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21.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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James Van Cleve
Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses
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Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light ofthis, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist's basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from an instructive series of attempts to reconstruct within the probability calculus the classical problem of independent witnesses who corroborate each other's testimony. Starred section headings indicate sections omitted here, but available on the author's USC website.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Martin Fischer, Neal A. Tognazzini
The Physiognomy of Responsibility
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23.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Devitt
Experimental Semantics
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special symposium |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Judith Jarvis Thomson
More On The Metaphysics of Harm
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Matthew Hanser
Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm
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book symposium |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy
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27.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Christopher Peacocke
Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators
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28.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Peacocke
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29.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Boghossian
Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic
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30.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Boghossian
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31.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Stalnaker
The Metaphysical Conception of Analyticity
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32.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Stalnaker
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33.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Horwich
Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy
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34.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Horwich
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review essay |
35.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Mark Van Roojen
Review of Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality:
Normativity and Human Action
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36.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Huemer
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
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37.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Issue: 1
David Barnett
Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?
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On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that nobody clearly knows that Harry is not bald. But it does not entail that nobody knows that Harry is bald or that nobody knows that Harry is not bald. Hence, the two standard views of vagueness aremistaken.
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38.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Bloomfield
Justice as a Self-Regarding Virtue
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39.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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N. Ángel Pinillos
Time Dilation, Context, and Relative Truth
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40.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Wayne Wu
What is Conscious Attention?
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