The problematic nature of scientific language begins to be felt particularly keenly when science begins to show signs of discord and division, when an established paradigm becomes eroded and changing its configuration and applications in an irrevocable way, when language loses clarity and lucidity, when its very identity begins to appear uncertain. This is the situation where scientific dogmas are apt to start creating myths, giving ever more urgency to the question whether language is rational at all. One might say that any surge of rationalization that creates a system, a view of the world, inevitably draws on the resources of the supplementary and opposing factor of unuttered ‘virtualities’. But these are the ‘virtualities’ that exist in the shape of what might be called a semi-formalized art of performance (τέχνη) inherent in language itself.

Web language sees the word only as a carrier of information and basically studies only those aspects of language that a computer can store or retrieve. The spoken word contains many dimensions that are inaccessible to the computer: dimensions we perceive when we labor to produce the right words for a thought; when we find ourselves struck by the appropriateness of a great poet’s language; or when we rejoice in coining a word that seems to express uniquely what we feel. While the computer-like function of language is highly respected, for modern linguistics either the word is factual and scientific in its referent, or it is mystical and has no real function in life. When language is bifurcated into such extremes modern man is deprived of its fullness-and the fullness of reality which language in all its dimensions can manifest. The ability of language to deal with ordinary human things and yet at the same time to be metaphysically grounded is the distinctive feature of Indian classical thought especially the Sphota theory of language of Bhartrhari.

The notion of other minds does not have any problem in our common experience of life. It is a basic feature of life that we know that the other walking and talking figures having human shape and form that have minds. There is a tradition in philosophy of holding the view that we believe in the knowledge of our own sensory states. From this knowledge we build up a system of explanation about the minds of other people. The attempt to describe the nature of other minds or inner state of affairs creates further problems. Consciousness seems an ever shifting mass of fleeting experiences and it seems impossible that words should ever capture it. What we feel and think seems inherently private, knowable only to the individual himself. But this suggestion has the implausible implication that the communication among individuals by using words of private sensation is impossible. The present work attempts to revisit the issue and analyse the philosophical importance from the Wittgensteinian position.

The paper entitled ‘Philosophy of subaltern language’ attempts to understand Wittgenstein’s language game theory in the light of Derrida’s theory of deconstruction. Derrida in his book entitled Of Grammatology criticizes structuralism. My contention is that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus admits formal language philosophy which stipulates structuralism. Derrida would problematize the possibility of objective description. The philosophy of subaltern language is quite different from technical language philosophy. It subscribes to philosophy of ordinary language. I have understood Derrida’s concept of ‘others’ as subaltern. Technical language is formal and not within the reach to subaltern or illiterate. Moreover it becomes an instrument of exploitation because the subaltern are sufferers because they do not know the technical language. Language game is meaningful in the context of socio-cultural relationship. My ideas have been shaped and developed on the basis of my study of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Jacques Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy. I have considered Wittgenstein’s philosophy of ordinary language as ‘philosophy of subaltern language’. Language game is the expressions of forms of life. I have attempted to develop the philosophy of subaltern language in the light of postmodernism. There is a difference between Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’ and ‘subaltern language game’ as it has been stipulated and developed here. Language game theory is concerned and confined to modern age and subaltern language game is related to postmodernism. My contention is that language of legislature, executive, judiciary and medical professionals are highly technical and beyond the comprehension of subaltern people. Technical language is an instrument to serve the end of the elite and educationally advanced class. I think any social change requires change in the language game. The philosophy of subaltern language deconstructs the formal language. The subaltern language game is not analytic but existential. In order to make society free from exploitation and reduce inequality, we have to change the language game. The philosophy of subaltern language is an attempt to free society from injustice, inequality and exploitation.

There are various reasons one might think that the semantic content of occurrences of sentences does not coincide with assertoric content –content of belief and assertion– corresponding to those sentences. But if a semantic theory exploiting such distinction is to play a role in explaining communication, there needs to be a tight connection between the two types of content. Drawing upon the considerations of McDowell (1991) and Evans (1979; 1982) concerning rigidity, Stanley (1997a, b, 2002) proposes to extend Lewis’ (1980) argument for the distinction between the two types of content –an argument concerning behavior of certain English language operators– to argue that modals do not operate on assertoric, but merely on semantic contents of sentences they embed. I argue that the Dummett-Evans-Stanley line of argument fails due to its inability to explain the connection between semantic and assertoric content. Unable to provide a plausible way of recovering assertoric content from semantic content, the theory renders successful communication mysterious. The moral of its failure is far-reaching –any theory that appeals to the distinction between these two types of content remains less than fully satisfactory unless the challenge of accounting for their connection is met.

Novelties and innovations in science require tradition-bound as well as non-conventional research. Kuhn identifies them with convergent and divergent thinking. Convergent thinking is based on normal research and acceptance of a certain paradigm, while divergent thinking requires deviation from consensus-bound research. In this article, I correlate Kuhn’s view of divergent and convergent thinking with Stanley Cavell’s extension of J. L. Austin’s performative utterances with emotive utterances. Cavell extends illocutionary acts by correlating Austin’s perlocutionary acts with emotive or expressive utterances. He thinks that as different from consensus-bound illocutionary acts, non-conventional perlocutionary acts including emotive or expressive utterances provide us with moral education and insights, in this sense they help us build our autonomy. The vacillation between the two opens a space for an open-ended dialogue. The first part of the article briefly summarizes Austin’s performative utterances. The second part discusses Cavell’s contribution.

Hannah Ginsborg has recently introduced a new kind of nor-mativity which is supposed to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and dispositionalist theories of meaning. Ginsborg calls her kind of normativity ‘primitive’, for, though it is not to be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, it is nonetheless to be applied to states or facts that are not purely intentional or contentful in that they are ‘below the level’ of meaning facts. Primitive normativity provides an explanation of how we first come to grasp the meaning of an expression. This explanation, according to Ginsborg, is missing in both non-reductionism, for which the state of meaning is sui generis, and dispositionalism, which does not explain how we go from mere discriminating to genuine understanding and meaning. I wish to defend non-reductionism, first, by showing that Ginsborg’s account does not yield the kind of explanation it aims at and, second, by suggesting that non-reductionism does not preclude a constructive account of the philosophical nature of meaning.

How does language relate to value? Why do we concern with this relation up to now? I will analyze the background of the increasing interest in the relation of language to value in contemporary philosophy of language, with the ideas that language has meaning through its intention which determines the way of acts in relation with values in societies, and that, when we consider the value in language, we are searching for consequences of our speech acts in advance of the final goals of language.

La rationalisation de la parole réalisée par Simonide et les sophistes a consacré le rejet de la vérité au profit de la doxa. Or, la doxa, l’opinion commune, c’est le lieu de l’ambiguïté et de l’instabilité du sens. La sophistique, en faisant de la doxa la valeur cardinale de tout discours, a conduit au subjectivisme et au relativisme. Mais Platon et Aristote considèrent qu’il n’y a de sens que du stable, et que la stabilité du sens repose elle-même sur le fait que la parole, qui en est l’expression, contienne nécessairement la vérité sur l’être. Ils ont donc voué toutes leurs oeuvres à combattre la doxa et les sophistes afin de rétablir la vérité comme valeur fondamentale du discours qui fait sens. L’on montre ici l’impertinence de la position platonicienne et aristotélicienne en en révélant la contradiction interne. Cela nous conduit au rétablissement de la doxa, c’est-à-dire au fait que l’instabilité du sens qui la caractérise n’entraîne pas forcément le rejet de la vérité, ni le relativisme. Seulement la vérité dans la doxa se comprend, dans un sens wittgensteinien, comme un consensus de forme de vie.

L’expérience propre du langage est différente dans le poète et dans le philosophe. Dans le poète le dire est un dévoilement immédiat, et à cause de cela, il est le plus génuine et le plus vrai de l’être. Dans le philosophe bien que le point de départ soit le même, la manière comme il s’exprime fait naitre aussitôt une différence, une distance et une brèche – on dira que le discours philosophique illumine (rationnellement) précisément dans ce qu’il cache comme cette “origine” - Sera donc évident que Heidegger en cherchant être, au même temps, philosophe et poète il nous parle du poétiser ”pensant” en souhaitant ainsi la synthèse parfaite: un dire qu’en étant rationnel et clair (ainsi aimerai Descartes) ne surveille pour cette même clarté, dans ce qu’il y a de plus originaire, le Logos lui-même. Une synthèse parfaite mais, malgré tout, impossible dans la mesure où lorsqu’elle devient ”rationnelle et claire” on perd toujours quelque chose, or il y a toujours quelque chose qui se voile.

Quel est l’enjeu de l’écriture dans la pensée de Derrida? C’est à cette question que s’attèle à répondre notre communication. A partir d’une approche de l’analyse textuelle, il est question de montrer que la pratique de l’écriture derridienne, apparaît comme une logique de l’indécidabilité”. L’indécidabilité formalise l’idée selon laquelle, il n’existe pas de procédé unique permettant de lire ou de comprendre un texte. Il est itérable. A ce sujet, Derrida pense que “sans notre capacité de lire les signes en dehors de leurs contextes, la question du contexte ne surgirait pas.” Tout signe, linguistique ou non-linguistique, parlé ou écrit “peut- être cité, mis entre guillemets, par-là il peut rompre avec tout contexte donné, engendrer à l’infini de nouveaux contextes, de façon absolument non saturable.” Par conséquent, “cela ne suppose pas que la marque vaut hors contexte, mais au contraire qu’il n’y a que des contextes sans aucun d’ancrage absolu.” Partant delà, nous pouvons nous interroger: qu’est ce qui soutend les enjeux d’une telle posture épistémologique?

La tesis que voy a defender en este trabajo es que las consideraciones de Wittgenstein acerca del significado muestran la inutilidad de la distinción actual de minimistas y contextualitas entre lo que se dice y lo que se quiere decir. Para este propósito: (1) hago una introducción en los debates contemporáneos en torno al significado. Concretamente, presento el paso de la semántica y la pragmática al minimismo y al contextualismo; (2) expongo las tesis principales del minimismo y el contextualismo; (3) presento la posición del Tractatus, como ejemplo de una concepción minimista del significado y la posición de Grice, como ejemplo de una contextualista, y (4) muestro, desde los pensamientos de Wittgenstein en el Cuaderno azul, la creencia, en el signo inerte, como el fundamento de la confusión que han generado rompederos de cabeza (debates sin fin) acerca del significado en esta tradición filosófica.

En esta investigación se tratará de responder las preguntas ¿Qué fuerza argumentativa tienen los argumentos analógicos? y ¿cómo se pueden evaluar tales argumentos? La tesis fundamental es que la fuerza de un argumento puede ser transferida, total o parcialmente, a otro argumento mediante el empleo de analogías. En una argumentación analógica se ofrece un argumento para mostrar que otro argumento es suficiente para establecer su conclusión (analogía directa) o para mostrar que no lo es (contra-analogía). En este estudio, el análisis de los conectores argumentativos desempeña un papel primordial, en tanto son ellos los que permiten dar alguna precisión a la noción de fuerza argumentativa.

Современный миф является неотъемлемой частью коммуникативного и познавательного процессов. Современная культурная ситуация, характеризуемая как “постмодерн” породила феномен “посттеоретического мышления”, обнаружив ограниченность теорий и их влияние на образ мира. Миф как форма целостного мировосприятия есть средство защиты человеческого разума от распада на отдельные теоретические версии, в конечном счете, от социальной шизофрении.

This paper examines the dispositional approach to the language introduced by the W. V. O. Quine. The author consideres the naturalistic understanding of the meaning and criticism of “mentalistic theory of ideas”. Dispositional approach to the language is characterized by the fact that: first, language statements are understood as a verbal reaction to the current stimulations or to situations, which are only potentially; second, stimulus meaning is subject’s detailed disposition to agree or disagree with the sentence in response to the stimulation. It is said that Quine’s ideas of ontological relativity, indeterminacy of translation and reference associated with dispositional approach to the language.

Στην εργασία αυτή θα εξετάσουμε κατά πόσον τα κύρια ονόματα έχουν νόημα και αναφορά (sense and reference). Η αναφορά ενός ονόματος είναι το αντικείμενο στο οποίο αυτό το όνομα αναφέρεται, ενώ το νόημα ενός ονόματος είναι ο τρόπος με τον οποίο αυτό το όνομα αναφέρεται στο αντικεί-μενο αυτό. Υπάρχουν διάφορες θεωρίες που εξετάζουν αυτό το ζήτημα. Κατά τον J. S. Mill τα κύρια ονόματα είναι καθαρά αναφορικά. Σύμφωνα με την περιγραφική θεωρία του Gotlob Frege το νόημα και η αναφορά των κυρίων ονομάτων προσδιορίζονται στην πράξη από μια καθοριστική περιγραφή (defi-nite description). Σύμφωνα με την ‘ομαδική’ (cluster) θεωρία (J. Searle) το νόημα και η αναφορά των ονομάτων προσδιορίζονται στην πράξη από μια ομάδα περιγραφών. Επίσης υπάρχει η αιτιακή (causal) θεωρία των κυρίων ονομάτων (Kripke, Evans) στις διάφορες παραλλαγές της που είναι κατά κά-ποιον τρόπο επιστροφή στην θεώρηση του Mill και σύμφωνα με την οποία τα κύρια ονόματα είναι καθαρά αναφορικά. Κατά την αιτιακή θεωρία θα πρέπει να υπάρχει κάποια (γνωστή ή άγνωστη) αιτιακή αλυσίδα που συνδέει το όνομα με το αντικείμενο στο οποίο αναφέρεται, ενώ δεν θα έπρεπε να μας διαφεύγει και ο ρόλος που διαδραματίζει το κοινωνικό πλαίσιο εντός του οποίου χρησιμοποιούμε τα ονόματα. Καμιά από τις θεωρίες αυτές δεν είναι πλήρης, όμως συνδυαστικά μπορούν να συντελέσουν στον πρακτικό προσδιορισμό του νοήματος και της αναφοράς των κυρίων ονομάτων.