Philosophy distinguishes life in general, inherent in all living things and social life – human life in a society. The last means the numerous relationships of man to nature, society, and all other people. To understand the social life, it should be considered at two levels: first, as everyday life, and, second, as «civilized», much higher according to its contents. The everyday life and the «civilized life» – are interconnected integrally with each other and at the same time are different from each other. Note the primary differences in the most general aspect. The usual everyday life is characterized by thing that people do daily, constantly. It is real, practical, biological-social life of each person: whether a man or a woman, an ordinary man and an eminent person. «The civilized life» is a life of higher level; it is penetrated by the theory, more comprehended and systematized; it is based on scientific and legal laws, philosophical truth and moral categories. Therefore people, on the basis of philosophical and scientific laws, regularities, and tendencies know the ancestral life, evaluate correctly estimate the present life and are able to predict the future life. Laws of everyday and civilized human life have been formulated.

The purpose of this paper is to present and explain a meta-philosophical methodological framework of how to look at seemingly competing approaches for the sake of cross-tradition understanding and constructive engagement in comparative philosophy in a global context. For this purpose, first, I introduce and explain some relevant conceptual and explanatory resources employed in the framework, especially the distinction between the methodological perspective and the methodological guiding principle, and make some initial methodological points. Second, I suggest six meta-philosophical adequacy conditions for adequate methodological guiding principles, which constitute one core portion of the suggested methodological framework.

The historical origins of the Kyoto School of Philosophy of modern Japan, represented by Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe, may be derived from both the ancient Chinese idea of Change and the ancient Indian Upanishadic idea of the mutual identity of Brahman and Atman. The ancient Chinese idea of Change signifies change as well as non-change, and even their dialectical unification. Both origins are structured by the self-identity of the opposed in logic, and these historical prototypes have been developed into the various forms of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophy. The notion of Nothingness or Emptiness rather than Being has been set up as the fundamental principle. The principle of Nothingness as ultimate reality has been connected with the logic of self-identity of theopposed, and this is evident in Nishida’s concept of the self-identity in absolute contradistinction that is equivalent to the Place of Absolute Nothingness. Even though Nishida’s idea of Place is directly and explicitly influenced by the ancient Greek idea of Topos, it has indirectly and implicitly been affected by the traditional agricultural society as well, in which the land is regarded as the self-identical substratum despite the cyclic time of the four-seasons change. The ancient Chinese idea of Change also reflects the agricultural society in which the cyclic time plays an important role on the basis of the unchanging self-identical land as the underlying substratum. Nishida succeeds in establishing the new logical expression of Eastern traditional thought, deeply hidden in consciousness, in relation toWestern philosophy. The uniqueness of Nishida’s idea of Place may have its main source in the traditional agricultural background, and in this sense his way of thinking may be rural in character. On the other hand, Tanabe, though following Nishida at first, turns to making criticism of the mentor with the establishment of the triadic logic of species as the dialectic, which is characterized by the perpetual self-negating conversion in action. In contrast to Nishida, Tanabe represents the urban type of thinking, which is in pursuit of transforming in life. While Nishida’s idea of Absolute Nothingness has an affinity with the ancient Chinese philosopher Laotzu’s idea of Nothingness from and into which every entity comes and goes, Tanabe’s concept of Absolute Nothingness as the principle ofconversion is more closed to the Buddhist idea of sunyata, i.e., Emptiness, which is devoid of any substance in itself. As regards evil, the difference between them is obvious in that for Nishida evil and time or history disappear into the ultimate horizon or place of Nothingness with the tendency toward a kind of monism of goodness, whereas for Tanabe evil copes with goodness and retains its own status throughout, never being reduced to the opposed. Even if so, both of them, however, fail to construct a philosophy of history from the epochal or durational viewpoint, compared to Heidegger and Jaspers.

This paper will present an alternative to the mainstream Western approach to human development. The mainstream Western approach to human development does not countenance contemplative interiority as a means of cognitive inquiry and a domain of cognitive value. Hence, its conception of human development is narrowly confined to the domain of formal-operational thinking and its application to material exteriority. The alternative I will present is the work of the twentieth Indian philosopher Aurobindo (1872–1950) whose integral theory of human of development inclusively countenances as realms of cognitive inquiry and value both contemplative interiority and formal-operational thinking and its application to material exteriority. The structure of Aurobindo’s integral theory of humandevelopment will be clarified and some of its implications for educational practice will be explored.

Buddhism traces its origin to the teachings of the historical figure of Gautama, the Buddha. Buddhist system addresses perennial human concerns and articulates profound insights into human nature and thus provides a practical context against the back ground of which it is possible to unravel the meaning of lives. Different branches of this school developed various scriptural traditions. Among them early Buddhist thought branched out into diversity of orders, schools of thought and teaching lineages. Wisdom and compassion are the distinctive marks of Buddhism and this strife-tormented world is in dire need of these qualities. Buddhism not only talks about these qualities, it also illustrates the way how to acquire the same. Post-modernism which is a movement in different fields, culture, philosophy, literature, and arts etc. claims to decentralize the importance of reason. There are many post modern thinkers like, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari, Levinas who worked in their own way and they discerned a shift in the art and culture of their societies from a distinctively modern phase to a postmodernist phase. Considering these observations this paper is motivated by two questions. On the one hand, one is constantly intrigued by the vast treasures of early Buddhist heritage; on the other hand, one is perplexed by the post modern deconstructive method which has some point of similarities with early Buddhistthought. In between these two lines of thinking this paper tries to argue that the better our understanding and appreciation of this ancient legacy of Buddhist treasures becomes, the more able we will be to grasp the lines of post-modern thinking. There are certain concepts of Buddhism namely, language, writing, desire, suffering, death which are all important issues to the post-modern thinkers. The present paper is an effort to high light some of these concepts against the back ground of early Buddhist traditions.

This paper is going to be a small study in the arena of comparative philosophy of the east and west. This study will show that ancient philosophies of India are still relevant in the modern world, and the modern philosophies in the western world is not a fruit of frustration, but both of them are two chief currents of thebrilliancy of human mind according to the development of human being and their need. Advaita Vedanta finds its extreme in nonduality, or non-existence of brahman, which is the negation of all materialistic subjects\ topics \things in this world, or basically it denies the complete existence of the present world. On the other hand, Post Modernism finds its goal in decentralization of any object\theory in this world. Therefore, we can say that the both the systems have almost same conclusion regarding the non-existence or decentralization, but there is a radical difference in their dates. Advaita Vedanta and Post Modernism have also similarity in their methods to find their conclusions: “netineti” is a prime tool for Advaita Vedanta to prove the non-existence of brahman , and Post Modernism follows the “logic of Difference” to decentralize any existence in this world. This study will explore the differences and similarities of both of the systems, and will try to present a common conclusion, which should be acceptable for both of the systems.

Neo-Confucian influence in early modern Japan was highly intellectual, indicating that Confucian ideals did not change the nature of Japanese norms of social lives. For early modern Japanese intellectuals, the conflict and contradiction between reality and ideals had always been a source of debate and inspiration. Within the theme of Neo-Confucian rites, the contradiction was highlighted owing to the fact that it included a guideline for authentic ancestral worship and religious policy. Once introduced within the Japanese circumstances of the day, Confucian understanding on spirits and proper rites lead Japanese scholars to define what was legitimate worship in the format of state religion: it was necessary to authorize traditional Japanese worship toward domestic shrines. Within thepractical process of policy making, it must be noted that a keen interest toward local beliefs had emerged through the discussion. Arai Hakuseki (1657‐1725) reflects such political interest within his work ‘Kishinron’. In order to understand the impact of Japanese interpretation of Neo-Confucian ideals, it is essential to focus on the interrelationship between religious policy and interest toward local beliefs.

Some of the most well known figures in three main cultures, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, defend negative theology. They believe that God doesn’t have any positive attribute and that no positive knowledge of Him is possible. Others, who are in majority, are anxious of agnosticism. Maimonides the great Jewish philosopher tries to relive this anxiety. He proposes negative knowledge arguing that in terms of negation we become closer to some knowledge of Him, though His nature still remains out of access. In this way he tries to avoid agnosticism and at the same time justify the extreme differences among believers in knowledge of Him. But it seems that, if we rely on reason alone, Maimonides' arguments are not convincing. This paper tries to criticize his examples and arguments. It seems clear that any negative knowledge should be based on a kind of positive one. No one by mere negation can receive any understanding of Him especially when the realm of negation expands upon the predicate of being too. In that case if someone like Maimonides insists to preserve his faith on God he should seek ways other than reason, like fideism or Gnosticism. And as a philosopher he cannot hold his position anymore.

This paper sets out to establish that dialogue defines truth in a world of divergent cultures and worldviews. It argues that culture has enormous influence on truth for which truth through monologue has inherent strong potentials that limit intellectual union and discusses how philosophy in its western tradition has served topromote this trend with its hegemony on different world cultures; the effect of which is the quest for difference by other world cultures through cultural philosophies that attempt to infuse reason and logic on their cultural achievement. The result then is an unending ambition for difference which promotes conflict of values in our world. The paper contends that truths realized in such a world is inherently deficient. It recommends dialogue as the basis for truth. Truth in a multi-cultural world would then not be the correspondence to, coherence with and pragmatic to reality but the ability to defy difference to promote the equality of difference. Bylooking at the several ways a thing could not have been for which it is an item, idea or value can then be considered to be true.

In the present paper we shall see that the different ways of understanding mind between Confucianism and Enlightenment in the 18th century. In this study each of these two different traditions is regarded as the East Asian context of mind study or as the Western European context of mind study. This idea comes from a kind of constructivism and constructive realism. The former, which comes from ideas of Lev Vygotsky, stresses that human mind is constructed on its cultural context. The latter insisted by Fridriech Wallner approves that every truth constructed on its cultural context can be an absolute truth depending on its cultural context. Due to these two viewpoints, we can see that the truth about human mind is not singular but plural and it should be an important theme of discussionhow to communicate between different understandings of mind and cultural context. Therefore three steps to approach the difference between Asian and European should be discussed in the following way: first, I will explain Confucian ways of understanding mind. It is Confucian cultural context as a social being that used to be the basis of cultural construction of East Asian’s mind. There were three types of Confucianism in 18th century Korea; second I will explain Western European way of understanding mind and the philosophy of Enlightenment as the basic context of cultural construction of mind; and third, I will conclude by comparing these two different ways of understanding mind and mind construction and by looking for a feasible way to communicate and understand each other.

The question is how have the Japanese received and analyzed Hegel’s philosophy? In addressing the theme of “Japanese philosophy and Hegel”, I would like to show that Hegel represents a junction in Western philosophy and that his ideas were transformed later, especially within the ranges of the sciences for understanding new developments. If interpretation of Hegel is again in transition today, and if Hegel’s work shows up in newer perspectives, we shall recall that not only Hegel’s understanding of the world and of the scientific system, but also the subsequent reception of the philosophical tradition present a new meaning for our times. Historically, Japanese philosophy has used both Eastern and Western ideas. It assumes that foreign ideas, which are necessarily plural andthus possess contradictory values, should be examined with respect to their special factors. Japanese philosophy transforms the stranger forms according to their own cultural problems, in order to preserve its identity. In this tension between dependence and independence and the harmonization of the plurality, one can understand Japanese philosophy. The reference of the Japanese to European philosophy means that the Japanese are no longer meeting with strangers, butare discovering themselves. It is no longer a question of Christianity versus Zen Buddhism, between the Western thinking of being and the Eastern experience of the nothingness, but for Japanese philosophy to free itself from such comparisons. Just in this way, can it see itself in the stranger, and the stranger in itself.

The question is: How did the Japanese Hegel's philosophy receive and criticize? On the way of an argument with the topic "The Japanese philosophy and Hegel" I want to show that Hegel represent a junction in the western philosophies and his ideas were transformed later especially within the ranges of humanities for understanding new developments. If the Hegel- interpretation is today again in a transitional situation, and if Hegel's work shows us in its effect even always new perspectives, then we will be recalled that not only Hegel's understanding the world and the scientific system, but also later receptions of the philosophical tradition have each conditional temporary borders, in addition, possibilities.

The article is devoted to Russia research Buddhism at the end of ninetieths and first half twentieths centuries in the comparativism development context in our country. It is marked in it that Russian comparative philosophy was closely connected with the oriental studies in our country. The Buddhism comparative research of that time was aimed at developing of theoretical and methodological foundation of comparative research, overcoming of European centralization and the problems of finding and understanding of common senses in different cultures, finding the ways of Buddhism language «translation» into the European civilization language, determining of the Eastern Philosophy role and place in the world historical and philosophical process and proper philosophical systemand concepts substantiation. Typological similarity concept of the Eastern and Western philosophy problems proved to be theoretical and methodological foundation of comparative research in Russia. The essence of this concept is concentrated at the assurance of the system range of the Indian philosophy being the same one as the Greek-European philosophy possessing the same problems, answers and thinking laws, may be not always in the same combination andquestions but it surely being the everlasting philosophical problems of humanity. This problem was investigated by such the East research scientists as I.B. Minaev, F.I. Scherbatsky. S.F. Oldenburg, O.O. Rosenberg and philosophers I.I. Lapshin and B.D. Dandaron.

Both descending love of western erotic novels and eastern poetry that ascends love to heavens are considered non-acceptable. Neither eastern maximalism and mysticism, nor western extreme rationalism and pragmatism are approved. Studying the “rational” appearance standing between these two extremes is preferred. Individual-human, real love stands somewhere between the Earth and sky, erotic and divine love. Differing from the understanding of love as a pure idea (Plato, Pushkin), and as a pure psychophysiological phenomenon (“Kama Sutra”, Sigmund Freud), synthetic unity of these two factors that leads to more realistic description of love is preferred in this article.

The paper handles a possibility to use the term “national philosophical tradition” in comparative philosophy as a branch of knowledge, which provides for methodological tools in an intercultural dialogue. It defines the concept of “national philosophical tradition”, principles and ways of its research. The basis of studies is a comparison between the Russian and Spanish philosophical cultures. Inherent common features of both traditions are an epistemological status of philosophy in culture, prevalence of an intuitive insight in the essence of the matter, a tendency to a synthesis between life and reason, confirmation of a fundamental cognation of literature and philosophy. An understanding of a boundary character of their culture has given rise to a messianic predestination of both nations and caused a keen interest in creation of an original national philosophy. So much in common have these two extremes of the European civilization, their main difference lies in the personalism of the Spanish philosophy and the cosmologism of the Russian one. This distinction can to a great extent be explainedby a different type of a religious background and mentality. It is these differences in national philosophical traditions that feed the world philosophy. It is on the basis of these national philosophical traditions that achievements of other philosophical cultures are introduced and assimilated in a new context. That is the reason why this concept may serve as a basis of comparison between different philosophical system.