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Displaying: 21-40 of 96 documents


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21. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Ishtiyaque Haji An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness
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The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S’s Aing. He focuses on explicating the role an agent’s belief that a prospective action, A, of hers is wrong must play in the production of her A-ing in order that she be blameworthy for A-ing. Towards this end, the author makes use of cases involving akrasia and self-deception.
22. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Edward Stein Can We Be Justified in Believing That Humans Are Irrational?
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In this paper, the author considers an argument against the thesis that humans are irrational in the sense that we reason according to principles that differ from those we ought to follow. The argument begins by noting that if humans are irrational, we should not trust the results of our reasoning processes. If we are justified in believing that humans are irrational, then, since this belief results from a reasoning process, we should not accept this belief. The claim that humans are irrational is, thus, self-undermining. The author shows that this argument---and others like it---fails for several interesting reasons. In fact, there is nothing self-undermining about the claim that humans are irrational; empirical research to establish this claim does not face the sorts of a priori problems that some philosophers and psychologists have claimed it does
23. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Douglas Odegard Neorationalist Epistemology
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Whether any beliefs are justified non empirically is important in a debate with sceptics who deny empirical justification, if the parties involved in the debate claim that their position is justified. Sceptics must assume that their premises are justified nonempirically, to avoid begging the question. The main problem with advocating nonempirical justification is that accounts tend to be either too niggardly or too generous, implying either that nonempirical justification is impossible or that peer adversaries must be equally justified. The way to solve this problem is to recognize that justification involves satisfying two conditions: having reason to hold a belief and having a ground for being confident about one’s reason. The rcason can be nonempirical even though the ground is almost always empirical. This distinction can be used to resolve a number of familiar concerns.
24. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Saul Smilansky Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me?
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Getting people not to harm others is a central goal of morality. But while it is commonly perceived that those who benefit others merit gratitude, those who do not harm others are not ordinarily thought to merit anything. I attempt to argue against this, claiming that all the arguments against gratitude to the non-maleficent are unsuccessful. Finally, I explore the difference it would make if we thought that we owe gratitude to those who do not harm us.
25. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Arda Denkel On the Compresence of Tropes
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Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how the latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids the consequence that such properties will be essential to the object. The specific targets of the second part of the paper include, first, a more precise description of the notion of a cohesive internal relation, and second, an explanation of how alteration is possible in an object the particular properties of which hold together by qualified internal relations.
discussions
26. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Michael Levin You Can Always Count on Reliabilism
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This article considers some recent objections to reliabilism, particularly those of Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry. Haack complains that reliabilism solves the “ratification” problem trivially, making it analytic that evidence relates to truth; this paper defends an analytic solution to this problem. It argues as well that reliabilism is not tacitly committed to “evidentialism.” Familiar counterexamples to and repairs of reliabilism are reviewed, with an eye to finding their rationale. Finally, it suggests that the underlying dispute between reliabilism and its critics is the existence of a priori relations between evidence and hypotheses.
27. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Robert Neal Johnson Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational
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This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith’s recent criticisms of it. On this “example model”, what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his “advice model”, that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith’s criticisms can quite easily be accommodated by the example model. Moreover, to the extent that his model connects reasons to advice, it is not a model of the internalism requirement at all. Yet, to the extent that it connects reasons to motivation, his model collapses into the example model. The author ends by arguing that Smith’s view simply proposes an unambitious conception of practical rationality, not an alternative construal of the internalism requirement.
28. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Trenton Merricks More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth
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Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In “Warrant Entails Truth” (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her “Does Warrant Entail Truth?” (PPR, March 1996). In “More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth” I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original “Warrant Entails Truth.” This paper responds to Ryan’s objections, but it is not merely a reply to Ryan’s article. It is, rather, a free-standing defense of warrant’s entailing truth that is the product of discussion and argument for over two years with many philosophers, including Ryan, over the arguments contained in my original paper.
book symposia:
29. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
John Campbell Précis of Past, Space and Self
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30. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
José Luis Bermúdez Practical Understanding vs Reflective Understanding
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31. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Quassim Cassam Subjects and Objects
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32. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson Sense, Validity and Context
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33. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
John Campbell Replies
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review essays
34. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Edward Erwin Psychoanalysis: Past, Present, and Future
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35. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Johannes L. Brandl Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano
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36. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Virginia Held Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics
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critical notices
37. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Michael McKinsey Beyond Formalism
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38. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
David O. Brink Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory
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39. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Tadeusz Szubka The Philosophy of Michael Dummett
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40. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
David B. Wong Beyond Morality
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