When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers ignore the negatives. Most assume that humans need friends to flourish, and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed. This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided. Here, I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship, despite it being ignored. They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary for flourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to one’s own self-sufficiency. I defend these views. Then I conclude with reflections on why Cynics and Pessimists actually make great friends. By helping people to focus on vulgar human nature and the flaws that humans have, they create an unpretentious basis for friendship.

Charles Peirce claimed that the principal ingredient in assertion is an act of “taking responsibility” for the truth of what is asserted. Some people writing about the Commitment Theory of Assertion have at times construed Peirce’s claim as his espousal of that contemporary theory, but this, I argue, is mistaken. Peirce saw “taking responsibility” as the assumption, not of an obligation, but instead of a liability, a penalty to be incurred if one’s assertion turned out to be false. I then consider how this point connects to other parts of Pierce’s analysis of assertion, specifically his claims that we assert to persuade, that assertion involves an intentional exhibition of our assumption of liability, and that this assumption of liability furnishes evidence for what is asserted. I conclude by sketching on Peirce’s behalf how the assumption of liability could constitute, and be intelligibly offered as, evidence for what is asserted.