The following letters were written by the distinguished British chemist Professor Brian G. Gowenlock in response to Tibor Frank’s article on “Networking, Cohorting, Bonding: Michael Polanyi in Exile,” Tradition and Discovery 23:2 (2001-2002): 5-19. The two letters contribute to the history of the Manchester years of Michael Polanyi with interesting details concerning several of his colleagues and contemporaries. These informative comments by a former student of Michael Polanyi will improve our knowledge of the last years of Polanyi as a physical chemist.

This essay is an obituary notice for Charles S. McCoy, who introduced many to Polanyi’s ideas and made creative use of Polanyi’in his scholarship.

This article examines the subject of intellectual controversy in Michael Polanyi’s thought, particularly in Personal Knowledge, sketching the reasons for disputes, obstacles to solving them, and strategies for overcoming these obstacles. It concludes with a focus on the role of tradition and community in Polanyi, using suggestions of H.G. Gadamer and W. Placher.

This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, which has been the dominant paradigm for most of the Western epistemological tradition.

Maben W. Poirier, compiler of the 423 page bibliography on Michael Polanyi published in 2002, comments on his bibliography project and the final product.

This essay is a brief introduction to four essays exploring the implications of Michael Polanyi’s thought for ethics.

This essay treats Michael Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy and the contributions of post-critical thought to ethics. It discusses the from/to structure of human knowing and heurism and ethics. It argues that virtue, viewed post-critically, is an achievement in community; post-critical thought calls for movement beyond specialization.

Moral inversion, the fusion of skepticism and utopianism, is a preoccupying theme in Polanyi’s work from 1946 onward. In part 1, the author analyzes Polanyi’s complex account of the intellectual developments that are implicated in a cascade of inversions in which the good is lost through complicated, misguided, and unrealistic dedication to the good. Parts 2 and 3 then address two of the most basic of the objections to Polanyi’s theory voiced by Zdzislaw Najder. To Najder’s complaint that Polanyi is not clear in his use of the term “moral,” the author replies that the pivotal distinction in Polanyi’s moral theory is not the moral against the intellectual, but the passions against the appetites. In considering Najder’s complaint that Polanyi’s argument represents a naive instance of ethnocentric absolutism, the author undertakes to show Polanyi’s consistency and perspectival self-awareness by focusing on Polanyi’s account of authority and dissent within a tradition, as well as on Polanyi’s treatment of persuasion as a heuristic passion.