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ProtoSociology

Volume 36, 2019
Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Consciousness

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Displaying: 21-28 of 28 documents


part v: debate: first-person and non-conceptual consciousness
21. ProtoSociology: Volume > 36
Stefan Lang Nonconceptual Self-Awareness and the Constitution of Referential Self-Consciousness: Objections to Tomis Kapitan
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This essay argues that persons not only have nonconceptual bodily self-awareness and nonconceptual mental anonymous self-awareness but also, at least if they produce the expression ‘I’, nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. It contains information of ‘I’ being produced by oneself. It is argued that this can be seen if we examine the constitution of referential self-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of being the referent of ‘I’ oneself. The main argument is: A. It is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is not assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. B. It is possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. C. Thus it is reasonable to assume that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. The justification of the thesis that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness is presented while discussing Tomis Kapitan’s analysis of conceptual egological self-consciousness. Conceptual egological self-consciousness contains infor­mation of being a subject oneself. It is argued that it is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness with the help of Kapitan’s interpretation of conceptual self-consciousness. However, it is possible to ex­plain the constitution of referential self-consciousness within the framework of Kapitan’s account if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness.
22. ProtoSociology: Volume > 36
Tomis Kapitan Egological Ubiquity: Response to Stefan Lang
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on contemporary philosophy and sociology
23. ProtoSociology: Volume > 36
Dieter Henrich Stationen einer Freundschaft
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24. ProtoSociology: Volume > 36
Luis Roniger, Leonardo Senkman The Logic of Conspiracy Thought: A Research Agenda for an Era of Institutional Distrust and Fake News
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This article analyzes the logic of conspiracy theories, stressing that it would be erroneous to assume that such theories about collusions and intrigues are irrational in nature. On the contrary, they operate on a logic that is no less coherent than scientific discourse, although it differs from the latter in its verification and discard methodology as well as in its mobilizing role. Being part of a larger research that explains the recurrent spread of conspiracy narratives in one region of the world, elucidating their historical and contemporary conditions of crystallization, the article claims that such research agenda has universal appeal, particularly in an era of institutional distrust and changes in the structure of information diffusion.
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Contributors
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Impressum
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Subscription – Single Article
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28. ProtoSociology: Volume > 36
eBooks and Books on Demand
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