition which has united the Scottish nation for centuries. The advancements in science, literature, politics, and culture in Scotland would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible, without such an intellectual culture established by thinkers in that tradition. This article is intended as a review of Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy in the background of his shifting academic interests from philosophy to history while he holds the professorship in University of Glasgow. His commitment to Scottish philosophical culture deserves the attention of contemporary historians and philosophers, for his work opens up a space for
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34.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017
鄭志忠
Jyh-Jong Jeng
康德對觀念論的駁斥
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
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在《純粹理性批判》B 版的論證(B274-9)中,康德提出一個有說服力的策略,嚴肅地正面回擊懷疑論者對於外在世界真實性的質疑。他直接攻擊懷疑論者的核心假設。首先,康德以懷疑論者都應該能夠接受的自我知識的構想為起點,然後逐步地揭露它的矛盾性。這使得懷疑論者陷入兩難困境。或者他們必須承認,在他們的假設之下,自我知識是不可能的;或者他們必須放棄那個假設,換句話說,他們不僅必須承認自我知識的直接明證性,同時也必須接受作為它的可能性條件的外部事物存在的直接明證性。本文主張:(1)「駁斥」是有說服力的;(2)「駁斥」與「先驗觀念論」的核心主張是相容的。論文分為三大部分。首先,釐清「駁斥」在先驗哲學中的系統性地位,並藉此闡明「現實性設準」的經驗認知意義;其次,批判地分析「駁斥」的論證結構與理由證成;第三,藉由釐清關鍵術語的歧義,來闡明「駁斥」與先驗觀念論的相容性;最後,總結「駁斥」的策略。
In the demonstration of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (B274-9), Kant brings up a persuasive strategy for seriously refuting skeptics’ position concerning the reality of outer world. He attacks directly the core presupposition of skeptics. First of all, Kant takes as a starting point the conception of self-knowledge that should be accepted by all skeptics. Kant then uncovers step by step the sceptics’ contradiction and he hence puts them in a dilemma. Under the sceptics’ assumption, either they must acknowledge the impossibility of self-knowledge or they must give up that assumption. In other words, not only must skeptics acknowledge the direct veridicality of self-knowledge, but also accept the direct veridicality of the existence of outer things as the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge.This paper argues that (1) the ‘refutation’ is persuasive, and (2) the ‘refutation’ and the core theses of ‘transcendental idealism’ are compatible.This essay contains three parts. The first part is to clarify the systematic status of the ‘refutation’ in transcendental philosophy and, by this clarification, to expound the empirically cognitive significance of the ‘postulate of actuality’; the second part is to critically analyze the structure of demonstration and justification of the ‘refutation’; the third part is to expound the compatibility of ‘refutation’ with ‘transcendental idealism’ by clarifying the ambiguity of key terms. The paper ends with a conclusion summarizing the strategy of the ‘refutation’.
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陳士誠
Shih-Chen Chen
知─行合一之哲學史及其倫理學的先驗說明之探究
A Research on the “Unity of Knowing and Acting” and Its Transcendental Explanation Based on Ethics
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知行合一是陽明學核心之一;探求其哲學史根源,以及其倫理學證成方式,以顯其學之規模,即本文之兩個目的。所謂根源,非泛指心學傳統中分析出一種模糊的觀念性連結,而是在確定文本中藉倫理學詮釋尋得文獻根據,以證此知行合一在經典承傳中之一脈相承處。此相承處即是《孟子.離婁上》中所揭示者:知之,即行之,此表示知行間的分析關係,在其中,知,乃智之實:知仁義,即固守仁義;因而,所謂知,即行其所知之遵守義。陽明謂是非心之知,其文本根據即可溯源至此,非如勞思光謂兩者只在詞源上有關而已。這是本文第一個目的。第二個目的乃是藉倫理學證成此知行合一之說。勞思光視「行」為發動義,把「行」一詞之意涵,從常識,提昇到心學與語言哲學位階,但若謂去證成知行合一在倫理學上的必然性,也即,知行何故非合一不可,這問題還需尋求更根本的說明。依本文,這乃基於一相關於使心學所蘊含之倫理學概念成為可能之先驗分析工作,也即,知行合一乃在人之主體同一性中成立,而這同一性則乃是使倫理規範與究責概念成為可能之先在性條件,從而即揭示知行合一之必然性基礎。在這同一性中,知與行在倫理上的屬己性被證立,從而倫理規範與究責之可能性才能被證成。因為,只有在知與行皆屬我的,我才能承認倫理規範之有效性及其可究責性,從而構成一藉主體之自我關係的形式性論證。
The doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” is one of the core concerns of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. This paper is trying to elucidate Wang’s theory by investigating: 1. The philosophical origin of this doctrine. 2. The justification of its ethical theory. Regarding the investigation of its “origin”, I will show the philosophical inheritance between Wang’s doctrine and classical texts by the support of relevant textual evidence, instead of examining the linkage between different general ideas in the School of mind. The common ground is revealed in Book 4A of Mencius, of which has been stated clearly that to know is to act. The relationship between knowing and acting is analytic. Since knowing is the richest content of wisdom, and genuine knowing is the observance of action, the knowing of benevolence and righteousness is also the observance of such values. Such Mencius’ idea serves not only the lexical origin as suggested by Lao Sze-kwang, but also as the textual ground of Wang’s understanding of the knowing function of the mind of discerning right and wrong. The second purpose of this paper is to justify the doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” by ethical interpretation. Lao emphasizes the significance of activity in the concept of “acting”, and transforms the meaning of “acting” from common sense to the level of school of mind and philosophy of language. Nevertheless, if the ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” has to be justified, i.e. the reason why knowing necessarily entail acting, a further explanation is needed. In this paper, ideas in School of mind will be explained in terms of ethical concepts in order to achieve a transcendental analysis. The “unity of knowing and acting” is possible in subjective identity, which is the a priori condition to make the concept of an ethical norm and imputation possible. The ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” can thus be revealed. In the subjective identity, the ethical “ownness” of knowing and acting is justified, and an ethical norm and the possibility of imputation can also be possible. Since knowing and acting belong to one’s own self, the ethical norm and its imputation is then valid. This is a formal argument constituted by the self-relation of one’s subjectivity.
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陳斐婷
Fei-Ting Chen
空氣如何容受顏色?:
亞里斯多德論中介物、光、與視覺
How Does Air Receive Color?
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本文嘗試重建亞里斯多德如何看待中介物空氣容受顏色,給予《靈魂論》第二書第七章418a26-b20 這個段落一個新的詮釋。亞里斯多德分兩個方向進行這項探究。一方面,我論述亞里斯多德嘗試建立一個視覺事件的因果發生序列,顏色是整個視覺事件因果發生序列的動力因起點,使得中介物諸如空氣等透明事物產生變動。而這項變動是一項性質變化。另一方面,透過考察亞里斯多德透過對於光的探究,我指出,處於實現狀態的透明事物,應該理解為展現其與火或此類物體同一的透明本性,是透明事物歷經變動的必要條件。如果上述關於空氣如何容受顏色的解讀是正確的,或許可以為視覺感官如何接受視覺對象的形式(De anima 2.12,414a18-19)提供新的思考方向。
In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).
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陳湘韻
Hsiang-Yun Chen
主教句型的真正問題
The Real Problem of Bishop Sentences
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描述性理論(或稱E-型理論)是對「驢子代詞」(donkey anaphora)的一種分析(如:伊凡斯(Evans,1977),韓牧(Heim,1990),尼爾(Neale,1990))。此徑路常為人詬病的一點是無法解釋「主教句型」(bishop sentences)。艾勃(Elbourne,2005)提出一套情境語義學(situation semantics)式的描述性理論,並宣稱該理論不僅能解決傳統描述性理論在說明主教句型時的困難,還能解釋另一種新的主教句型。本文旨在質疑艾勃的分析。我指出艾勃的解法不但使用了未受約束的指代詞(unbound anaphora),且其對新的主教句型的說明也並不適切。
Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.
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書 評 / book reviews |
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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楊德立
Tak-Lap Yeung
評After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
A Review of After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
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相比十九世紀後半葉的德國哲學,哲學學者與史家一般更注重前半葉的成就。Frederick Beiser 這本著作,正是針對這種情況而寫。他認為十九世紀後半葉被過度簡化和忽略,其實相對於前半葉,後半葉甚至「更重要和哲學上更有趣」,而通過新的敘事和理論重構,該能賦予其應得的重視。為此,作者鑄造了五條不同的歷史線索,包括新「康德主義的興起」、「物質主義的爭論」、「歷史主義的發展」、「現代邏輯的根源」、「悲觀主義的冒起」,讓讀者以不同角度,重新認識這段歷史。他以發掘失落的傳統為己任,對於志同道合的讀者而言,這書當然對味,然而,若要讓讀者公平、恰當地了解當時的思潮,從另一角度而言,書名引來的期望或未盡相符。作者的學術素養無容置疑,本書豐富的資料和清晰的整理,能讓無論是否熟悉該段哲學史的讀者皆耳目一新。若讀者能自行把當中的細節,放到更大的歷史脈絡看,相信會對此書有更正面的評價、獲益更多。
In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.
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論 著 / articles |
39.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017 >
Issue: 53
黃文宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論洪耀勳「真理論的絕對辯證法」的構想
On Hung Yao-Shun’s Conception of “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”
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Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.
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40.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2017 >
Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀鈴
On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition
論極小命題
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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先,本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表,釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義,並被賦予三種特色:直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變,因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次,本文論證,抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物,因此難以有真假值可言。
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