De extensione totius mundi materialis tum quoad dimensionem eius spatii tum quoad multitudinem finitam corporum eiusdem agitur.Resolutionem huius quaestionis iam ab antiquis temporibus multi quaerebant. Attamen nil hac de re scientifice cum certitudine statutum est. Philosophia Christiana quaestionem — utrum mundus finitus sit in sua extensione — probabilem ostendit. Etiam argumenta per hodiernas scientias naturales proposita hac in re fines probabilitatis non transgre- diuntur et certitudinem scientificam non pariunt.In prima parte nostri articuli hypothetice quaeritur: Utrum universus mundus corporeus finitus sit. Ope historiae agimus de quibusdam deline- amentis huius problematis.In parte secunda breviter de hypothesibus recenter a D. Einstein ac D. Hoyle statutis tractamus.In partibus sequentibus (tertia, quarta et quinta) nostri articuli propo- nimus nostram, videtur novam, theoriam hac in materia cum aliquo novo successu in resolutione huius problematis. Genuina nostra conceptio in hoc eonsistit, magna facta abbręviatione, quod, adhibito principio Pauliano, multis illi amplificationibus additis et variis circumstantiis perspectis, di- stinctionem ponimus inter duas series moleeularum, ex quibus una sit finita alia autem inifita, utraque tarnen sit ordinata secundum naturalem suum gradum propriae energiae, quae pro quacumque molecula talis sit oportet (quod ex principio Pauli consequitur), ut inter unamquamque mole- culam saltem minima differentia existât; scilicet alia alia sit grandior cum omnes in serie ordinären tur. Talis consequentia specialiter ex principio Pauliano deducitur. Reprobata nunc compositione infinitae seriei molecularum propter evidentem impossibilitatem existendi in mundo mole- eulae habentis infinitam energiam, quae efficeret contractionem omnium infinitae seriei molecularum .in unam massam, consequenter finitae seriei molecularum exisientiam eligimus. Tali modo multitudo corporum in uni- verso mundo materiali finita esse demonstratur. Ee ita nostra conceptio in simplici repraesentatione, tamquam in modello, summatim praesentatur; latius ac scientifice describitur in corpore articuli.In parte tertia meram possibilitatem argumentandi, ex scientis natu- ralibus, veritatem finaiitatis dimensivae simul ac corporeae mundi uni- versi tractamus. Argumentationem incipimus ab explicatione principii sic dicti Pauliani; quod principium statuimus fundamentum nostrae, videtur novae, theoriae. Auctov huius principii — Pauli atque alii viri docti in scientiis physicis multis experimentis principium hoc probaverunt tam- auam certum. Quod principium in hodiernis scientiis physicis iam receptum ac magnopere fundatum est. Totam demonstrationem nostram, quae duo- bus argumentiis constat, depromimus ex scientiis physicis. De ea tractamus in parte quarta nostri articuli.In parte quinta argumentum fundatum in principio Pauli confronta- mus cum principiis methaphysicis.In ultima denique (etiam in aliis locis) parte congessimus aliqua con- sectaria ex nostra solutione problematis descripti consequentia.Solutio problematis non est compléta. Et ideo speramus fore multos peritos argumentum allegati articuli scientifice perscrutaturos propria addita inventione. Animadvertendum est nos etiam mathematicam elabo- rationem argumenti pro nostra theoria praeparare; principia quaedam huius argumenti in parte quarta nostri articuli suggeruntur.

L’ambition, selon la conception de s. Thomas d'Aquin, constitue un vice s’opposant à la magnanimité par excès; elle implique en effet un désir désordonné des honneurs, en ce sens que l'on attend d’autrui des marques de considération pour une excellence que l'on ne posséde pas, ou que l'on ne destine pas à la gloire de Dieu et au service des autres. De nos jours, toutefois, la philosophie contemporaine emploie le terme d’„ambition“ non seulement pour désigner ce défaut, mais aussi pour signifier la tendance à l’acquisition d'un bien ardu, encore à venir, d'accès difficile, quoique possible; en somme, on retrouve là la notion thomiste de l’espoir qui, chez Aristote déjà. faisait partie de l’objet matériel de la magnanimité. Les Stoïciens par la suite, offrirent une interprétation pragmatique des notions de magnanimité et d'ambition. De même Abélard, qui s’opposait ainsi à s. Bernard. S. Albert et s. Thomas d’Aquin élaborèrent une remarquable synthèse des aspects aristotéliciens, stoïciens et chrétiens de la notion du désir de grandeur et de choses difficiles, ouvrant ainsi la voie aux applications de cette doctrine en pédagogie. On ne peut que reconnaitre la parfaite actualité de la doctrine de s. Thomas concernant le désir sainement compris des valeurs difficiles à atteindre; doctrine dont ont si grand besoin les jeunes surtout, trop souvent minés par le manque d'enthousiasme et l’inertie dans la poursuite des valeurs spirituelles, à cause des mirages trompeurs d’une philosophic existentialiste et athée, ou par suite des difficultés de la vie d’aujourd’hui.

Cet article conti ent seulement une partie d’un chapitre d’un plus grand ouvrage.L'auteur nous y présente le problème de l'aumône chez saint Thomas d’Aquin du point de vue du devoir qu’a le propriétaire de rendre aux pauvres le superflu de ses biens (bona superflua). II y discute avec la thèse d’un des commentateurs thomistes R. Brunet qui soutenait que saint Thomas avait changé plus tard son premier point de vue sur le devoir moral strict du proprietaire de rendre son superflu en aumônes.C’est que ce malentendu pent être expliqué facilement si l'on distingue le devoir de l'aumône du point de vue de celui qui la donne et du point de vue de celui qui la reçoit. Cette même distinction explique la controverse qui existe entre certains commentateurs thomistes: les uns liant le devoir de l'aumône à la justice les autres la liant à la charité.

L’auteur est d’avis que l’analyse du rapport existant entre l'éthique el les disciplines pratiques impose le besoin de formuler-à partir de plu- sieurs ensembles de problèmes seientifiques-quelques données fondamentales, à savoir: une définition élémentaire de l'essence de la morale et de la science, l’analyse du problème des jugements constatants et appréciants àinsi que celle de leurs rapports dans les mathématiques, le passage — dans la science — de l'ordre théorique à l’ordre pratique, l’analyse de l'ordre pratique dans la science, le rôle de la sagesse, le caractère auxiliaire des sciences (question de leur objet formel et de leurs interdépendances).

Axioma scholasticum „verba sunt signa naturalia veritatis“ a plu- ribus auctoribus modernis in dubium vocatur, ut solu ti oni problemat is de secreto efficaciter tuendo facilior via stematur. Quorum difficultates demonstrare intendunt, nexurn inter verbum et mentem non in natura verbi, sed in libera hominum conventione fundari. Praecipuae rationes haec adducuntur: diversatas linguarum, pluralitas functionum, et applicationum loquelae, ac demum subordinatio loquelae bono communitatis.Solutioni harum difficultatum analysis naturae verbi praemittitur. Et quidem in verbi obiectiva realitate distinguendum est inter eius a) con- cretam individualitatem, quae cum varia in variis linguis verborum appa- rentda phonetica sive graphica identificatur, et b) verbi significativam specificationem, quae in artificiosa et soli homini propria verbi articulata formatione comsistit, ac simul elementum commune omnibus verbis constituit. In hac praecise specificatione fundatur interna verbi finalitas, vi cuius verbum medium aptum ad mentem alii homini exprimendam efficitur. Praeter specificationem tarnen ad finalitatem verbi plene consti- tuendam concurrunt adhuc externa adiuncta, a quibus dependet, utrum verba ad propriam mentem loquentis aperiendam inserviant, — et tunc habetur locutio formalis, — an vero aliis hominum utilitatibus applicentur, — et tunc habetur locutio materialis. Necessitatibus vitae humanae rite perpensis statuitur finis locutionis formalis primarius, fines vero loeutionis materialis secundarii et primario subordinati sunt censendi. Ideo propria locutioni ordinatio moralis ex obiectiva verbi finalitate complete spectata exigit, ut in locutione formali verba semper menti conformentur, quod probat nexurn inter verba et mentem naturalem esse et in obiectiva verbi natura, non vero in libera hominum conventione, f imdatum.Ad propositas difficultytes respondetur:Diversitas linguarum respicit concretam verborum individualitatem, nexus vero inter verbum et mentem in communi omnibus verbis interna eorum finalitate fundatur. Pluralitas functionum loquelae negari nequit, attamen criteria adsunt ad unam prae caeteris fundamentalem, primariam et locutioni essentialem assignandam. Socialis vero aspectus loquelae in eo consistit, quod loquela semper ad aliam personam tendit eique mentem loquentis detegit, ex quo facto ad eius Subordinationen! bono societatis, nisi indirectam et mediatam, concludere non licet.

Comment interpréter les informations,’ extrêmement laconiques, que nous transmettent les „Actes des Apôtres" au sujet de la propriété commune des premiers membres de l’Eglise? Le problème est d’une importance capitate non seulement pour l’historien des moeurs chrétiennes, rnais encore pour le moraliste. Ce dernier s’intéresse surtout à la question de savoir si cet état de choses particulier que nous observons dans la communauté chrétienne primitive pouvait découler des principes mémes de la morale prêchée par le Christ ou bien si c’était la prudence et les circonstances qui l’imposaient.En partant des données relatives à la situation sociale et économique de la Judée d'alors, l’analyse du problème de la propriété dans la première communauté chrétienne amène hauteur à la conclusion que les premiers partisans du Christ s'étaient probablement décidés à renoncer tous, ou presque, à leurs propres „champs et maisons“. C'était une nécessité qu'imposaient les circonstances exceptionnelles: le nornbre relativement grand d’indigents (surtout parmi les coreligionnaires), le boycottage et les chicanes de la part des juifs orthodoxes (le plus souvent pharisiens) qui dominaient le marché, l’annonce de la ruine proehaine de Jerusalem... Grâce à ce caractère momentané et local des motifs, le renoncement aux immeubles, au profit de la communauté, était toujours considéré comme une obligation morale provisoire que ne sanctionnait aucune loi écrite, aucun droit coutumier.Ce caractère „communioniste“ de la première communauté avait cependant aussi un fondement plus profond dans les traditions quasifamiliales et quasimonastiques du cercie d’Apôtres et de disciples accompagnant Jésus-Christ, c’est-à-dire dans les actes et l'enseignement de Celui qui est venu „parfaire la Loi" aussi en ce qui concerne la richesse et la pauvreté: II y a fait régner l’esprit de l’amour charitable et sans bornes.

C’est l'interprétation erronée de l’enseignement de l'Eglise au sujet du travail, proposée par un groupe de religieux, qui décide saint Augustin à reprendre la question. Pour bien comprendre sa solution, il faut prendre en considération certains principes de la philosophie augustinienne, à savoir la notion de Dieu-créateur, le processus du perfectionnement continu des créatures, la conception de l'homme de même que celle de la fin dernière.Saint Augustin est d’avis que le travail n’est pas en contradiction avec la nature humaine. Loin d’être une conséquence du péché, le travail permet à l'homme d’atteindre la plénitude de sa perfection. C’est pourquoi aucun travail ne dégrade l'homme. Chaque travail peut mener l‘homme à son Bien Suprême. Certaines professions (le commerce) offrent à l'homme plus d’occasions de s’éloigner de cette fin. Saint Augustin apprécie beaucoup l'agriculture. En fin de compte c’est à l'homme de faire bon ou mauvais usage de son travail. Le saint auteur souligne l'importance du travail physique en le mettant sur le même niveau que le travail mental. Tout homme doit s’adonner au travail manuel, à moins que le bien commun ne lui ordonne de consacrer son temps à d'autres occupations. Etant donné la nature psychophysique de l’homme, celui-ci doit associer le travail mental au travail manuel.La doctrine augustinienne en ce qui concerne le travail, exerce une influence considérable sur la pratique de la vie monastique (les règles bénédictine et franciscaine). Ses plus importants éléments sont assimilés par la doctrine de saint Thomas.II faut done constater que la doctrine augustinienne du travail est profondément enracinée dans l’Evangile et eile constitue une acquisition durable de la doctrine sociale chrétienne. C’est pourquoi il convient de réfuter les opinions de ceux qui donnent une appréciation négative de cette oeuvre de même que celles des auteurs qui y aperçoivent des influences des classes possédantes.

L’auteur divise les textes en question en trois groupes: 1° textes ay ant trait à la conception néoplatonieienne de la pureté; 2° textes coneernant ia sainteté paîenne, mise en rapport avec le culte divin; 3° textes touchant la sainteté chrétienne de la grâce.Ces passages permettent d’entrevoir, d’un côté, la difference qui existe entre la notion de la sainteté paînne du culte, au caraetère naturel, et la notion de la sainteté chrétienne au caraetère surnaturel, fonction de la grâce sanctifiante. D'autre côté ces textes-là semblant rapprocher de quelque façon ces deux notions en mettant en relief des traits communs, traits de.toute première importance: la pureté et la constance.Les énonciations de St. Thomas pourraient constituer la base d’une étude à venir, à savoir de celle d'une interprétation detaillée de ces deux notions.

The determination of the meaning of transcendental and universal concepts was brought about owing to the analysis of the structure of their content and of the extension of predication.Essential element and basis of the definition of the subject is the analysis of the problem of their structure. Problem of the content and extension of predication is only a necessary consequence of their particular structure (construction).The determining of the structure of the concepts was brought about by the analysis of the „place“ where they are formed. This „place“ is intellect i.e. the acts of theoretical intellectual cognition, not sensual nor pragmatic (sensual and intellectual) cognition. Determining the place where they are formed prepared the definition of the way in which they are constructed. It has been shown that universal concepts are formed in a different way from transcendental ohes. Universal concepts are formed as result of spontaneous abstraction (called also total) if they are prescien- tific concepts or, if they are universal scientific concepts (where we work up the content as result of methodical abstraction called induction according to peripatetic tradition. This induction is also reduced to spontaneous abstraction but in its further acts is directed to determined aims. Transcendental notions, however, are not formed by means of abstraction but by means of a more complicated „separation“ which is conditioned by existential judgements whose content is obtained by means of predicative judgements which express both the content of a thing and its existence. Abstract functions always omit actual existence o£ a thing if any real element of being is omitted.Constructions subordinated to the cognition formed in result of separate cognitive processes (concepts make cognition possible) appear to be different in their structure. For universal concepts are a group of characteristics (attributes) or transcendental relations with identical „angles“ of relation in the content of the thing. Transcendental notions, on the other hand, are main primary judgements in which intellect „sees“ being and exchangeable values in it. Obviously main primary intellectual judgements contain in a material sense (from the point of view of the matter and not only of the afirmation called judgement sensu stricto both the existential judgements and series of negative judgements. The judgement of identity which is the main transcendental „concept“ of being contains in its subject existentially being expressed and in predicate essentially expressed being or vice versa.That is why the elements functioning as subject and predicate from the point of view of their material content are a group of existential judgements. Everything that actually exists is determined in itself and identical with itself. Only such primary judgement can be called „transcendental concept of being“ because its structure expresses the structure of being composed of essence and existence. Such „transcendental concept“ is an intuition of reality which Thomas Aquinas in qu. 6, 1 in De Trinitate called intellectus.From different constructions of universal and transcendental concepts conceived in this way results determination of their different contents. Universal concepts express only content and essential aspect of things in a particular scheme i.e. in an abstract and univocaJ way. At the same time content of concepts and content of things are identical from the point of view of the concepts as there is no reason to deny this identity of content if existence and essence in being are really non-identical. With identical content in a concept and in a thing there is only a question of a different existence of the content in intellect and in the thing itself. Transcendental notions, on the other hand, include all the reality with its all, even smallest symptoms without excluding any element of being. They are therefore analogous concepts, equivocal and concrete including i nd expressing everything actu confuse.As to the extension of the predication of these concepts, universal concepts predicate only about certain groups of beings arranged mto certain classes and species. These classes are narrower or wider. They are not formed arbitrarily but as the result of different structures of being. ]n any case what we call species exists as universale metaphysicum identified with particular concretes in which relations constituting the content of these beings are very similar to relations in other beings included m the predication of the same universal concept. On the other hand transcendental notions predicate about all the reality and all its symptoms both substantial and accidental. They form internal content of every being but at the same time are not exhausted in any concrete as had been proved by the process of forming them by means of separation. The extension of predication is the most noticeable quality differentiating universal and transcendental concepts, it is not an essential quality, however, but to a great extent derivative. Essential differences between these concepts lie in their different structures.

After the introductory remarks on the conditions of the proper research on the methodology of the philosophy of being or metaphysics, ultimate premises in various types of special (positive) sciences were briefly charakterized. Thus: in formal (deductive) sciences analytical propositions are the ultimate specific premises; in natural sciences — propositions purely observational; in arts — propositions based directly on observation and at the same time on the understanding of something which is on expression. Metaphysics of Aristotle and his continuators cannot be treated as one of the above mentioned types of science. It has its own character and its theses are general and necessary factual (not verbal) statements. As the result of this, ultimate premises of metaphysics must have the same character. Before showing which propositions are the ultimate premises of the philosophy of being an attempt had been made to solve the problem if general and necessary factual statements are at all possible. The affirmative answer was being proved.The ultimate premises of metaphysics should be these theses of metaphysics which are not deduced themselves but from which all others are deduced. It seems that strictly speaking there are no such propositions in the philosophy of being. The whole group of the essential theses of general metaphysics forms a system of something like axioms. All the theses though partly based on each other are also proved directly. They are therefore the work of intellectus principiorum and at the same time supported by other theses. At the end of the article the explanation of the basis of metaphysical theses has been considered with a special attention paid to the problem how to reach metaphysical principia which are: the general and necessary factual statements.

The paper begins with the presentation of the views of Hume and logical positivism, that statements about facts (the so called real statements) cannot be necessary (if „necessary' is understood as „the one which is known true independently of experience“).This point of view ought to be carefully analysed by the adherents of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas who to the statements of their philosophy attributed two simultaneous properties of logical necessity and i eality.The method here applied is a sort of conceptual analysis. This method consists in defining concepts in terms of relevant metalinguistic predicates (such as „true“, „atomic“ and similar other ones) and of logical constans. Owing to this method the application becomes possible of logical calculus to the comparison of the extensions of the predicates (we confirm, for instance, the equivalence or lack of equivalence between analysed definitions). In this way we can formulate the following definition of necessary statement:(N) The statement p is necessary in language L if and only if no true atomic sentence implies here the negation of p.The definition (N) allows also to establish the relation of inclusion between the class of analytic and the class of necessary sentences, where the former are meant as statements reducible to logical truths by means of mere definitions.Next a satisfactory condition is formulated, which, when fulfilled by a sentence, makes this sentence real:(R) If from a sentence p and some true atomic sentence q follows an other true atomic (sentence, then p is real.It is not difficult to realize that (N) and (R) do not bring forward sufficient grounds to establish an exclusion between the classes of necessary and real sentences. Morever, one may easily show the instances satisfying simultaneously (N) and (R), what is a quite satisfactory argument, for the thesis that necessity does not exclude reality.In the last part of the article two statements of thomistic mataphysics ere discussed. These statements enjoy logical necessity as being a substitution of logical truths; on the other hand the same propositions satisfy the condition of reality (R). One may object to a thus formulated condition on the ground that it is too weak and, therefore, it cannot secure the knowledge against the metaphysics. But one can point that there are many theorems of science acknowledged as real by virtue of the proposed test of reality, i. e. the same test, which is satisfied by discussed metaphysical statements.

The author distinguishes at least four relations between the theory of knowledge (considered as science whose subject is knowledge as true and whose final aim is an evaluation of human knowledge) and metaphysics (considered as a science dealing with being as being whose ultimate aim is to give the most basic rationale of what exists), i.e. 1. genetic or psychological relation, 2. historical relation, 3. methodological relation, 4. epistemological relation. In the first two relations, in which time is concerned, mataphysics come before the theory of knowledge as we first study the being, and only afterwards reflect upon the truth of our knowledge. As to the third relation (as regards proofs or justification) both sciences are independent: metaphysics is not based on the premises taken from the theory of knowledge, and the theory of knowledge is not based on the premises taken from metaphysics. In its epistemological aspect, however, theory of knowledge is primary to metaphysics: it evaluates both itself and metaphysics while metaphysics does not evaluate either itself or the theory of knowledge. Here, however, we are not considered with an ontological relation as the relations between the subjects of both sciences do not give us any conclusions as to the relations between these sciences.The article analyses and refutes the argument for the methodological and epistemological priority of metaphysics among philosophical sciences which may be suggested by contemporary Thomists. It is stated in the conclusion of tire article that to achieve its main aim the theory of knowledge cannot and need not be based upon an objective theory of the structure of knowledge (as metaphysics or psycho!ophysiology of knowledge). It should be not so much a system as a systematized reflection using in its research phenomenological description (without Husserl's btoyy] and contemporary means of methodological analysis worked out by semantics and formal logic.

Dans cet article je m’efforce de démontrer, contre l’opinion aujourd’hui généralement admise, qu’Aristote non seulement dans ses Analytiques Secondaries, dans le classique chapitre 7, mais aussi dans quatre autres textes qui jusqu’ici n’ont pas encore été pris en considération sous ce rapport, à savoir dans le livre II, chap. 1 et 4 Peri Psyches, et dans le livre VII, chap. 3 et le livre IX, chap. 3, des Métaphysiques pensait à la différence réelle (métaphysique) entre l’essence et l’existence dans tous les êtres soumis au mouvement, et même dans toutes les substances. Ainsi sera int éliminées à la fois la conception de Gilson que Aristote aurait seulement présenté la structure essentiele de l’être et robjection faite par Rougier que la différence mentionnée entre l’essence et l’existence qu’on rencontre dans toutes les oeuvres du Docteur Angélique serait d’origime platonicienne et ferait de sa doctrine un conglomérat qui bouleverse l'économie du système péripatétique.