The philosophy of René Descartes has been attacked by environmental ethicists for supposedly being pivotal in preventing the formulation of proper environmental concerns and attitudes. Yet, Descartes’ philosophy if read charitably is, in fact, effective in developing a proper environmental ethic. He believed God created two kinds of substances, mental and physical; humans are composed of a mental and physical substance, plants and animals of only a physical substance. He argued that humans, animals, and plants, despite their difference in substance, share the same status of creatures and interact with one another. Morally, Descartes argued that humans properly serving God receive theistic pleasure from promoting the welfare of their communities. Humans, animals, and plants exist in an ecological community with one another. Thus, Descartes’ philosophy naturally develops a theo-ecocentric environmental ethic as humans will receive theistic pleasure in promoting the welfare of ecological communities.

In environmental ethics, the conception of possession is generally criticized, since land, plants, and animals should not be objectified, controlled, or owned. Yet, Aldo Leopold planned to title A Sand County Almanac “Great Possessions.” His title emphasized a point that Leopold thought important. In contrast to a sense of possession as domination, Leopold articulates a deeper, moral sense of possession in which the person claims and is claimed by others. For example, not only does Leopold claim his pines, his wife, and his chickadees, but he is also claimed by them. In this sense, possession is an act of love, care, and willingness to work on the behalf of others with passion and commitment. This sense of possession is worthy of our understanding and our emulation.

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two.

Philosophical reflections on our ethical responsibilities toward urban wildlife populations have tended to be based on a “parallel planes” framework. This framework is insufficient when it comes to looking after the well-being of city-dwelling wild animals. A different starting-point in thinking about urban wildlife ethics, informed by phenomenology, can bring a number of possible obligations to the fore—for example, an ethics of attentiveness, flexibility, adjustment, and change; virtues associated with an ethic of care from attentiveness through generosity to empathy; and a practice of hospitality. These obligations are moral rather than political; their “ought” is generated from the perspective of an ethic of care.

Urban residents have the potential to play a key role in helping to facilitate ecological resilience of wilderness areas and ecosystems beyond the city by helping ensure the migration of nonhuman climate refugee populations. Three ethical frameworks related to this issue could determine whether we have an ethical duty to help nonhuman climate refugee populations: ethical individualism, ethical holism, and species ethics. Using each of these frameworks could support the stronger view that policy makers and members of the public have a moral duty to mitigate the impacts of climate induced migration, or the weaker claim that these impacts should be taken into account when making land-use and planning decisions in urban contexts.

Several researchers hold that the cohousing movement supports sustainability, but it remains economically restrictive. This condition challenges cohousing’s status as sustainable, considering that its financially exclusive nature fails to meaningfully address sustainability’s social dimension. Yet, it is doubtful that the cohousing movement set out to create this outcome. When we examine the historical conditions that pertain to multifamily housing, we discover a long-standing pattern of discrimination. For today’s cohousing communities, we see that they are dealing with the residual effects of such prejudicial practices. Most of the unfair treatment comes from zoning and lending, but we also see that cohousing has internal challenges that complicate matters. Through employing an environmental justice framework, however, we can parse kinds of responsibility. If planners, financiers, and cohousing communities can remove these barriers, then cohousing can bolster efforts in urban sustainability.

Around 750 a.d., new settlements in Chaco Canyon in the Southwest United States began moving toward intensified urban form, monumental architecture, and increased hierarchical social organization that bordered on nation-state authority. But around 1140 a.d., the relatively concentrated populations in Chaco Canyon dispersed over just a few generations. At new destinations emigrants from the canyon did not reinstate the urban intensities and political hierarchies that had dominated there. Four lessons from this history can be drawn. First, the model of social and political coordination that best fits the history of Chaco Canyon is one of escalating and deescalating gift-giving. Models that instead appeal to purely transactional relations, such as contracts, are historically and philosophically inadequate. Second, and more broadly, the real power of any well-functioning, complex, and urbanized society must be a reserve of generalized social trust. This was true then, and remains true today. Third, while environmental pressures play important roles in the formation of foundational urban settlements such as those in Chaco Canyon, we should be careful not to explain too much by them. As then, our own environmental challenges call upon us to nurture political arrangements, especially in our cities, that can address environmental constraints and challenges. Except perhaps when circumstances become impossibly dire, we should treat environmental constraints as the boundaries into which we must fit ourselves through political means. Finally, philosophers should investigate developments in historical urban settlements. Such cases are indispensable for understanding human cooperation, forms of social authority, and environmental decision making.

Portland, Oregon enjoys a growing reputation as a beacon of urban sustainability. Its modern planning history has seen effectve efforts to curb urban sprawl and introduce a comprehensive mass transit system. More recently, the city has also become a hub for a “makers” movement involving a plethora of local, small-scale craft production. Within this context, Portland is also home to a thriving urban agriculture scene, featuring community gardens, community-assisted agriculture, farmers’ markets, food co-ops, and various farm-based education and outreach programs. While recent case studies of Portland insist that the social sustainability case made for urban agriculture (UA) remains open, this position is arguably unwarranted and lacks an adequate grasp of the critical urban geography perspective developed in the work of David Harvey and Neil Smith. Following the lead of what Chiara Tornaghi calls “the critical geography of urban agriculture,” Portland’s urban agriculture should, on the whole, be seen as an adjunct to rather than a resistance movement against advanced neo­liberal urban governance.

The perception of modern environmental ethics in China has been greatly influenced by two factors: scholarship of environmental ethics in Europe and the United States on the one hand, and ideological resources from traditional Chinese culture on the other. In practice, while Chinese governmental agencies, enterprises, and social organizations are paying more and more attention to the perspective of environmental ethics in technology assessment and social governance, they are still faced with the challenge of a large number of realistic problems. Behind these intellectual features, there is the potential impact of cultural back­grounds, including traditional views of nature, epistemology, methodology, and axiology in China. Modern environmental ethics in China is growing into a kind of environmental ethics with the characteristics of the philosophy of organism, which can meet the requirements of sustainable development and responsible innovation, so that it may play its unique role in the era of globalization.

There is a problematic dichotomy of nature/power in Western ecological politics. In this article, we try to argue for a new type of ecological politics, based on Chinese Taoism, especially the idea of Zhuangzi, that can integrate humanity, nature, and power. Zhuangzi’s idea of “play with nature” constitutes a new kind of play-style view of nature. This view not only emphasizes the freedom and pleasure in everyday human practices with nature, but also proposes a way to deconstruct the rigid authority, symbolism, and ideology surrounding these practices. It thereby opens up an ecological politics with a play-style position, which can break down the mind’s fixations that are disciplined by power, of encountering situations as they emerge, and living with nature in a sincere and joyful manner.

This article discusses a Confucian notion of cosmological life and its eco-philosophical implication. In contrast to the Kantian notion of the man who has exclusive moral worth, existing as the ultimate value-conferrer among beings, Confucian cosmological man understands his/her selfness through the lens of sacred unity with other beings. The modern ecological disaster is arguably caused by the reluctance to recognize the inherent value of nature, which is due to the anthropocentrism partly introduced by the enlightenment notion of humanity. The Confucian cosmological person worships the ultimate value of the cosmos as a unity of heaven, humans, and earth, and in so doing delivers genuine care for the environment, not for the sake of its instrumental but for its inherent value.