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241.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Justin E. H. Smith
Leibniz and the Natural World:
Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy
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242.
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The Leibniz Review:
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Michael J. Seidler
The Gift of Science:
Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition
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243.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Roger Berkowitz
Reply to Michael Seidler
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244.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Michael J. Murray
Leibniz and His Correspondents
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245.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
François Duchesneau
La Monadologie de Leibniz:
Genèse et contexte
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246.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Brandon C. Look
Leibniz:
Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics, 1666-1686
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247.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Andreas Blank
Reply to Brandon Look
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248.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Donald Rutherford
The Science of the Individual:
Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual Substance
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249.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Stefano Di Bella
Reply to Donald Rutherford
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250.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Jérémie Griard
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe
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251.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Patrick Riley
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe
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252.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Philip Beeley
Leibniz’s Final System:
Monads, Matter and Animals
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253.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Glenn A. Hartz
Reply to Philip Beeley
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254.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Andreas Blank
Leibniz on Justice as a Common Concept:
A Rejoinder to Patrick Riley
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255.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
16
Herbert Breger
News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
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256.
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The Leibniz Review:
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16
Recent Works on Leibniz
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257.
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The Leibniz Review:
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Acknowledgments, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
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articles |
258.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
15
Paul Lodge
Garber’s Interpretations of Leibniz on Corporeal Substance in the ‘Middle Years’
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In 1985 Daniel Garber published his highly intluential paper “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years”. In two recent articles, Garber returns to these issues with a new position - that we should perhaps conclude that Leibniz did not have a view concerning the ultimate ontology of substance during his middle years. I discuss the viability of this position and consider some more general methodological issues that arise from this discussion.
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259.
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The Leibniz Review:
Volume >
15
Brandon C. Look
Leibniz and the Shelf of Essence
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This paper addresses D. C. Williams’s question, “How can Leibniz know that he is a member of the actual world and not merely a possible monad on the shelf of essence?” A variety of answers are considered. Ultimately, it is argued that no particular perception of a state of affairs in the world can warrant knowledge of one’s actuality, nor can the awareness of any property within oneself; rather, it is the nature of experience itself, with the flow of perceptions, that guarantees our actuality. A consequence of this view is that no non-actual individuals can truly be said to experience their worlds, nor can they ask the question if they are actual or not.
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260.
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The Leibniz Review:
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15
Ohad Nachtomy
Leibniz on the Greatest Number and the Greatest Being
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In notes from 1675-76 Leibniz is using the notion of an infinite number as an illustration of an impossible notion. In the same notes, he is also using this notion in contrast to the possibility of the ‘Ens perfectissumum’ (A.6.3 572; Pk 91; A.6.3 325). I suggest that Leibniz’s concern about the possibility of the notion of ‘the greatest or the most perfect being’ is partly motivated by his observation that similar notions, such as ‘the greatest number’, are impossible. This leads to the question how Leibniz convinced himself that the notion of the greatest number is self-contradictory and that of the greatest being is not. I consider two suggestions, one that stress the difference between beings and numbers and one that stress the difference between two notions of infinity, and conclude that neither of them provides a satisfactory solution to this question.
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