This article aims to elaborate two meanings of the category of the political in relation to the question of legitimacy in constitutional regimes: John Rawls's conception constructed on the regulative ideal of political neutrality and Carl Schmitt's notion of the political as friend-enemy distinction relying on a logic of exclusion. A comparative textual examination explicates that these two approaches imply opposed meanings to be attributed to the nature, essence, and boundary of the political, although both thinkers have the common aim of developing a theory of the political realm free of religious, metaphysical, and ideological connotations.

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life.

Poststructuralist theories of identity have been accused of restricting the political efficacy of the subject. However, it could be argued that poststructuralist theory, as a philosophical method that insists upon a critical resignification of the traditional understanding of agency and critique, may actually enlarge the scope for activism.

The subject of this paper is the new theory of political liberalism, developed by people like jJohn Rawls and Charles Larmore. This is a quite specific subject and it should not be confused with another and more usual meaning attached to the same expression. This more conventional meaning of political liberalism is primarily a form of liberalism which stresses the political sphere - the state - as opposed to the economic sphere - the marketplace. However, the new theory of political liberalism is not in opposition to economic liberalism in this way. Instead, the adjective political refers to the fact that this recent defence of liberalism avoids reliance on comprehensive and controversial religious, metaphysical, epistemological, and moral views. In this sense, political liberalism is a theory of argumentative restraint regarding the defence of liberal justice.

By the late twentieth century, the liberal definition of a citizen as an individual with equal rights under the protection of the law has failed to respond to the demands of the members of contemporary plural societies. The recent discussions in political philosophy between Kantian liberal approaches and their communitarian and republican critics are relevant to this challenge. These criticisms are, in one way or another, related to the main principles of Western liberal thought. The communitarians take a stand against the priority of rights over conceptions of the good in liberal politics. They also criticize the ontological assumption of the individual as an "unencumbered" self. The absence of a substantive common good and the separation of politics and morality are the shortcomings of liberalism that are stressed by both communitarians and republicans. In contrast to liberals' emphasis on rights, republicans underline the role of duties and active participation as the constitutive elements of citizenship. In fact, they reverse the relation between rights and politics as it is understood in liberalism: they regard rights as the products of the political process, rather than its presuppositions.

The subject of this paper is modern representative democracy. Instead of discussing the many theories which strive to define and describe the essence of democracy, such as the classic, the competitive, the structural, the participatory, the concessionary, etc., it is our aim to present the various practical approaches to "democracy in action" in the post-Communist period, i.e., to characterize the various notions of the axiological and philosophical assumptions that provide the cornerstone of democracy.

In his book, The Logic of Democracy, T.L. Thor son has published a chapter entitled "Majority Rule and Minority Rights". In this paper he has pointed out a controversy which has arisen between "natural rights democrats" and "majority rule democrats." In this paper I argue that elected representatives represent the majority and their rule can be called the rule of the majority so long they can protect the rights of individuals. This is why the natural rights of man are more fundamental and essential than majority rule. In conclusion, I insist that neither "natural rights" nor "majority rule" can be called the elements of democracy. If the former and the latter could have been understood as the end of democracy and the means to achieve the end, respectively, then the controversy would not have arisen.

The paper develops a theory of human rights under three main headings: that ways of acting or of being treated require effective normative justification, that they must have authoritative political endorsement or acknowledgement, and that they must be maintained by conforming conduct and, where need be, by governmental enforcement. The paper, then, applies this notion of human rights to two main cases: as constitutional rights within individual states (the case primarily contemplated within the UN's Universal Declaration), and as international human rights maintained by confederations of states or by looser international coalitions.

"Justice" has been, since Plato and Aristotle, a concept of central importance in European philosophy. It is also a concept in everyday speech and in political discourse. As an inter-discursive concept, its value is not culturally limited, so that it seems particularly apt for use in discussions about achieving "globalization with a human face" (as one might say). For such processes of communication it is, however, necessary to reflect on the different uses made of this concept, which is claimed by very different, even contrasting political-ethical projects.

The Paleolithic paintings and drawings found on cave walls at sites in France and Spain, such as Lascaux, Altamira and Vallon-Pont-D'Arc, have profound effects on those who see them. In addition to their historical interest, they are prized for their aesthetic and spiritual qualities, which have had an important influence on modern art. But the caves are small and the paintings are fragile. Access to them has been sharply limited: some caves have been closed to protect the paintings from the damage caused by human respiration; access to others is limited to those who negotiate a daunting reservation scheme. Despite being the heritage of humanity as a whole, the cave paintings are, and must be, restricted to a very few. Not everyone who wants to see the paintings can do so if they are to survive.

El presente trabajo se hace cargo de uno de los problemas cläsicos de la democracia: el sentido, limites y paradojas de la exigencia igualitaria, exigencia que pone a la sociedad democratica en una paradoja: promover diferencias por mor de una presunta igualdad.

This paper examines the capacities of deliberative democracy as a decision-making mechanism in controversies concerning the cultural rights of minorities. It is claimed that existing views of public deliberation leave unanswered the question how to fit, by deliberative means, the cultural needs of culturally different communities into one and the same regulatory framework. The difficulty is that these needs are articulated in culturally specific frames of reference. Consequently, they are not commensurable in terms of their relative importance for the respective communities, and they cannot be referred to in arguments which would be recognized as valid by all the parties in the deliberation. The proposed solution proceeds from the differentiation between ethical-existential (also ethical-political) and moral questions which has been made by J . Habermas in discourse ethics. I explore the possibility of applying to ethical-existential discussion, which articulates a community's cultural needs, the standards of public deliberation, and of developing a quantitative measure of needs.

In this short paper I would like to open discussion on the prevalence of political and ideological considerations in most of contemporary social theory in and pertaining to the Southeastern European context. With the significant political changes in this region the relevance of ideology has grown significantly.

Der Rassimus-Diskurs hat sich auf die fortschrittlichen kapitalistischen Länder konzentriert. Da der Rassimus kein westliches Phänomen ist, sondern eine aus der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise hervorgehende Idologie, sollte die Rassismus-Diskussion auch in Ländern, in denen sich die kapitalistische Produktionsweise erst spät etablierte, untersucht werden. Untersuchungen zu Rassismus in der Türkei zeigen, dass der Rassismus in der Türkei besonderheit aufzeigt, die nicht mit denen der westlichen Länder vergleichbar sind. Deswegen werde ich in meinem Referat den Rassismus in der Türkei vor dem Hintergrund einer Auseinandersetzung mit Albert Memmi, Robert Miles, Immanuel Wallerstein, Etienne Balibar, etc. erlaütern.

In transitional societies, a search for ethnic identity becomes the most common form of personal response to the destruction of customary forms of social life. The sense of ethnic unity can arise spontaneously or be formed by ideologists. Ethnic stereotypes play a crucial role in embedding national myths into people's consciousness, and the effectiveness of their influence is practically independent of their accuracy. The system of perception stereotypes of a nation almost always adds up to a holistic myth of that nation that includes mythologems of different levels (from routine perceptions to historical-philosophical theories). Thus, one can say that turning mass consciousness towards a national myth is the main method of the formation of national identity.

This paper provides a structural and comparative analysis of two sets of concepts in social and political philosophy: the Russian Eurasian school of the 18th,19th, and early 20th centuries, on the one hand, and the concepts of American Exceptionalism and American Destiny, on the other. Both sets of concepts guided the social and especially foreign policies of Russia and the United States as semi-official political doctrines at certain stages of their history.

The formal logical characteristics of the categories of "tolerance" and "intolerance" are emphasized, as well as empirical-pragmatic advantages of a declaration and realization of tolerant positions in modern international life. It is mentioned that the limits of intolerant actions are set either by external resistance, or by intolerant subjects' potential for exhaustion. The historical and ideological prerequisites for political tolerance, as well as the principle of "resistance to evil by force" advocated by Russian philosopher Ivan lliyn, are reviewed. The basis of socio-ontological tolerance in the modern life of the world community, its reinforcement by tendencies in scientific and technical development and in international law, and the role of comprehensive objective interpretations of the function of international tolerance by mass media systems are analyzed. The meaning of an axiological foundation for tolerance in international policy and the objective difficulty of consolidating it in the social life of the early decades of the 21st century are revealed.

This paper examines two conflicts that emerge in the engagement between monotheism, especially as it is expressed in its fundamentalist form in both Christianity and Islam, and the separation of church and state. The first conflict involves intellectual compartmentalizing. The second conflict concerns the possibility that the contract may require that all "absolute truths" be assigned metaphorical status.

The purpose of this paper is to argue against a certain view of what terrorism is. In particular, I wish to dispute the definition of terrorism used by philosophers Andrew Vails and Angelo Corlett who separately put forward arguments defending the possibility of morally legitimate acts of terrorism. In support of this conclusion, they each employ a broad definition of terrorism that makes room for highly discriminate, i.e., precisely targeted, acts of political violence to count as terrorism. Defending a broad definition of terrorism requires the inclusion of such cases. I argue in defense of a more narrow definition of terrorism, one that associates terrorism with more indiscriminate acts of violence. I believe that this definition better accords with common usage and commonsense.

Anti-essentialism, antiuniversalism, anti-foundationalism, fragmentation of subjectivity, pluralization of truths are feared to entail the danger of forfeiture of possibilities for critical counter discourses. But the deconstruction of categories is not inevitably the death of politics; rather, the postmodernist intervention of canonical power /knowledge alliances facilitates the recovery of "other" strategies of resistance concerning world problems from "nonconventional" sources that have hitherto been invalidated by mainstream discourses. Thus the crisis triggered by postmodern critique could hold immense opportunities for new configurations of politics to emerge through micro-politics of permanent resistance and diversification of discourses of subversion. Political activism today stands in a complicated parasitical relationship of debt and defiance vis-ä-vis the postmodernist discourse, which, despite many shortcomings, does offer possibilities of thinking the "Other". To this end, I seek to go back into the history of philosophy and reclaim tools of resistance from "different" cultural contexts to revitalize and re-imagine our oppositional practices in the present. This paper attempts to experiment with the concept of non-violence [Ahimsa) as conceptualized within the Indian philosophical tradition.